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Abstract: 
Toward a National Foreign Policy: Russia and the Middle East, 1991-1996 
The basic aim of this thesis is to analyse the transformation of Russia's foreign policy from 
1991 to 1996, using the Middle East as a case example of the changing perceptions and 
strategy of Moscow. 
Chapter one serves as an introduction while the final chapter, nine, is the conclusion. Chapters 
two and three are concerned with Soviet foreign policy from 1945 to 1991. Their main 
purpose is to provide a background to the relations between Russia and the Middle Eastern 
countries chosen for the thesis, but as importantly, to serve as a comparison with the post- 
Soviet period. 
Consequent chapters look at relations between Russia and the key countries of the region: ch. 5, 
Russia and Israel; ch. 6, Russia's relations with Israel's neighbours (excluding Egypt); ch. 7, 
Russia's relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia; ch. 8 Russia's relations with Turkey and Iran. 
Chapter four provides a broad look at the transformation and debates regarding foreign policy 
under Yeltsin from 1991 to 1996. This chapter highlights the various phases in Russia's 
foreign policy outlook, which began as ideologically pro-Western in 1991 and settled into a 
pragmatic, national policy by 1996. I hope to show that this centrist position was not 
ideologically opposed to the West, but it sought much greater emphasis upon national interest. 
This, I argue, is a stable and rational policy for a world power to adopt. 
The Middle East is an area of high priority for Russia in which interests often do not coincide 
with those of theUnited States. By looking at the examples of the various countries, I hope to 
show how Moscow has sought to reconcile the relations established as a result of Gorbachev's 
New Thinking with upholding its traditional interests and geo-strategic concerns. 
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Chapter I: Introduction: The Making of a National Foreign Policy 
Between 1991 and 1996, Russian foreign policy was in a state of constant change. 
Looking back at this period, there appeared to be a logical development of ideas and 
action. It began with the dreams of a new Russia in a new world order where 
democracy, human rights, free enterprise, co-operation and international law reigned 
supreme. The new elite in Russia looked to the West as a symbol of hope and 
salvation. Although Mikhail Gorbachev opened the chapter of co-operation with the 
West, which brought an end to the Cold War, it was the lowering of the Red Flag 
over the Kremlin which symbolised the last breath of the once mighty Soviet giant. 
The psychological reaction appeared to be a sense of anger and bitterness at the past. 
Those who glorified it were characterised as eccentrics or die-hard extremists. In 
1992 and 1993, President Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
represented the Russia of the future, while those who opposed them were seen as 
wanting to revive the Communist tyranny which ruled over them for more than 70 
years. 
In those early years, those who looked to the future of Russia as being a modern state 
which saw its fate as being closely linked to the West were generally referred to as 
Atlanticists. Their opponents were known as Eurasianists, partly because of the 
strong emphasis many members of this group placed on geo-strategic factors. Francis 
Fukuyama was among the many Western academics who defended Atlanticism and 
criticised the Eurasianists. He looked back to the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire and the founding of the modern Turkish state as an example of the way a 
power learns to accept its limitations as a result of internal and external factors. ' The 
fluidity of the concept of national interests forms the founding basis of his argument. 
Thus, from that standpoint, Fukuyama argued that Soviet `national interests' were not 
applicable to a new democratic Russia, which must devise a new foreign policy 
concept based on its allegiance to the democratic West. 
Sergei Stankevich represented the view of a growing number of Russian academics, 
who were not necessarily pro-Soviet, but who maintained that certain unchanging 
realities existed within the sphere of international relations. 2 Writing in response to 
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Fukuyama's argument, Stankevich argued that even his Turkish example did not 
suffice because the once great Ottoman power continued to play a role well outside 
its national borders, whether it was the Balkans, Cyprus, the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and as far as Central Asia. This was not, he argued, a modern democratic 
national state but a regional power with neo-imperialist ambitions. Russia was a 
power on a far larger scale, and for Stankevich and other Eurasianists, it would have 
been naive to expect it to retreat into its shell and ignore the turbulent events around 
its borders, particularly in the former Soviet republics. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry, under Kozyrev, made a distinct policy change between 
1992 and 1993, toning down its pro-Westernism and adopting policies in the CIS 
which were more harmonious to those being espoused by the Eurasianists. It was 
with increasing frequency that Kozyrev and other top government officials began to 
refer to Russia as a `great power. ' This in itself was a move away from the New 
Thinking of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the first year under Kozyrev, 
in which it was tacitly admitted that the internal problems of the country were so great 
that it was rendered helpless in international affairs. Shevardnadze lamented, in his 
autobiography, the discrepancy between Soviet `power' in the world as a leading arms 
seller, and the `third world' state of many of its citizens. ' 
The development of Moscow's foreign policy resulted in making the `Atlanticist- 
Eurasianist' divisions insufficient for explaining the dynamics of change. From 1992 
Russia involved itself in regional affairs. First, it was in the post-Soviet space: the 
wars in Georgia, the Azerbaijani-Armenian war, the war in Tajikistan, a dispute with 
Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet and other territorial and ethnic issues, the Baltic 
states and Kazakhstan over ethnic Russians living there. Kozyrev, a staunch pro- 
Westerner, himself appeared to be convinced that it was up to Russia to ensure 
regional stability because nobody else could. The Chechen war added to the belief 
that if regional conflicts were not controlled, then the tide of chaos could spread 
inside Russia's own borders. Andranik Migranian, an advisor to President Yeltsin, 
took this argument further to note that if Russia did not act firmly to promote its 
interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Iran and Turkey were two regional powers 
which would be able to step into Russia's shoes. 4 In the same way the Monroe 
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Doctrine outlined the rest of the American continent as a U. S. sphere of influence, the 
territories of the CIS were similarly viewed as an area for Russian domination. 
Kozyrev, while abandoning the idealism of the radical pro-Westerners, did not convert 
to the neo-imperialist or neo-communist viewpoint. He remained a pro-Westerner, 
but there was an added pragmatism to his policies. Meanwhile, a large body of media 
in the West was being discredited for failing to distinguish between those who were 
hostile to the West in principle, such as Vladimir Zhirinovskii's extreme nationalist 
Liberal Democratic Party, and pragmatic nationalists, who were suspicious of the 
West but did not believe a more assertive Russia would necessarily lead to conflict 
with it. Gennadii Ziuganov and Gen. Aleksandr Lebed were two leading contenders 
in the 1996 presidential elections who were best categorised as pragmatic nationalists. 
Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Margot Light and Roy Allison all agreed that there was a 
basic left-right-centre division, based on the democratic reformers, neo-communist 
and centrist outlooks. 5 Others argued that the flux and mutability of Russian internal 
affairs made it impossible to create a lasting and useful categorisation of foreign 
policy debates in Russia. However, in this thesis, it is argued that the foreign policy 
options for Moscow were best contained in five groups: radical pro-Westerners, 
pragmatic pro-Westerners, centrist-nationalists, pragmatic nationalists and extreme 
nationalists. Chapter IV, on the debates and policies in the first five years under 
Yeltsin, focuses on these arguments in the light of relations with the Middle East. 
With the birth of a foreign policy within a `national' framework, it became more 
fashionable in Russia to attempt to define the meaning of national interest. One article 
in Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (1996)6 noted that the concept 
of national interests was new to Russia. In Tsarist times there was an imperial foreign 
policy, while under Communism it was, in theory at least, underpinned by 
internationalism. Certainly, Stalin introduced `socialism in one country', but this was 
a workers' state and the national divisions within the Soviet Union were not taken 
into account. The very word `natsional'nyi' in Russian implied ethnic nationality - 
whether Jew or Kazakh or Chechen and so on. Thus national interest, since 1991, 
had to mean not only the interests of Russians within the Russian Federation, but to 
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all the `nationalities' within it. A new problem was created after 1991, when it was 
noted that many Russians lived in neighbouring countries, such as Kazakhstan, the 
Ukraine and Estonia. It was asked, not without reason, "what about their interests? " 
President Boris Yeltsin immediately affirmed his "duty" towards the 25 million 
Russians outside the Republics: "But understand me that it is impossible to defend 
people with tanks. After that their lives would be more complicated. It is necessary 
to put our relations with those republics on a juridical foundation, one of international 
rights, which we are presently doing. "7 This issue remained unresolved by the end of 
1996, though Moscow insisted that if they were harmed or threatened, then it would 
be forced to take action to protect them. 8 
Soviet interests and the Middle East: competition and co-existence 
The West and China posed the most serious direct military threat to the USSR and in 
this sense at least the Middle East was a minor factor. But the Middle East was a key 
battleground on which the superpowers played their Cold War game ever since the 
British and French began evacuating the region in the 1950s. This thesis places a high 
degree of importance on history because without it there would be no reference point 
from which to compare, contrast or chart the course of Russia's Middle East policy. 
The Middle East, in this context refers to Turkey, Iran, the Arab Gulf states, Israel 
and its neighbours. The omission from this work of Oman, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, 
Qatar and Yemen (North and South in the Soviet era) is partly due to practical 
factors; looking at a country such as Qatar, for example, would take up too much 
space for the sake of making a minor point. On the whole, Saudi policy dictated the 
general thrust of the policies of its fellow Gulf Co-operation member-states, although 
since the dissolution of the USSR there were more visible signs of intra-state 
differences. Relations with the Yemens, particularly South Yemen, were very close 
during the Cold War. However, they were regarded as being on the periphery of the 
Middle East. From the Soviet viewpoint, they did not relate to the three key features 
which were of interest to Moscow: The Arab-Israeli conflict, U. S. -Soviet rivalry for 
influence and control in the Gulf and relations with the bordering states of Iran and 
Turkey. These three aspects shape the most important framework for conducting this 
research, regarding Russian foreign policy and the Middle East. Until the early 1970s 
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Egypt formed the cornerstone of Soviet policy in the region by enabling it to rival the 
United States. Yet once President Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel and 
made his country a U. S. ally, Moscow chose to ignore it. As Egypt did not fit into 
the three areas of concern listed above, it has been omitted from the post-Soviet 
period of research. 
Stalin's secretive nature superimposed itself on the Soviet system and this did not 
exclude foreign-policy making. This ambivalence during the cold war era fuelled the 
Western political and academic debate between left and right, with both sides deftly 
using the vagueness from the Kremlin to put forward their own interpretations. 
Although the divisions were far more complex than that of `pro-establishment' and 
`anti-establishment' academics in the West, there was in broad terms a basic conflict 
in attitude regarding Moscow's intentions. On the one hand there were those, mainly 
in the United States, who argued that the USSR was an aggressive, expansionist `evil 
empire' (to quote President Ronald Reagan) seeking to destabilise the world order for 
the purpose of extending its own influence. This was countered, on the other hand, 
by the view that Moscow was generally a `cautious bear', to borrow the term used by 
Efraim Karsh. 9 According to this argument, the Soviet Union possessed all the means 
(including military ones) of a superpower, yet deliberately avoided any actions which 
could have forced it to use them in a direct clash with its chief adversary, the United 
States. To elaborate on Karsh's metaphor, the Russian bear did not hesitate to extend 
its claws when it was necessary to defend itself but it was careful not to use them lest 
it lead to a life-threatening confrontation. 
It was widely agreed, as Robert 0. Freedman pointed out in Moscow and the Middle 
East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan, both superpowers, and the 
leaderships in the capitals of the Middle East were all locked in the two-camp 
mentality which was set by President Harry Truman and J. F. Dulles on the one hand 
and Joseph Stalin and Viacheslav Molotov on the other. 1° Khrushchev continued to 
believe in the epic battle between capitalism and communism, but his policies were 
based on existing realities at the time, which included the need to divert the Cold War 
from direct confrontation to the Third World. Alexei Vassiliev, in Russian Policy in 
the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism, supported the view that 
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Khrushchev's reign provided the basis to Soviet foreign policy until 1985: "After the 
fall of Nikita Khrushchev, there was no change in Soviet policies in the Middle East 
region. "11 George W. Breslauer, in his editorial role in Soviet Strategy in the Middle 
East, was in agreement with Vassiliev about Soviet intentions, which "sought to 
protect a radical new ally by pushing for Arab unity and Egyptian mobilisation as a 
means of deterring U. S. or Israeli intervention, while simultaneously seeking to avoid 
escalation into a full-scale war. "12 According to Vassiliev: "As far as the Soviet 
Union supported the Arab confrontation with the West (though without pushing 
things to the point where it might itself have become involved in a conflict)... Soviet 
policy had clear-cut parameters and was rather fruitful. "" 
In the following chapter, describing Soviet-Middle East relations from 1945-1985, 
important documents are presented which outline top-level meetings between the 
Egyptian and Soviet leaderships before the former suddenly announced it would 
break-off all relations with the latter. The Egyptian minutes of the meetings in 
October 1971 and April 1972, which were classified and remain unpublished but to 
which I was given access, detailed the growing suspicions between the two sides. 
Cairo feared that Moscow wanted to maintain a balance of power in the region by 
preventing an Arab victory over Israel which might have resulted in direct U. S. 
intervention to defend the Jewish state. The Russian leadership suspected that Sadat 
was secretly negotiating with Washington in order to get the best deal available for 
Egypt. As it turned out, both sets of suspicions were founded on a firm measure of 
reality. 
For similar reasons, during the 1970s and 1980s there was growing friction between 
Syria and the USSR, as highlighted by Dennis Ross, in "Soviet Behaviour toward the 
Lebanon War 1982-1984, " (chapter four of Breslauer's book). Moscow had failed to 
dissuade Syria from invading Lebanon (fighting against the Palestine Liberation Army 
and other leftist forces in Lebanon), and to persuade Asad to co-operate with long 
time rival Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The Soviet Union was also pressurising Syria to 
take part in peace negotiations which would raise Moscow's profile in the region. In 
other words, Moscow's chief objective was to become "a recognised arbiter of events 
in the area. i14 With regard to the Iran-Iraq war, Moscow also found it a strain to 
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maintain a key ally (Iraq), which was in many ways uncontrollable, partly because of 
Iraq's ability to buy arms with petro-dollars. Russia found it equally difficult to win 
over a strategically much more useful potential ally - Iran. In another chapter, Ross 
and James Clay Moltz in "The Soviet Union and the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, " 
argued that "what the Iran-Iraq war highlights most of all are the sheer limits of 
Soviet influence in the region. i15 
The most popular explanation for Soviet retreat from international affairs, including 
the Middle East, was economic disintegration at home blamed largely on the 
stagnation during the Brezhnev era. Gorbachev 's `New Thinking' and Third World 
Conflicts, edited by Jiri Valenta and Frank Cibulka studied Soviet foreign policy 
reforms from that premise. The chapter by Vernon Aspaturian, "Gorbachev's `new 
political thinking' and foreign policy" argued that Moscow's global expansionism and 
adventures led to the downfall of the system: "The most serious and crippling price 
that the Soviet Union has paid for its immense military growth and globalist ambitions 
was the disorientation, dislocation, and deformation of the Soviet economy, which 
entered into a period of stagnation and decline. " 16 
This point was repeated in Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition, edited by Roger 
Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamara J. Resler. Under Gorbachev, wrote Kanet 
and Garth Katner, "the Soviet leadership recognised its basic inability to mould the 
international environment to meet its own objectives, " blaming the cause on domestic 
shortcomings. So while some observers such as Aspaturian argued that international 
demands sucked out resources from the Soviet system, Kanet and Katner pointed out 
that dwindling resources from within weakened Moscow's international standing: 
"The primary objectives of Gorbachev's campaign of perestroika and glasnost were 
based on the recognition that the position of the USSR in the world depended upon a 
dramatic improvement in the functioning of the Soviet economy. "" Gorbachev's 
New Thinking totally rejected the role of ideology in foreign policy-making; conflict 
was to be replaced with harmony and the hand of friendship was extended to all 
willing to share Moscow's new vision. The courting of Israel was among the most 
notable consequences of New Thinking. Robert Freedman's Soviet Policy Toward 
Israel Under Gorbachev argued that this began in 1987. As well as rebuffing Asad, 
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Gorbachev also told PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in 1988 that "Israel's interests had 
to be considered in any peace settlement. " 8 Considering that Moscow had severed 
all ties with Israel in 1967, and the Jewish state's existence was a key card in Arab 
opposition, such remarks portrayed a clear reversal in perspective. 
The largest test for Gorbachev's new strategy in a crisis situation in the Middle East 
was the Gulf war. The Soviet position against the old ally Iraq and with the old 
enemy the United States raised an important question for Gad Barzilai in his book, 
The Gulf Crisis and its Global Aftermath: "Have economics, interdependence and 
functional co-operation really come to supersede geopolitical preoccupations like 
national identity, territory and security which traditionally have ranked at the top of 
international concerns? "19 From that premise, it thus raised the suggestion that 
Gorbachev had replaced one ideologically internationalist outlook -communism- with 
another vision of humanitarian harmony: This may have had universally noble 
intentions but it failed to recognise `primitive' and traditional national interests and 
security problems. Under Yelstin, the discrediting of Gorbachev's idealism was in 
part used by the anti-Westernisers to make their point that the realities of the present 
did not permit illusions of a new world which did not exist. 
Russia and the Middle East: setting the parameters 
The general aim of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of Russian policy 
toward the Middle East in the period 1991-1996. Chapters II and III provide a 
historical setting for the thesis: the period 1945-1985 will show that despite intense 
efforts, Soviet policy was confronted with serious limitations which brought about the 
radical policies introduced by Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze. In Chapter IV, 
an examination of the political and academic debates revolving around Russia's policy 
will show that the ideals of New Thinking and the radical pro-Westernism met their 
own limitations, forcing Moscow to face existing realities in international politics. 
Yeltsin himself announced the need for his country to reassert itself on the world 
stage: "It is now particularly important to draw a distinction between partnership 
(with the West) and attempts to dominate or to foist on us their own actions which 
run counter to Russia's interests. It [domination] is unacceptable to Russia. i20 
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However, this `realisation' by Moscow that a new policy was necessary relates to the 
more specific aims of this thesis: to refute arguments that Russia would have, out of 
some kind of nostalgia for the Cold War, resorted to the competitiveness of the past 
and that out of disappointment with the West Moscow's elite (and public opinion) 
would have sheltered in its `Eastern' or Eurasian roots. In both cases, using the 
Middle East as an example, the evidence proved insufficient to make them credible. 
The suggestion regarding the Eurasianist outlook of Russia proved to be particularly 
erroneous because it was unrealistic for a country with such unique features in such 
unusual circumstances to place itself in any single `box'. From this standpoint, this 
thesis aims to take the argument further and show that Russia was seeking to 
formulate a new policy from a pragmatic `national' perspective, which very often 
collided with past prejudices and accepted norms. As one Russian view contended: " 
`We are abandoning old friends, ' charge the critics of this approach, but those now 
responsible for Russian foreign policy reply: `We are becoming a civilised state, and 
are respecting international law in action and not only in words. ' New standards and 
new behaviour brings new friends; the old friends remain friends, as long as close 
involvement with them does not contradict the new values. "21 The study of Russia's 
policies with the key countries of the Middle East in the first five year period fits 
neatly with this comment. 
Up until 1994, it was widely suggested in Russia and the West that there was 
confusion in Moscow about who was in charge of foreign-policy making. RFE/RL 
Research Report published in February an article by Jan Adams titled, "Who will 
make Russia's Foreign Policy in 1994? " She stated categorically that the new 
constitution gave the decision-making powers to the president and took it away from 
parliament, which was dominated by opponents of the radical and pragmatic pro- 
Westerners. The nomination of Primakov as Foreign Minister on 9 January 1996 
added strength to the central decision-making bodies of Russia and made it easier for 
the new balanced and centrist-nationalist policy to be implemented. 
The Western media generally misunderstood this shift in policy. Moscow's 
developing policy towards one guided by national interests was perhaps seen as being 
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too dull to sell newspapers. Instead, it was implied that Yeltsin was conceding 
ground to the extreme nationalists (Zhirinovskii was given much more public attention 
than his real political influence) and that Russia was heading towards a new 
confrontation with the West. The nomination of Primakov was seen as another step 
in this direction, as one headline in The Guardian asserted: "Russia selects trouble- 
maker. "ir. The developing Russian policy was best reflected in the increasing 
attention that was being redirected towards the Middle East. Yeltsin's special envoy 
to the region, Viktor Posuvaliuk, who later became Deputy Foreign Minister, stressed 
in an interview that "Russia, as a great power, has two key roles with regard to the 
Middle East. Firstly, it is a close neighbour, a major power with very broad interests, 
economic, political, spiritual, religious and of course military. Second, is co- 
sponsorship of the peace talks. "23 This point was backed up by former Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev who said "Russia has serious and long term interest 
in the Near East. i24 
In the context of the peace process, Russia did not want to steal the U. S. thunder (and 
it could not even if it wanted to), but simply re-emphasised that as co-sponsor it could 
play a positive role. Relations with Israel (Chapter V) took on a particularly 
significant feature because it enhanced Moscow's position as an `honest broker'. 
Russia's open criticisms of Israel after 1993, which became more direct in 1996, did 
not mean that the leadership was returning to the anti-Israeli anti-Jewish traditions of 
the Soviet era. The criticisms were simply a consequence of the view in Moscow that 
certain actions, such as the bombing of civilian targets in Lebanon, the building of 
settlements on disputed territories while negotiations with the Palestinians were taking 
place, or the refusal to discuss the status of Jerusalem, were not conducive to peace in 
the region. This was not a radical view, but one that was actually very similar to the 
policies of most European capitals. It was Washington's staunch support for Israel 
which was out of line with the international community. Russia was arguably taking 
a moderate line. 
Moscow's insistence that sanctions against Iraq (Chapter VII) be eased was similarly 
misunderstood. While Russia had economic interests there worth at least $20 billion, 
the Kremlin acted according to all UN measures and in full co-operation with the 
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United States. However, it was increasingly being argued by the political leadership 
that it had a right to declare its interests in the region and to promote its view that 
sanctions against Iraq should be gradually eased in accordance with Baghdad's full 
co-operation. Kozyrev's attendance in Baghdad of Iraq's recognition of Kuwaiti 
borders in November 1994 (achieved for the first time ) was presented as a shining 
example that Moscow could play a positive role in the Gulf. 
Likewise with Iran, the dispute over Russia's participation of the building of a nuclear 
reactor was perceived as a diversion from the facts, and suggestions that Tehran's 
ambition to become a nuclear power was being aided by Moscow was flatly rejected. 
Moscow's argument that it was not in Russia's interest to have close to its borders an 
unstable government with nuclear weapons was totally reasonable. However, the 
leadership in Moscow stressed the need to co-operate with Iran because it was a 
regional power which carried influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Gulf; 
three key areas for Moscow's national interests. For similar reasons Turkey was 
given high priority and relations with the two countries will be looked at in greater 
detail in Chapter VIII. The economic potential in the Middle East from countries 
such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Chapter VII) in particular was too great 
to be ignored. Since 1993, the `great power' claim that was becoming more widely 
heard in Russia, was natural; as a new nation-state with considerable international 
standing, it needed to regain the prestige lost in the twilight years of the Soviet era 
and to build a new basis for national pride. Such sentiments were acceptable for 
Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the United States and others to have, and did not 
mean that these countries were belligerent towards others. Moscow was requesting 
its rightful place as a `great power' in the Middle East. 
Russian and Arab journals were highly valuable for the writing of this research. 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, Segodnia, Moskovskie novosti were but a few newspapers 
which included regular coverage of Russian policies towards the Middle East. Pravda 
was interesting in that it provided the view of the opposition, stubbornly clinging on 
to old ideas. From the Arab press, AI Hayat was best for its neutrality (most Arab 
newspapers were directly affiliated to their Party or government). Al-Hayat also 
included fairly extensive articles by Viktor Posuvaliuk, Deputy Foreign Minister, who 
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used the opportunity to encourage more trade between Russia and Saudi Arabia (Al- 
Hayat was a Saudi-funded paper), as well as from other leading officials from the 
Russian Foreign Ministry. Other journals, such as Mezhdiunarodnaia zhizn' were 
useful in having the finger on the pulse of Moscow's foreign policy outlook. The 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Journal, published in London, 
regularly included relevant articles from authoritative sources. In 1993, it published a 
presentation by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the institute which included 
interesting observations regarding the end of the Cold War. 25 Its relevance to the 
Middle East, he added, was that "no Arab leader, be he Saddam Hussein - and he 
learnt the hard way - President Assad or Qadhafi, can rely anymore on the Soviet 
umbrella under which he has sheltered for 31 years. "26 
In addition to contemporary written sources, direct meetings and interviews with 
individuals closely connected to the subject further enhanced the research basis of this 
thesis work. Following a field trip to Moscow in October 1996, meetings with several 
academics and journalists added to the `insider' dimension. Furthermore, it was 
possible to meet with officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most 
notably Sergei Kepechenko, who was Deputy Director of the Middle East Desk. The 
long discussion with Professor Vitalii Naumkin, Deputy Director of the Institute of 
Oriental Studies, was positively enriching for this work. From the Arab side, meeting 
the President of the Palestine National Authority was a particularly productive 
experience. Yasser Arafat was keen to reiterate the close relations which continued 
to exist with the elite in Moscow, particularly Evgenii Primakov. Abdel Magid Farid 
and Ahmad Ashraf Marwan, senior figures in Cairo during the final years under 
President Nasser and early years under Sadat provided an insight into Soviet-Egyptian 
relations at the time and their ultimate breakdown. Saudi Ambassador Mohyaldin 
Khoja and Lebanese Ambassador Mohamad Hamoud both were present in Moscow 
during the crucial phase of transition, and their co-operation for this research enabled 
a better understanding of the last years under Gorbachev and early years under 
Yeltsin. 
The approach of this thesis, in the context of the two choices presented by Celeste A. 
Wallander, opts for the "description and documentation of Russian policy, " and 
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avoids the "explicitly and self-consciously theoretical. "27 The conclusions of the 
author, who professed a theoretical emphasis, was that "on the whole Russian foreign 
policy has become more assertive and confrontational. 5528 By contrast, my thesis 
hopes to show that there exists a difference between defending national interests and 
adopting behaviour which is `confrontational. ' There was little proof that between 
1991 and 1996 Russian policy in the Middle East was characterised by the latter. 
Mark Webber reflected on the relevance of the theoretical schism between the schools 
of Neo-realism and Pluralism/Interdependence on post-Soviet Russia: "Is it a state 
which seeks to maximise and assert its power ä la realism -a course likely to bring it 
into competition with its erstwhile adversary the US and its new neighbours in the 
USSR? Or is it a state, now freed of communist ideology, more willing to co-operate 
with the states of the West, with international organisations and with the other 
successor states? "29 Neorealism, which focuses on the international system rather 
than internal factors30, fits in with the proposal of this thesis and the view of Primakov 
that multipolarism was the most likely outcome to emerge from the rubble of the 
bipolarism of the Cold War. However, its leading proponents argued with pessimism 
that this trend leads to a "more complicated, more uncertain, and ultimately more 
dangerous"31 world. This thesis shares the optimism of the pluralist school that the 
growing role for international institutions and co-operation between the great power 
centres, a policy of balancing various interests which was repeatedly espoused by 
Primakov, means a more stable international climate. Russia's behaviour in the 
Middle East between 1991 and 1996, as this thesis shows, was generally responsible 
and rational, giving greater hope for the new millennium. 
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Chapter H: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1945-1985: 
Opportunities and Limitations. 
It would be impossible to understand Russia's relations with the Middle East 
countries without a broader look at Soviet policies towards the region from 1945 
to 1985. This forty-year period witnessed the entrenchment of Soviet interests in 
the Middle East, but it was also accompanied by thwarted expectations and the 
realisation by Moscow that in many cases the price was too high to make a deeper 
commitment. The split with Egypt in the early 1970s typified the suspicions which 
both sides harboured. The conclusions drawn from such experiences were to play 
a noticeable part in the formulation of Russian policy in the Middle East. 
There were three distinct phases of Soviet policy towards the Middle East between 
1945 and 1985: first, between 1945-1955 when Europe and the United States 
were the overwhelming preoccupation of the Kremlin. Secondly, between 1955- 
1967, when Soviet interests in the Middle East reached their peak in terms of 
success and priorities. Finally, 1967-1985, when there was a more calculated 
approach that was balanced between aggressive pursuit of low-risk opportunities 
and cautious manoeuvring in high risk or complicated situations. These time spans 
were compatible with the three dominant leaderships between 1945 and 1985; 
those of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Undoubtedly, certain policies, or key 
aspects of policies, often overlapped as failures and successes passed on from one 
leadership to another. For example, Khrushchev's idea of peaceful co-existence 
was basically left intact under Brezhnev because it was useful in diverting the 
superpower conflict to Third World countries where battles were fought with 
conventional arms through surrogate armies. Such conflicts, where the Middle 
East was a prime example, put the Soviet Union on a par with the United States 
and forced the two superpowers to negotiate, either publicly or secretly, in order to 
let the other side know what the limits of their involvement were. 
Over this forty-year time span, Moscow had invested heavily in military, economic 
and political terms in the Middle East, suggesting that the region was highly valued 
by Moscow's top foreign policy makers. But each leadership held its own distinct 
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perception of the region: Stalin showed little concern to the region as a whole 
though Turkey and Iran were regarded as a high priority because they bordered the 
Soviet Union. Khrushchev held a much broader vision which included all countries 
from the Maghreb to Iran as useful in terms of enhancing Soviet prestige and 
limiting U. S. influence. This new internationalist outlook also laid emphasis on 
international institutions such as the United Nations and others created by U. S. - 
Soviet summits and agreements. Brezhnev's policy was more restrained, dealing 
only with countries which were either highly reliable or highly strategic. Iraq and 
Iran, for example, were placed at the top of both categories. 
Stalin and the bi-polar world 
Stalin's immediate priority after the Second World War was to secure the borders 
of the Soviet Union, particularly to the west, and as has been fully documented, 
Europe was eventually divided by Churchill's symbolic 'iron curtain. ' Under Stalin, 
the Soviet Union had become a continental power in both Europe and Asia as its 
territories straddled both land masses. The Arabs were of little interest to the 
ageing dictator. But Turkey and Iran, by contrast, were of high geo-strategic 
value, particular as they bordered the Soviet Union. 
Turkey was of particular interest to Moscow and was the chief cause of centuries- 
old rivalries between the two powers. At the end of the Second World War Stalin 
pushed forth claims for territories from the Turks, including the Eastern Anatolian 
provinces of Kars and Ardahan, which were Russian-controlled until the civil war 
just after the revolution of 1917. But Stalin's more precious jewel was control 
over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits. The former would fortify entry 
into the Black Sea while the latter strait could be an outlet to the Mediterranean. 
Anti-Turkish propaganda was intensified and Soviet troops were amassed on the 
border with the former Ottoman Sultanate so that "by the spring of 1947 Ankara 
genuinely feared a Soviet invasion. "' But the Turks did not give in to their historic 
enemy to the north, partly due to strong U. S. backing against the Soviets. Stalin 
backed down and the troop concentration on the border was nothing more than a 
bluff. The consequence of the venture was to push the previously neutral Turkey 
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into the arms of the anti-Soviet camp. "The half-million Turkish army, that helped 
form NATO, brought the East-West confrontation directly to the USSR's southern 
border. "2 
Further east, Iran was seen as another potential buffer to the Soviet Union's 
southern border. Under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact Moscow demanded that 
Iran be in the Soviet sphere of influence. During the war, Soviet troops were 
stationed in northern Iran while British troops occupied the south in order to 
prevent the Persians from forming an alliance with the Germans. But an agreement 
requesting both powers to withdraw at the end of the war was ignored by 
Moscow, which actually strengthened its military position there in October 1945. 
Tehran's authority in Soviet occupied areas was transferred to the Red Army, 
under the guise of the creation of autonomous Azeri and Kurdish republics. ' But 
once again, U. S. pressure forced a Soviet retreat and created unnecessary hostility 
from Tehran. A compromise reached between the Iranian leadership and Moscow 
to establish a Soviet-Iranian oil company and incorporate communists into the 
government prior to Soviet withdrawal in May 1946, was annulled by Tehran in 
1947 when the Red Army had left. 
Beyond the southern border Moscow's activities in the Middle East were driven by 
the motive of expelling the British from the area, which led to its rapid recognition 
of the Jewish state of Israel. The Arab leaderships were viewed by Moscow as 
being too dependent on the British, as they consisted of the traditional Arab 
Hashemite monarchies south of Turkey, British installed Sheikhdoms in the 
Arabian peninsula, and King Faroukh in Egypt. But the Soviet Union under Stalin 
hastened to show vocal support for Arab struggles for independence from colonial 
rule, being the first power to support Syria in 1944. It also supported Egyptian 
demands for British troop withdrawal in 1947. In a speech by Andrei Gromyko to 
the United Nations Security Council in August 1947, the Soviet representative 
said: "The USSR understands and sympathises with these national aspirations on 
the part of Egypt and its people towards an independent existence on the basis of 
sovereign equality with other states and people. "4 These words were the seeds of 
a policy that was to be honed and systemised by Khrushchev in later years. 
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Stalin's recognition of Israel and support for it in the 1948-9 war by sending 
weapons via Czechoslovakia enraged Arab public opinion, but soon afterwards, 
Moscow cooled relations with Israel. Hence within the very short period of two 
years, between 1948 and 1950, Stalin's policies had successfully antagonised every 
single country in the Middle East, though in reality that could have hardly been the 
intention. In fact many were puzzled by Soviet policies in the region, particularly 
the reversal with regard to the creation of Israel. W. Z. Laqueur argued that the 
decision to recognise Israel may not have even been made at top level, but "by 
some Foreign Ministry advisers and approved by Stalin in a fit of 
absentmindedness. "' Such a scenario was dismissed by Avigdor Dagan. "What 
brought the Soviet Union to the support of the state of Israel were not Russian 
sympathies but Moscow's assessment that there was a coincidence of interests 
which the Soviets could use to foster their own aims. "6 There was no accident or 
sentiment in Moscow's foreign policy making but design, which foresaw the 
potential for conflict. He may have hoped that such conflicts could open new 
possibilities for the USSR, which at the time was completely excluded from the 
region. 
The West's response to Moscow's activities in the region led to the formation on 
11 November 1951 of the Middle East Command comprising the USA, UK, 
France and Turkey. This bloc was a precursor to the Baghdad Pact. When three 
months later Greece and Turkey joined NATO, Moscow feared that it was under 
siege.? But the United States found it difficult to foster a broader alliance against 
the Soviets. John Foster Dulles, U. S. Secretary of State, and Stalin's political 
arch-rival, actually held a very similar outlook of a world divided into two camps 
that were incompatible. Dulles toured the Middle East in May 1953 to co-ordinate 
anti-Soviet support. On 1 June, back in Washington, Dulles shared his 
conclusions: "A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an 
immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with 
their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to 
the menace of Soviet Communism... In general, the northern tier of nations shows 
awareness of the danger. "8 
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The Middle East Command was viewed by Moscow as a threat which extended the 
Cold War arena beyond Europe. The USSR's response on 24 November 1951 to 
the governments of the United States, France, Britain and Turkey on the issue of 
the Middle East Command was that such plans "are nothing other than an attempt 
to involve the countries of the Middle East in the military measures of the 
aggressive Atlantic bloc [Nato]. "9 The statement, probably dictated by Stalin, was 
prophetic in pointing out that the Middle East would become a local playground 
for the superpowers, where the game was war. 
Khrushchev broadens Moscow's horizons 
The power struggle that followed Stalin's death in 1953 was resolved by 1955, and 
this was reflected in changes to Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev's critics 
described him as poorly educated and unsophisticated, but he was undeniably 
ambitious and a visionary. His far-reaching domestic endeavours to reform 
agriculture, modernise industry and place his country at the forefront of space 
travel and research were matched by an equally enterprising plan for foreign policy. 
According to such a policy the Soviet Union would no longer be on the defensive 
as it was under Stalin when the perception was that the world was against the 
Soviet Union. Instead, Khrushchev's foreign policy sought to attack, seeking new 
areas as fertile ground for expanding Soviet influence, and this was amply provided 
in the newly liberated countries of Africa and Asia. It was thus logical that the 
problem of having Turkey and Iran as a barrier to Soviet expansion could be 
solved by hurdling over them straight into the heart of the Middle East. 
Khrushchev elevated his country from a continental superpower into a world 
super-power. He believed that the Soviet Union was ready to compete with the 
United States in every sphere and in every part of the world, but without a need for 
a direct military confrontation. These aspirations were ideologised by Khrushchev 
and new slogans were created: peaceful coexistence, peaceful co-operation, the 
non-capitalist path to development were but a few. Most countries in and around 
the Middle East tended to be home to U. S. military bases (Morocco, Libya, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), while British bases in Iraq, Libya, Egypt, 
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Sudan and Jordan underlined Western domination. Moreover, the Baghdad Pact, 
signed on 24 February 1955, grouped Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan under a 
British umbrella in an anti-Soviet alliance. Such "alliances had therefore to be 
undermined. "10 Khrushchev's reasoning was based on the Marxian assumption that 
"if the USSR was helping the Middle Eastern countries to win and then to 
consolidate their independence, it would accelerate the 'dying' of the capitalist 
West inasmuch as the West could not survive without sources of raw materials, 
without markets and without cheap labour. "11 Beyond ideological considerations, 
the Baghdad Pact also provided a large and menacing launching-ground from the 
USSR's soft underbelly. 
A . ready ally for the Soviet Union was Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, who 
vehemently opposed the Baghdad Pact because it directly challenged his pan- 
Arabist dream, and his ambition to realise it. Khrushchev recognised that it would 
be necessary to invest heavily in allies in the Middle East in order to find openings 
which would counter-balance U. S. inroads there. '2 In September 1955 a $250 
million Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal opened the door for a flood of Soviet 
supplies and investments. The 1955 deal included the supply of 100 MiG-15 
fighters, 45 11-28 jet bombers and 150 T-34 tanks as a core bulk of the deal. A 
new phase in Soviet involvement began in the Middle East, characterised by a high 
level of political, economic and military commitment. 
The Anglo-French conspiracy with Israel against Egypt over the Suez Canal in 
1956 was to draw the Soviet Union to the heart of Middle East politics. The 
Egyptian leader's announcement that he would nationalise the canal was met with a 
vitriolic response from London and Paris. Nasser's attempt to defuse the crisis by 
offering compensation to shareholders and to adhere to the 1888 Constantinople 
Convention on the freedom of navigation was rejected and Operation Musketeer 
was executed. On 30 October Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula while Britain and 
France demanded that both Israeli and Egyptian troops withdraw from the canal 
zone, as had already been agreed in the secret plan. On 31 October British and 
French jets attacked the canal zone as well as Cairo and Alexandria. The 
unsophisticated London-Paris conspiracy led to international outrage and it gave 
24 
the USSR the opportunity to castigate the 'imperialist ambitions' of Britain and 
France, and of course to move attention away from the Soviet tanks which had 
been sent into Hungary to crush a disobedient leadership. 
Nikolai Bulganin, Soviet Prime Minister under Khrushchev, wrote to U. S. 
President Eisenhower asking for a joint stand against the aggressors: "The Soviet 
Union and the United States of America bear a special responsibility for stopping 
the war and restoring peace and tranquillity in the area of the Near and Middle 
East. "13 These events marked the end of an era for Britain and France in the 
Middle East, and the beginning of a new one for the United States and the USSR. 
Whereas in 1955 Soviet support to Egypt passed indirectly through 
Czechoslovakia, Moscow could then play a direct role. Khrushchev routinised the 
Soviet view of Israel as a Western puppet, with the purpose of causing instability in 
the Arab world. Bulganin's message to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
during the Suez fiasco clearly highlighted this: 
"The government of Israel, acting as an instrument of outside imperialist forces, is continuing 
the reckless adventure, challenging all the peoples of the east who are fighting against 
colonialism for their freedom and independence ... 
fulfilling the will of others, acting on 
instructions from abroad, the Israeli government is criminally and irresponsibly playing with the 
fate of peace... It is sowing a hatred for the state of Israel among the peoples of the east such as 
cannot but make itself felt with regard to the future of Israel and which put in jeopardy the very 
existence of Israel as a state. "" 
As a measure of Soviet protests, the Ambassador was immediately recalled from 
Tel Aviv, though diplomatic relations at embassy level continued. A few weeks 
after the Suez War, on 18 November, Khrushchev said in a speech to fellow 
communists, "What is Israel? A country without any great importance in the world, 
whose only task is to play the role of provocateur before an aggression. If the 
Israelis did not feel that they had the support of the Great Powers, they would be 
sitting quietly like little boys. " 5 Such remarks reflected the growing affinity 
between Moscow and the Arabs, who began to view the Soviet Union in a more 
positive light. "The prestige which the Russians gained during the Suez crisis was 
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of great consequence... The USSR was now unambiguously acknowledged by the 
great majority of Arabs as their protector against Western imperialism. "" 
One of the side-effects of the British and French actions in Egypt was to further 
dent the moral and political justification of the Baghdad Pact amongst Arabs. 
Syria, which did not join, felt threatened by Iraq and Turkey, which were core 
countries in the Western-led alliance. Between September and October 1957 
Moscow interpreted Turkish mobilisation and exercises on the Syrian frontier as a 
prelude to a Turkish-American assault on Syria to prevent it from becoming 
communist. 17 Again, the Soviet Union stepped in to warn the West, and 
simultaneously economic and military deals were struck with Damascus. In less 
than two years from the first deal in Autumn 1955 Syria was estimated to have 
purchased more than £100 million worth of Eastern bloc weapons. 18 To further 
consolidate the bond in the face of more Turkish pressure, on 29 October 1957 
Syria and the Soviet Union signed an economic and technical agreement worth 
$579 million. '9 
In the following year, a revolution in Iraq disposed of the pro-Western monarchy 
and put into power the radical Abdul-Karim Kassim. In 1959 he withdrew Iraq 
from the Baghdad Pact, dealing another blow to Western influence. Though 
Moscow was not directly responsible for converting the three major centres of the 
Arab world (Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus) into friendly states that were hostile 
to the West, this apparently positive development began to create new problems 
for the leaders in the Kremlin. Iraq and Egypt were rivals since the beginning of 
civilisation itself. Later in history under the glory days of the Islamic empire 
which stretched from Spain to India, Baghdad and Cairo wrestled with each other 
to hold the seat of the Caliph; in other words, leadership. Nasser's aspirations to 
lead the Arab world were not looked upon with any sympathy by the military 
government in Baghdad. 
Moscow faced a dilemma. Egypt was a key ally, a point confirmed in January 
1958 when the Soviet Union provided Egypt with a $175 million loan, as well as 
$100 million for the building of the Aswan dam. 20 Arms shipments conti--to 
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flow and contacts between Nasser and Khrushchev were regular. But the Soviet 
Union did not encourage Arab unification because it weakened its hand and made - 
Nasser too strong. The Egyptian leader was above all else a nationalist. The UAR 
was used by Nasser to crush the communist parties of both Egypt and Syria, where 
they were gaining influence. By contrast, the Iraqi regime seemed to be influenced 
by communists and was generally more left-leaning than Nasser's government. In 
1959 the Soviet Union pledged $137 million towards Iraqi economic aid. 21 
The dilemma for Moscow eventually resolved itself. The union between Syria and 
Egypt collapsed in 1961, and the radical leadership in Iraq turned against the local 
communist party, whose support was. no longer needed after gaining power. 
Khrushchev was also encouraged by Nasser's centralisation and nationalisation of 
the economy. The Egyptian leader was forced to do this because of increasing 
economic difficulties, but Moscow regarded the measures as more evidence of 
conformity with the Socialist camp. Between 1955-1960 Egypt received over 
$500 million of military aid, making it the largest Third World recipient of Soviet 
aid at the time. Syria and Iraq received over $200 million in that same period. 
Khrushchev increased this aid so that between 1961-1964 Egypt received $700 
million worth of military aid. Iraq and Syria received $100 million each. 22 The 
Soviet Union had been transformed by Khrushchev into a major patron for the 
third world, and for none more so than the Middle East. Economic and military 
aid was also backed-up with diplomatic support at the United Nations and vis-ii-vis 
the United States, giving it prestige as a champion of the weak states against the 
stronger 'imperialist powers. ' 
Despite this, the last years of the Khrushchev era were marked by international 
developments that were to force an alteration of Soviet policy. The main event 
was the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Khrushchev had the sense to back down but 
the limits of Soviet power and the need for greater superpower co-ordination were 
clearly elucidated by the crisis. Also in 1962, the United States introduced the 
Polaris nuclear submarine (SSBM) into the Mediterranean Sea and later the 
Poseidon in the Indian Ocean which targeted Soviet cities. U. S. strategic 
advantage made Soviet Middle East successes appear less valuable than in the 
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middle to late fifties. President Kennedy could afford to be more choosy about 
friends and allies in the region: "By 1962 American intermediate range ballistic 
missiles (IRBM) were withdrawn from Turkey... Conventional military bases near 
an adversary's border became less valuable" with the development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and the SSBM's. 23 When the Shah of 
Iran told Moscow on 15 September 1962 "that it will not grant any foreign nation 
the right of possessing any kind of rocket bases on Iranian soil, "24 it may have 
appeared as an advantage gained by the Soviets. But in reality the Persian ruler 
had wisely concluded that the U. S. had probably no interest nor need for missile 
bases on his territory and he was offering an empty gift-wrapped assurance to the 
Soviets. 
Khrushchev's energetic policy had the down-side of requiring a huge amount of 
resources which was at a level that was unrealistic to maintain in the long term: 
"In adopting 'forward policy', Khrushchev overrode his opponents... and plunged 
the Soviet Union into the thick of regional politics lying far beyond Moscow's 
traditional security belt i25 All of Khrushchev's successors until 1996 appeared to 
take the view that this mistake would not be repeated; that Moscow would not be 
drawn heavily into areas which did not produce a tangible return. "We value trade 
least for economic reasons and most for political purposes, " Khrushchev boasted in 
1955.26 Following the downfall of the ideologically driven Soviet leader, such 
boasts were to be seen as a source of embarrassment among Moscow's elite. 
While the leading countries of the Middle East such as Iraq and Egypt wanted a 
strong military and made much noise about their antipathy towards Israel, the 
reality was that Nasser and the Ba'athists of Iraq essentially wanted to drag their 
countries into the economic forefront. Ba'ath, meaning renaissance in Arabic, was 
an ideology seeking to modernise the Arab society it ruled. Moreover, Nasser and 
his Arab counterparts were well aware that Soviet support was not, as the 
Egyptian leader once sarcastically remarked 'for the blackness of my eyes' (for 
Arabs black eyes are a sign of beauty), but because of their own needs and 
interests. Thus even before Khrushchev was toppled, there seemed to be a 
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growing recognition that there was a distinct lack of realism in Soviet policy 
towards the Middle East. 
Brezhnev: consolidation leads to stagnation 
The Khrushchev era was followed by collective rule aiming to provide a more 
balanced government that would not give too much power to one man. The 
triumvirate was in fact a two man leadership as the President, Nikolai Podgorny, 
held a ceremonial role. Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and General Secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev were the real power-brokers, at least for the first decade, as the 
latter was to supersede his former political partners as the most dominant figure of 
that era. 
A number of academics held the view that there was "no change in Soviet policies" 
towards the Middle East after the fall of Khrushchev. 27 There was some truth in 
this in the sense that support for 'anti-imperialist' countries with 'socialist 
orientation' was the official framework for policy. However, there were major 
changes under Brezhnev with regard to the nature of relations and some aspects of 
policy such as economic factors were raised on the list of priorities. The Soviet 
Union also began to look for military bases to counter the strong U. S. presence in 
the Mediterranean. This ran against Khrushchev's official strategy of encouraging 
non-alignment so that members of that movement would refuse military bases for 
either superpower, partly because of the conclusion drawn in Moscow that the 
Soviet Union held a disadvantageous position the United States. 
Up until 1967, Soviet support for the Arabs was evident, "though without pushing 
things to the point where it might itself have become involved in a conflict... Soviet 
policy had clear-cut parameters and was rather fruitful . 
372" Egypt remained the 
principal ally and the two countries seemed to be moving closer together. In a 
speech to the Egyptian parliament, Kosygin, who in the early years played a 
prominent role in Soviet policy towards the Middle East, highlighted the nature of 
the relationship of the two countries as it stood on 17 May 1966: "The 
proclamation by the United Arab Republic that its national aim is the building of 
socialism brings our countries still more closely together. 7129 He then described the 
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institution he was addressing as "the most representative Parliament the country 
has had throughout its entire history, , 30 despite his knowledge that the communists 
had recently been forcefully excluded from Egypt's political institutions. 
A little over a year later relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab world in 
general and Egypt in particular were put under great strain as a result of the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war. Moscow's assumption that Israel was too weak to launch a pre- 
emptive strike was proved wrong and Soviet policy was then dictated by what one 
author termed "collaborative competition. "" In effect, this was that competition 
with the United States would be balanced by co-ordination and compromise to 
avoid a major confrontation. 
Soviet statements and signals leading up to the June War misrepresented 
Moscow's real strategy in the region. On 11 May, 1967, Soviet President 
Podgorny received an Egyptian parliamentary delegation headed by Anwar Sadat 
who was informed by his host that Israel was concentrating forces on the Syrian 
border and planned an attack between 18 and 22 May 1967. The Israelis denied 
the report and the Soviet ambassador in Damascus refused an offer from Tel Aviv 
to view the border area for himself. On 14 May Nasser sent Egyptian Chief of 
Staff General Mohammed Fawzi to Syria to check the Soviet claims for himself 
and he reported, in consultation with Damascus, that there were no Israeli 
concentrations. Having ascertained that Moscow's information was false Nasser 
may therefore have interpreted the report to mean Soviet encouragement of an 
Egyptian move against Israel. 32 The Egyptian leader ordered his troops into Sinai 
on 14 May and two days later asked the U. N. peace-keeping forces to withdraw its 
forces from the border with Israel. On 22 May Egypt blockaded Israeli shipping 
through the Strait of Tiran. These steps were met with criticism from the West but 
Moscow's response to Cairo, through Kosygin, was that "we will stand by you . 
5)33 
On 5 June Israel attacked and wiped out the Egyptian and Syrian air defences 
within 48 hours, and in six days achieved total victory adding more territory and 
more importantly confirmed its absolute military supremacy in the area. 
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The Soviet Union sought credit for stopping Israel after only six days by warning 
the United States that it would intervene if Damascus or Cairo were invaded, but in 
reality Israel stopped because it had achieved its main objectives and was content 
to complete the war with the little losses it had incurred. The Arabs were furious 
with Moscow: where was their support? After the war, the Soviet leadership 
insisted that "we will stand by you" meant that they would have supported the 
Arabs if the United States took part in the war to help Israel. Moreover, Soviet 
weaponry had proved to be inferior to U. S. -made jets and heavy armour supplied 
to Israel. 
The Soviet leadership in turn blamed the Arabs for their incompetence for the 
defeat. Brezhnev told Arab representatives in Moscow immediately after the war: 
"We feel deeply hurt when we hear Israeli officers say that our tanks and aircraft 
that you abandoned are the best kinds of weapons. 1134 But if Brezhnev and his 
colleagues were so concerned about war breaking out in the region, why did they 
give out false information about the Israeli build-up on the Syrian border? The 
most plausible explanation relates to Syria's domestic political scene, where the 
pro-Soviet regime was close to being toppled because of economic difficulties and 
political opposition which included sections of the army. By airing news of an 
impending threat by its chief enemy Israel, Brezhnev and his comrades thought that 
public and military support would rally around the government. If that was indeed 
the intention, then the consequences were disastrous for the Arabs and the Soviet 
Union itself. To save face, Moscow severed all diplomatic relations with Israel, 
and launched a huge effort to rearm its Arab partners. On the diplomatic front the 
Warsaw Pact countries in addition to Yugoslavia but excluding Romania began 
their offensive on 9 June by issuing an ultimatum to Israel to cease hostilities: 
"Israel's aggression... is the outcome of a conspiracy against the Arab countries by 
certain imperialist forces, above all the United States.. . 
If the government of Israel 
does not stop the aggression and withdraw its troops behind the truce lines the 
socialist states which signed this statement will do everything necessary to help the 
peoples of the Arab countries administer a resolute rebuff to the aggressor. "35 
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Soviet weapons were transported to the defeated Arabs almost immediately after 
the fighting had stopped. 300 modern SAM-3s (Surface to Air Missiles) and up to 
20,000 'technicians' were sent by Moscow to the defeated Arab countries by 1971. 
150 MiG-21s were also sent to provide cover for the SAM batteries. 36 The 
intensified Soviet military involvement which included military and naval bases in 
Egypt and Syria as a concession had obvious benefits for Moscow, but it also had 
its pitfalls. Nasser wanted the Soviet Union to be directly responsible for Arab air 
defences, but this would inevitably have involved the United States in any future 
conflict, and by that stage, Soviet leaders were well aware that neither they nor the 
United States could secure peace in the volatile and often unpredictable Middle 
East. 
Some analysts suggested that the Soviets were happy with a 'no war, no peace' 
situation in the Middle East because it sustained Arab dependency upon them, yet 
such arguments placed a heavy responsibility on Moscow for the continued tension 
in the area. Breslauer was among a group of writers on the subject who rejected 
this view, saying that since 1967 there was "intense Soviet interest in a political 
settlement that would remove the escalatory potential from the conflict - but not at 
any price; and neither the United States nor Israel was willing to pay the Soviet 
price. "37 
After 1967, the Soviet leadership wanted to initiate a Middle East peace process in 
order to enhance their country's international standing and to refine a system of 
communication and understanding with Washington so that both superpowers 
would have an immediate understanding and anticipation of the other's reaction 
should another regional crisis erupt. The superpowers embarked on difficult 
negotiations following the 1967 war, mainly through the United Nations, until they 
devised an agreed charter for peace which took the form of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. These called for Israeli withdrawal from territories it 
occupied during the June 1967 war in return for Arab recognition of the Jewish 
state. The guiding principle of the Resolutions was land in exchange for peace. 
When Nasser visited Moscow in July 1968, he was to be disappointed by a Soviet 
stance that appeared to change in emphasis: "Soviet leaders were unambiguous in 
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conveying to Nasser the following points; 1, The USSR placed highest priority on 
avoiding a direct clash with the United States in the Middle East; 2, Nasser was 
engaging in 'daydreams' if he thought that a military solution was possible in the 
foreseeable future; 3, The Soviet Union would not meet Nasser's request for a long 
list of the most advanced offensive military weapons; 4, Nasser would be better 
advised to moderate his demands and seek a political solution to the conflict. "38 
More broadly, these points were the fundamental framework which characterised 
Moscow's approach to the Arab-Israel conflict until the demise of the Soviet 
Union and for the first five years after that under President Yeltsin. 
The death of Egypt's charismatic President Nasser in 1970 was to have a 
psychological effect on the balance of power in the Middle East. Few Arabs had 
dared question his aspiration of reviving national and pan-Arab greatness. His 
policies and speeches were always aimed at audiences far beyond the borders of 
Egypt, and that was a major reason why Soviet leaders regarded him as being of 
such value. In his memoirs, former Soviet ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov wrote 
a telling tribute on Nasser: "The feelings of Abdul Nasser towards the Soviet 
people were not exclusively of respect, but also of warmth. He knew well what 
our men endured in extraordinary circumstances, because it was what Egypt was 
going through in her military forces but also in the field of industry, construction 
and development. 1139 
Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, was more pragmatic, composing policy solely 
from a national, that is to say, Egyptian point of view. The Soviet leadership was 
rather suspicious of Sadat, and in Syria too they were faced with a less ideological 
and more pragmatic Asad, who led a coup within the Ba'ath that ended the reign of 
the radical socialist, Salah Jadid. Despite these changes, Soviet power in the early 
seventies seemed to be at its zenith, rivalling the United States on a global level. 
There were favourable relations in the Middle East with all the local powers, from 
Iran to Turkey, from Iraq to Egypt as well as Syria. The exceptions were Israel 
and Saudi Arabia, who were at that time unshakeably pro-Western. When Sadat 
went ahead with the signing of a treaty of friendship and co-operation with 
Moscow on 15 May 1971, it seemed to be further confirmation of this trend. 
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Meanwhile, the United States was bogged down in Vietnam and seemed to be 
paralysed against stemming Soviet influence in the Middle East. So, it came as 
some shock to the Soviet leadership when Sadat sent a message to Moscow on 7 
July 1972, demanding that 15,000 'technical advisers' leave by 17 July. 
Since coming to power Sadat had made several visits to the USSR, and on the last 
visit at the end of April 1972, there was no hint of such a course of action from the 
joint Soviet-Egyptian communique of 30 April. It said that as a result of the 
dangerous situation that existed in the Middle East, the two sides "considered it 
necessary again.. . to review the measures to 
defend.. 
. the 
Arab peoples, in particular 
through raising the military potential of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The Parties 
agreed to further strengthen military co-operation between them. 110 
But according to transcripts of conversations between Sadat and the Soviet 
leadership in October 1971 and April 1972 (these were previously unpublished 
documents which were made available to me) there was an evident lack of trust on 
both sides. This was to be a deciding factor in the split between the two countries 
because it highlighted the basic flaw in bilateral relations, and the differences 
reflected a more significant turning point in the relations between Moscow and the 
rest of the Arab world. For Cairo, there was disappointment with Moscow at the 
limit of its economic capabilities in providing technological and financial assistance. 
Moreover, Moscow appeared to hold back in providing the most advanced attack 
weapons which would create military parity between Egypt and Israel. In all the 
meetings between Sadat and Brezhnev that took place in 1971 and 1972, Egypt's 
concern with Washington's role in modernising the Israeli military machine was 
made clear. In April 1972, three months before Soviet specialists were suddenly 
ejected from Egypt, Sadat expressed his concerns to Brezhnev in their meeting in 
Moscow. He told the Soviet leader that the latest Phantom jets as well as other 
advanced weapons were being "extended" to Israel; that the U. S. was to set up 
advanced weapons plants in the Jewish state; and that President Nixon and his 
administration were making comments which cast doubts over Soviet 
al commitments to Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. 
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Sadat was in effect probing to test the Soviet response, but the suspicious nature of 
the relationship was not all one way. Moscow also questioned Cairo's motives in 
the light of meetings between top Egyptian and U. S. officials in which reports were 
circulated that an agreement behind the back of the Soviet Union was a distinct 
possibility. In the meeting of 12 October 1971, Brezhnev's opening remark to 
Sadat was that "we [the Soviet side] hope to find with you a spirit of trust and 
honesty. "42 This was more than a polite diplomatic opener because in all 
subsequent meetings this point was to be stressed over and over again by both 
sides. The U. S. -brokered Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in the late 1970s 
showed that Soviet suspicions were not unfounded. 
The shrewd Sadat told Brezhnev in the October meeting that he believed, from his 
communications with the United States, that Washington had three aims: 1) An 
end to the Soviet presence in the area, and sowing the seeds of mistrust between 
Arabs and the Soviet Union; 2) To remove Egypt from its position as the main 
centre of the Arab world; 3) The destruction of progressive movements, which 
after Egypt was removed would then become easy for the rest of the Arab world. 43 
Sadat also told the Soviet leaders that Washington was arming Jordan with the aim 
of increasing its military capacity from 50,000 to 100,000 troops supplied with the 
latest U. S. weapons as a reward for its new neutral policy towards Israel and its 
friendship with the West. 
Sadat told Brezhnev that from Presidents Truman to Nixon, the United States had 
made it a clear policy to preserve Israel's military advantage. "I seek a specific 
request that the Soviet Union stands up to this vile American policy.. .1 want a 
resolution with the USSR that gives me parity with Israel and one that is carried 
out. "44 But Brezhnev was reluctant, fearing that a strong Egypt would wage war 
against Israel which in turn would result in a superpower conflict because of 
Washington's commitment to Israel. He encouraged a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. More subtly, Brezhnev also pointed out that Soviet debts to its friends 
had amounted to 14 billion Rubles. In other words Moscow was concerned about 
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financial considerations and was not prepared to provide large-scale Soviet aid, as 
in the days of Khrushchev. 
In the meeting of April 1972 between the two leaders relations were quickly 
spiralling downwards. Sadat warned Brezhnev that the "United States controls 
everything... It manoeuvres in the region - politically and militarily - as it pleases, 
and it encourages Israel to do as it wants. " Following Sadat's impassioned plea for 
more Soviet help Brezhnev, in his dry manner, responded with the following: "The 
President has spoken much and has given the impression that the Americans are all 
heroes. 
Sadat: Only in the Middle East and not in other areas. 
Brezhnev: And the President suggests that we are frightened. "" 
This final remark highlighted the tension that became prevalent in relations 
between the two leaderships. Brezhnev, whose words were usually carefully 
chosen, had become uncontrollably irritated at Sadat's constant reminders of 
Soviet inadequacies in the region. The wording of Sadat's demands suggested that 
Soviet inaction would appear as betrayal or cowardice, two of the most detestable 
traits for the Russian character. 
When Sadat did not get the desired response he ordered the evacuation of all 
Soviet personnel from his country. The Soviet advisers packed their bags in an 
orderly fashion and hastily departed Egypt, gladly according to observers' 
conclusions as it was believed that Moscow had decided it was more involved in 
Sadat's Egypt than it really wanted to be. 
Reorientation after split with Egypt 
With the worsening relations with Egypt the Soviet Union upgraded its relations 
with Baghdad leading to the signing of a treaty of friendship with Iraq in April 
1972. Iraq was the natural alternative to Egypt as a great Arab power. Moreover, 
there were growing reasons unrelated to the split with Egypt which made Baghdad 
ever more important to Brezhnev's foreign policy chiefs. The Gulf region in 
general was growing in value as a result of the oil factor and its geo-strategic 
position. Iraq, unlike Egypt, was able to pay for its supplies with hard currency or 
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with oil which was resold by the Soviet Union to the West for dollars. This led to 
large-scale military shipments; by mid-1971, the USSR supplied Iraq with "110 
MiG-21 and Su-7 fighters, over 20 helicopters and trainers, 100-150 tanks, some 
300 armoured personnel carriers, and about 500 field guns and artillery rockets. "46 
After the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship, "Baghdad also took delivery of SA-3 
surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, Tu-22 medium range bombers (the first and at the 
time the only deployment of this type of aircraft outside the Soviet Union or 
Eastern Europe), Scud surface-to-surface missiles armed with conventional 
warheads, and MiG-23 fighters, then the most advanced model available to the 
USSR. 247 
As a way of repayment, the USSR imported 4 million tons of Iraqi crude by 1973, 
the year of the energy crisis. "After 1973 the USSR continued to receive Iraqi 
petroleum at the pre-increase price of below $3.00 per barrel and, given the oil 
shortage in the West, proceeded to make a killing. "48 It should be noted, however, 
that this Soviet practice greatly angered many Arab countries because firstly it 
undercut OPEC oil quotas and prices, and undermined the Arab embargo of oil 
sales to Western nations supporting Israel, a move whole-heartedly encouraged by 
Brezhnev as part of the great struggle against imperialist forces! 
Brezhnevite pragmatism, or its double-standards, was also revealed in the way 
Arab communists were dealt with by Moscow. For example, the Syrian communist 
party, under veteran leader Khaled Bakdash, had been the most pro-Soviet party in 
the Middle East. He had spent much of his time in Warsaw Pact as well as other 
Arab countries, exiled by the various anti-communist military dictators that came 
and went in Syria. He returned under the Ba'ath party rule of Salah Jadid but a 
faction within the party in 1969 criticised Bakdash's staunch pro-Soviet line, 
including his acceptance of the 1947 resolution on the partition of Palestine. 
Bakdash rejected his opponents' call for the liquidation of the state of Israel as 
'non-proletarian' because "it disregarded the established fact of the Jewish presence 
in Palestine, [and] the potentially positive role of the Jewish masses ... 
i49 Despite 
his opposition to the idea that transition to socialism could take place through petty 
bourgeois 'revolutionary democracies' such as Ba'ath party rule, Bakdash finally 
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accepted terms for joining Asad's National Progressive Front under Soviet 
persuasion and pressure. This caused his party to split and even Bakdash's 
majority faction was to disappear into political oblivion in Syrian politics, a 
consequence of Moscow's undermining of one of their most loyal and long- 
standing communist allies. 
Asad meanwhile was sending out co-operative signals to the United States as he 
embarked on negotiations with Washington on the Arab-Israeli dispute, leaving 
Moscow worried that it might be left out from any peace deal that may affect the 
region. Brezhnev and his Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko also became 
frustrated at their inability to bring Asad together with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. 
The reasons for their animosity were closely tied to the history of the Ba'ath 
movement and the different strands within it, of which Asad was regarded as a 
deviator from the mainstream. But a simple explanation why Moscow could not 
get them to reconcile their past differences for the common good was that there 
was a personal dislike of each other. The style of the flamboyant and unpredictable 
Iraqi leader was incompatible with the shrewd and calculating Asad. Such features 
of regional politics could not be neglected by Moscow as they illustrated the limits 
of the Soviet superpower, as well as the United States, in guaranteeing influence in 
the Middle East. 
Asad's rule created many problems in bilateral relations between the USSR and 
Syria. During the 1970s, the USSR modernised and expanded its Mediterranean 
naval fleet, including the construction of aircraft carriers, yet Syria was the only 
friendly base in that region. Asad took advantage of his strong position in 1976 
and his forces entered Lebanon in 1976 to fight the PLO and other leftist forces 
seeking the overthrow of the pro-western government. The Syrian leader was 
strongly advised by the men in the Kremlin that it would not help the Arab cause to 
fight against their PLO allies and other 'progressive' Arab groups, but he felt clearly 
confident enough to ignore it. This was one of many developments during the 
1970s in which Moscow discovered that its political influence in Damascus was 
minimal. 
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Syria had taken part in the Egyptian-led Arab attack on Israel in October 1973 
which was intended to make up for the defeat of 1967. Early Arab success in the 
war, largely as a result of an element of surprise as the attack took place on the 
Jewish most holy day, was eventually redressed due to massive U. S. support to 
Israel. Soviet intervention was timed to preserve its credibility as a superpower 
and to prevent an Arab defeat. S° While the Soviet Union had expressed its 
disapproval to the Arabs about initiating the war, it had the positive consequence 
of setting in motion "a process of negotiations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours which had long been advocated by the USSR. 5151 
Yet as a result of the war Washington grew in stature as the most likely peace- 
maker, in the eyes of both Israelis and Arabs. Moscow became concerned that 
Asad would follow the Egyptian example and break off links with the Soviet 
Union. Fortunately for Moscow, angry Arab opposition to Egypt's peace moves 
led Syria to delay any similar considerations. Between 1970 and 1974 Syria 
emerged as the largest recipient of Soviet aid, worth over $2.5 billion. Egypt 
received a similar amount but this withered dramatically after 1972. Iraq's figure 
was around $2 billion and Iran's was $600 million. 52 With Egypt forging ahead 
with the Camp David peace agreement with Israel under U. S. guidance, Syria's 
role at the core of an anti-peace Arab alliance helped the Soviet Union maintain 
influence in the region. It came in the form of an anti-Egyptian Arab alliance called 
the Arab Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation. This temporarily brought 
together Iraq and Syria as well as Libya, the PLO and other Arab countries to 
announce that they were still committed to an armed struggle against Israel. They 
were supported by Saudi Arabia, whose conservative monarchy was under 
increasing pressure since 1975 to prove that it was not a Western puppet. Egypt 
had become the new pariah because of its peace moves towards Israel and the nail 
in the coffin came when Cairo abrogated the treaty of friendship with Moscow on 
5 May, 1975. 
Iran during that period was dextrously playing the two superpowers against each 
other by heightening fears about Moscow's growing military support to Syria and 
39 
Iraq. As a consequence of the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty in 1972, President 
Richard Nixon smoothed the way for the sale of F-14 and F-15 jets to Iran. 
"During the years 1972-8 Iran ordered about $20 billion worth of US arms. "53 
Iran was at this time competing with Saudi Arabia as Washington's most important 
ally in the Gulf. This tussle was to favour the United States which at that time was 
seeking to secure the oil-rich region by means of a military presence. The two- 
pronged strategy of the U. S. was to protect the flow of oil supplies from disruption 
as a result of Soviet adventurism, and also to consolidate conservative pro-Western 
regimes with the aim of eventually pushing them to reach an agreement, as Egypt 
did, with Israel. According to Evgenii Primakov, a top Soviet expert on the 
Middle East at that time, the U. S. had placed the "Indian Ocean and the Gulf on a 
par with Western Europe... i54 U. S. involvement had grown rapidly in the region 
during the 1970s so that by 1977 American military and civilian specialists in Iran 
and Saudi Arabia had reached 80,000.55 
While Iran strengthened ties with Moscow, with trade in 1977 between the two 
exceeding $1 billion56, Saudi Arabia continued to shun Soviet attempts to re- 
establish diplomatic relations and stuck firmly in the Western camp. U. S. arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia rose "from under $200 million in 1970 to $4.2 billion in 1978 
(a 21-fold increase). The high point for the period was reached in 1976 when sales 
amounted to $5.8 billion, " before returning to $4.2 billion in 1978. "The latter 
figure was doubled in 1981 by one arms agreement alone... the $8.5 billion 
combined airborn warning and control planes (Awacs) and F-15 enhancement 
package ( missiles, extra fuel tanks, and tanker aircraft, all of which enhanced the 
capabilities of the F-15s). "57 The motive for signing such an astronomically 
expensive deal was the revolution in Iran, which saw the toppling of the Shah and 
the coming to power of the Shi'ite Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The violently 
anti-Western nature of the regime seemed to be a gain for Moscow, but the old 
grey men in the Kremlin were to discover that the Islamic fundamentalist 
revolutionaries were equally anti-communist. 
Because in 1980 the United States had no diplomatic links with Iran - nor with Iraq 
until 1984 - the Soviet Union tried to end the war that had started between the two 
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countries in the hope that it could strengthen its position in the Gulf. When it 
became clear that the war had opened up a pandora's box of regional 
contradictions Moscow seemed to have decided that Iran was worth backing, even 
at the price of losing Iraq, though this was delicately done so that not all the 
proverbial eggs were placed in one basket. But this policy was to backfire because 
by 1985 the Iranians were referring to the Soviet Union and the United States in 
the same breath and both were depicted as Satan, further underlining the limits of 
Soviet influence in the region. "' 
The invasion of Afghanistan did not help change the anti-Soviet outlook from 
Tehran. In reality, the Brezhnev leadership's involvement in Afghanistan was to 
prove characteristic in its short-sightedness and Moscow also failed to have the 
foresight that Hussein had with regard to the Khomeini regime; that its existence 
was dependent on foreign adventures and influence over Muslims in Central Asia 
and the Middle East, which was in fact one of the main reasons why Iraq attacked 
the Iranian Republic almost as soon as it was established. 
The oil rich Gulf States, which were backing Iraq in its war against Iran, were 
fearful of communist expansion and the de-stabilising effect of the invasion of 
Afghanistan. They utilised their oil-wealth to mobilise Arab opposition to the 
invasion, including severe criticisms of the Soviet action from Baghdad. Saudi 
Arabia was the first country to announce its boycott of the Moscow Olympic 
games in 1980. Only Syria obliged by refraining from making attacks on Soviet 
military action in Afghanistan. In fact Syria signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Co-operation with the Soviet Union in 1980 following ten years of evasion and 
reluctance. Asad finally agreed to sign because of his isolation in the Arab world, 
dominated then by his arch-rival Saddam Hussein. Added to this was growing 
internal opposition from within Ba'ath party ranks and uprisings that were quashed 
by forceful means. 
Asad's hatred of Saddam Hussein actually drove him to take sides with non-Arab 
Iran in its war against Iraq during the 1980s. Tehran found the Syrian hand of 
friendship useful, but it clearly felt it could afford to reject similar Soviet efforts. 
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The Iranian delegation to Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982 was made up of 
junior foreign ministry officials, which was not in accordance with protocol for 
such occasions. "In December 1982, Iranian authorities permitted a demonstration 
by Afghan refugees at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The crack-down on the 
Tudeh (communist) Party which had been underway for well over a year 
culminated in February 1983 with the arrest of the Party's general secretary, 
Nureddin Kianuri, and other prominent Party members on the charge of spying for 
the Soviet Union. "59 The troubled relations continued until the death of Khomeini. 
The military dimension 
By 1985, the USSR had arguably been transformed into a hollow superpower. As 
one author pointed out, the Soviet Union "is a superpower in one dimension only, 
that of military power. , 60 Under Brezhnev, particularly during his twilight years, 
inefficiency, decay and stagnation were more typical stereotypes. It had been 
overtaken by Japan in terms of industrial output and was well down the list in 
terms of living standards. In the last eight years under Brezhnev, "the Soviet 
Union ranked eleventh as a world trader behind the US, West Germany, Japan, 
France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Belgium. "61 The 
military aspect of international relations had become primary as it enhanced the 
Soviet Union's image as a world power. The usefulness of arms sales was that 
they could be activated quickly, especially in a crisis, whereas economic assistance 
often requires lengthy preparations. 
Soviet economic aid in the Middle East between 1954-1985 was as follows: 
Turkey $3,339 billion, Iran $1,164 billion, Syria $1,916 billion. 62 Turkey was the 
biggest recipient of economic aid, whereas the emphasis with regard to the Arab 
countries was on military hardware. Syria and Iraq, the largest recipients of 
military aid under Brezhnev, bought or were supplied with, in respective order, 
$19.1 billion and $19.4 billion worth of arms between 1974 and 1985.63 
The following table shows Soviet military deliveries to third world regions, 1977- 
64 86. Billions of current US dollars, 1987. 
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1977-81 1982-86 1977-86 
Africa 18.5 18.9 37.4 
East Asia 8.8 9.6 18.4 
L. America 5.0 8.2 13.2 
Middle East 21.7 9.5 51.2 
South Asia 5.0 9.3 14.3 
But U. S. -made weaponry given to Israel consistently proved to be superior to 
Soviet arms, despite Soviet propaganda which suggested the opposite. Soviet 
military leaders insisted on justifying the losses by their Arab allies as a result of 
direct American support to Israel. As one military spokesman wrote in 1982: "The 
effectiveness of the air raids carried out by Israel on June 5,1967 was ensured, at 
least partially, due to information about the location of Egyptian airfields and 
planes received from American sources. s65 He suggested that by receiving SAM 
missiles and ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles), the Arabs were able to provide a 
much better defence capability in 1973. "The Israeli Command underestimated the 
66 effectiveness of the Soviet-made Egyptian missiles, " he argued. 
Moscow's massive militarisation of the Middle East was defended by its leaders as 
a means of countering similar U. S. actions in the Gulf, and the huge naval presence 
in the Mediterranean in the form of the U. S. 6th Fleet. Soviet leaders, particularly 
those with military connections, referred to the 6th Fleet as "the big stick of U. S. 
imperialism" in the Middle East. 67 Soviet military experts said a fleet comprising 
50 warships including 2 atom-powered aircraft carriers America and Saratoga, 
operating more than 200 jet fighter-bombers and fighters and personnel numbering 
25,000 officers and ratings with its central base in Naples, Italy, was far more than 
necessary for a simply defensive task force. "It seems as though the United States 
is trying to turn the Mediterranean into a giant launching site, " one Soviet military 
commentator wrote. 68 
Indeed, growing U. S. military power led one Arab specialist on the subject to 
conclude that "at least from the mid-seventies onwards, Soviet aims in the Middle 
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East were to a large extent defensive, " and were generally directed towards the 
United States. 69 Soviet military support to the Arabs was intended to "maintain 
strong defensive capabilities for Arab forces confronting Israel (particularly Egypt 
and Syria), in order to repel any Israeli attack... and to show the Soviet Union 
clearly as a world power able and willing to uphold Arab national security, " but not 
to the extent that the Arabs could launch a decisive attack of their own. 70 Moscow 
did so because it did not want to antagonise the United States, thus reaffirming the 
point that the Arab-Israeli dispute was never a matter of vital importance for the 
Soviet Union, nor post-Soviet Russia for that matter. 
Conclusion: failure outweighs success 
Brezhnev's speech to the Indian Parliament in Delhi in 1980 provided a telling 
illumination of the aims and failures by his leadership in their policies in the Middle 
East. The ageing Soviet leader proposed a series of measures regarding the Gulf: 
"Foreign bases should not be established in the Gulf area and its adjacent islands, 
no nuclear weapons should be deployed there, force should be neither applied nor 
threatened against the countries of the Gulf area, there should be no interference in 
their internal affairs, their non-aligned status should be respected, and the `normal 
commercial exchange and the use of maritime communications linking the Gulf 
states with other countries of the world' should not be impeded. "" By 1991, if the 
nuclear potential of Iran and Iraq could have been taken into account as well as the 
sanctions imposed on the latter, there was substantial evidence to suggest that each 
of these objectives ended in failure. 
By the time Gorbachev had come to power in 1985, Moscow had no trustworthy 
ally in the Middle East. The balance sheet under Khrushchev and the early 
Brezhnev period could be judged as tipping towards favourable for Moscow in the 
sense that the Soviet Union grabbed the headlines, particularly during the 
Khrushchev era, in a way which seemed to be positive for most countries of the 
regions. Turkey and Iran were neutralised, the Arabs were given ample political, 
financial and military support and the United States and Israel were forced to 
acknowledge that Moscow was a political player that needed the utmost respect. 
It was under Brezhnev that things appeared to become more problematic for the 
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USSR. By the late 1970s the Soviet Union did not have the material resources to 
compete with the United States yet Moscow believed it was necessary to maintain 
the pretence. 
The loss of Egypt, the unreliability of local allies and events all amounted to a loss 
of substantial investments but the lessons were not learned. As one author pointed 
out, "long before the scale of Third World indebtedness to the Soviet Union 
became public knowledge it must have been clear to Soviet officials that the USSR 
was deriving scant economic benefit from its relations with the Third World. )172 
The stagnation and corruption of the Brezhnev era not only sustained untenable 
policies in the Middle East, but also committed the superpower to a new adventure 
in Afghanistan which eventually crippled the once mighty Soviet military machine. 
Brezhnev's policy was that if control could not be achieved over a given area, then 
stability would be the next best thing. In the words of one specialist, "because the 
USSR's fundamental interest in the Middle East was the stabilisation of the area 
(albeit according to its own image), a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict became a 
pressing necessity. "73 The Soviet Union wanted stability and peace, but not at the 
expense of overwhelming domination by the United States over the Middle East. 
Here was the dilemma for Moscow: how to compete with Washington without 
antagonising it or destabilising a region which shared its very same borders. 
Clearly, Gorbachev, Moscow failed to get the right balance. 
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Chapter III: Gorbachev's New Thinking: the transition period 
An analysis of Gorbachev's foreign policy reforms in the context of the Middle 
East provides a useful illustration of the break from the past while simultaneously 
giving a pointer to the foundations laid for the policies of post-Soviet Russia. In 
terms of ideas and ideology, Gorbachev's reforms in foreign policy were 
unquestionably revolutionary. However, in terms of practical policies, the Middle 
East presented many political realities which prevented such ideas from being 
smoothly converted into tangible results. Nonetheless, events such as the Gulf 
War showed that the theory of New Thinking was being successfully put into 
practice despite strong domestic and external criticisms. 
Brezhnev's legacy, generally unaffected by his weak successors (lu. Andropov and 
K. Chernenko), was entanglement in Afghanistan, tension with China and Japan, as 
well as the prospect of a new dimension to the arms race with the United States in 
the form of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). The world order in the 
year Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, 1985, had become dangerously unstable, 
with a confrontationalist administration in Washington and a stagnating 
counterpart in Moscow. Added to this was growing discontent in the Warsaw 
Pact countries, particularly Poland and Hungary, and involvement in almost every 
major regional conflict: whether it was Central America (Nicaragua and El 
Salvador), or Angola in Africa. 
Change was imperative: The Soviet Union's economic situation had become so 
dire that it simply did not have the resources nor the capability to compete with the 
United States. The last Soviet leader's overriding aim was to resuscitate the 
faltering economy, leading to the introduction of perestroika (restructuring) in the 
internal workings of the Soviet system. At the 27th Congress in 1986 (the first 
under Gorbachev), his speech hardly mentioned the Third World and virtually 
ignored the Arab-Israeli conflict. "Indeed, Gorbachev's was the first report of a 
General Secretary since... 1952 not to express itself explicitly to the problems of the 
Third World. "' 
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Gorbachev recognised that in terms of foreign policy, as in other aspects of the 
Soviet system, there would have to be a change not only in policy, but in the 
policy-making process itself. That there was an unavoidable correlation between 
domestic priorities and the country's relations with the outside world was an 
obvious point for Gorbachev; principally, that there would have to be a reduction 
of the huge Soviet military machine and arsenal, and the need to ease the burden of 
subsidising an extensive network of client states, particularly in the Third World, as 
well as its Warsaw Pact `partners'. As early as 1986 Gorbachev was openly 
stating: "Yes, we need peace; we appeal again and again for a halt to the arms 
race. "2 Gorbachev's vision went beyond the idea of simply downgrading the level 
of conflict, or to use a basic analogy, a temporary respite for Boxing fighters to 
catch their breath back before they reembarked on what had hitherto been viewed 
in Moscow and Washington as an historic battle of ideologies; with each side 
seeking to emerge victorious at the other's expense. The new Soviet leader 
wanted to conduct affairs with the outside world on the basis of a new message 
stressing common human values and the need of survival as the pillars of a new era 
of co-operation. 
The promotion of Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary was followed by 
the appointment of younger and more energetic people to senior positions. This 
paved the way for a more dynamic style of presenting policy. In July 1985, the 
post of Foreign Minister of the USSR was accepted by Eduard Shevardnadze 
despite his negligible experience in the field of international diplomacy. Yet 
Gorbachev's decision did hold its own logic because he did not want someone 
shackled by old habits. Shevardnadze's ideas were well suited to reform. In his 
words, Shevardnadze said he wished to change the way national security and 
strength was understood. "We have captured first place in the world weapons 
trade (28 percent of the entire sales total), and have made the Kalashnikov machine 
gun the hallmark of our advanced technology. But we occupy about sixtieth place 
in standard of living, thirty-second in average life expectancy, and fiftieth in infant 
mortality. s3 
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Among the first and most important challenges for Shevardnadze was to redefine 
the role of the Foreign Ministry. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
ostensibly the official foreign policy-making body, it was subservient to the 
Politburo and International Department, and had far less influence than the Defence 
Ministry. In effect, Shevardnadze had to convince the Communist Party elite to 
relinquish its power over a field it highly cherished to enable his Ministry to see 
through the reforms. It was therefore unsurprising that from the very first year of 
taking office there was a clash of interests. But for the first four years, the 
reformers enjoyed a high level of success thanks to the immense power Gorbachev 
had and his skilful ability to manipulate it. One commentator went so far as to say 
of the General Secretary that "his control of foreign policy was perhaps greater 
than that enjoyed by any individual Soviet leader since Stalin. "4 
With Gorbachev's support, Shevardnadze oversaw sweeping changes within the 
Ministry. "Between 1986 and 1989 all nine deputy ministers and three out of four 
senior officials in the Foreign Ministry were replaced. New functional departments 
were created for disarmament, humanitarian issues, the non-aligned movement, and 
international economic relations. i5 With regard to regional issues, including the 
Middle East, there was a major reassessment in thinking. There was continuity 
with the past in that the top priority for foreign policy was clearly the United 
States, but unlike Brezhnev, Khrushchev et al, Gorbachev acknowledged that 
relations with Washington were closely interlinked with co-operation over regional 
issues. 
In the words of one Gorbachev adviser, the re-evaluation of Soviet thinking was 
based upon the acceptance of distinct factors, based on the realisation that by the 
mid-1980s the Soviet Union was no longer a superpower equal to the United 
States. "Its allies were primarily underdeveloped countries in the Third World 
whose interests were purely mercenary... [Moreover, ] the idea of achieving 
strategic parity was totally unrealistic. ))6 Gorbachev's high moral tone initiated a 
wave of popular support in Europe and even in the United States which was 
further enhanced by his obvious charm, wit and seeming approachability to 
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ordinary people. But in the cut-and-thrust world of realpolilik his preaching about 
reforms and change required backing-up with action because there undoubtedly 
remained a great amount of suspicion among Western political elites about 
Gorbachev's intentions. 
Redefining alliances and threats - the Middle East 
New Thinking had left a strong imprint on the nature of Soviet-Middle East 
relations which substantially altered the balance of power in the region. However, 
this did not mean that Gorbachev's concessions towards Washington meant that 
the region had suddenly lost all of its strategic-economic value: "Moscow definitely 
indicated that it would not abandon its investment of over thirty years in the Arab 
world. "7 Moscow's traditional allies in the Middle East did not support 
Gorbachev's aims of transforming the guiding principle of foreign policy from 
having geo-strategic considerations to one stressing a sharper emphasis on 
international institutions and principles based on democracy, human rights and free 
trade. 
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze set out to broaden the base of the Soviet Union in 
the Middle East, despite their acknowledgement that it would be at the expense of 
long-standing allies in the region traditionally regarded as `progressive' regimes but 
which were in reality a confrontationalist and totalitarian bloc of nations led by 
Syria's Hafez Asad, Moscow's closest ally during the early 1980s. By placing a 
higher emphasis on new factors such as trade and interdependence and abandoning 
the idea of international class struggle, Moscow's traditional foes in the region 
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia became acceptable as friends. The post-1985 
leadership called on the superpowers to disengage from regional conflicts and 
encouraged international institutions such as the United Nations to take over in a 
peacemaking role. This was also an acknowledgement that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was too deeply-rooted and historic for it to end as soon as there was 
complete U. S. -Soviet disengagement. Shevardnadze made a clear distinction 
between Khrushchev's `peaceful coexistence' which "applied only to our relations 
with potential adversaries", and his new "universal principle of partnership, co- 
operation, mutual understanding, and joint action... i8 
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Israel and New Thinking 
One of the most significant consequences of the Gorbachev period in the Middle 
East was the forging of diplomatic relations with Israel. This was an inseparable 
branch from the tree of New Thinking. It was also perceived as a diplomatic slap 
in the face for the Syrian leader: "When Syria's President Hafez Asad travelled to 
the Soviet Union in April 1987, he was told by Gorbachev that the absence of 
relations between Tel Aviv and Moscow was `not normal'. A year later, at a 
Kremlin reception, Gorbachev lectured visiting PLO chief Yasser Arafat that Israel 
was also concerned about its security and borders. "9 
Israel was keen to establish links with the Soviet Union because of the highly 
advantageous rewards it promised. First, Tel Aviv could use these ties to create 
differences between Moscow and Damascus, but more importantly they could open 
the door to massive Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. To a large extent 
both these objectives were attained by Israel, particularly with regard to the latter. 
Gorbachev, though, must have realised that his open door policy to Jewish 
emigration would entail the wrath of Arab public opinion and their governments. 
But there was a plus side to the equation: Soviet concessions on the Jewish 
emigration issue would ease political pressure from the United States. In this 
sense, earlier Soviet accusations about the extraordinary influence of the American 
Jewish lobby and Israel on the political scene in Washington were proved correct 
because Soviet acquiescence on this issue certainly sped the path towards better 
relations with both the United States and Israel. Most experts agreed that "by 
1989, the issue of Soviet-Jewish emigration was to become a major factor in 
Soviet-Israeli relations ... 
By the start of 1989, despite the outbreak of the intifada, 
Soviet-Israeli relations had markedly improved. i10 Diplomatic relations were 
established at consular level, with a Soviet consular team having arrived in Israel in 
July 1987 and an Israeli team in Moscow a year later. The number of Soviet Jews 
allowed to leave was provided in the following yearly account: "In 1987 over eight 
thousand Soviet Jews were allowed to leave compared with under a thousand the 
year before. In 1988 almost 20,000 Soviet Jews left the Soviet Union, and in 
1989, the number of Jewish emigrants exceeded 70,000. "" The figures illustrated 
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the way the number of emigrants multiplied from year to year, providing an 
indication of the rapid development of relations despite the turbulent events in the 
region in that period. 
Soviet and Israeli officials met for the first time in twenty years in Helsinki, in 
August 1986. The following month, Shevardnadze and then Israeli Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres met at the United Nations in what was the highest-level meeting of 
Soviet and Israeli officials since 1967.12 Meanwhile, the Soviet press and media 
noticeably reduced the vitriolic attacks against Israel to a more balanced view. 
One periodical specialising in the observation of the Soviet press suggested that 
"the silence about restoring relations with Israel was broken when Izvestiia 
(25.1.90) political observer Aleksander Bovin analysed the letters received on the 
subject" and found that "nine out of ten wanted relations restored and criticised 
Brezhnev's 1967 decision to sever them. 1513 
The economic aspects of bi-lateral relations eventually began to bear fruit. In late 
November 1990, Israeli agricultural Minister Avraham Katz-Oz reached agreement 
in Moscow in which Israel would sell $30 million in agricultural produce to the 
USSR as well as provide assistance in water planning, cotton production and the 
establishment of dairies and chicken COOPS. 14 Moscow was understandably very 
interested in gaining access to Israel's successful agricultural schemes, but the 
Soviet Union's other goal was to acquire some of the technical expertise, ranging 
from medical equipment to sophisticated military hardware. 
However, the road to restoring full diplomatic relations with Israel, which was 
finally achieved in the dying months of the Soviet state, was fraught with many 
hazards and potentially insurmountable obstacles. After Moscow had persuaded 
the PLO to recognise the right of the state of Israel to exist and to renounce 
terrorism as a necessary precondition to any. peace process in December 1988, 
there was an uneasy feeling by policy makers in the Kremlin that the United States 
would exploit its new dialogue with the Palestinians. In fact, the opposite 
happened, with Israel and the United States taking a more intransigent line which 
had severely undervalued the compromise undertaken not only by the PLO, but 
54 
also by the Soviet Union. Israel's proposal was a plan for Palestinian elections for 
local representatives that in effect opposed any form of a Palestinian State and 
excluded Arafat from the peace process. Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Gennadii Gerasimov bluntly responded that "elections without the PLO's 
participation were not elections but a sham aimed at setting up puppet 
representative bodies with which Israel could reach a peace. " 5 
Also in that year Moscow made vociferous criticisms of Israeli policy in Lebanon, 
particularly the abduction of Hizbollah leader Sheikh Obeid in July. The Soviet 
response to that action was direct and unambiguous: "The act of violence 
performed by Israel is unquestionably a flagrant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty 
and no motives can justify it. It constitutes an act of international terrorism. "16 
Despite that particularly tense phase of Soviet-Israeli relations, little was done to 
augment the extent of Moscow's displeasure. For example, looking at the rate of 
Jewish emigration in the summer of that year, which under Brezhnev was 
sometimes used as a thermometer of Cold War temperature, the rate actually 
increased rather than decreased: April, 4,557; May, 3,779; June, 4,354; July, 
4,537; August, 6,756. " 
Despite his peace initiatives, Gorbachev could justifiably feel aggrieved at the little 
gratitude shown from any of the sides of the Middle East, as on the contrary, there 
was constant pressure and criticism, particularly from the Arab side. 
Simultaneously, the level of U. S. demands on Israel's behalf was also intensifying, 
and these included "1) The re-establishment of full diplomatic relations; 2) The 
abrogation of the UN `Zionism is Racism' Resolution, which Moscow had helped 
to pass in 1975; and 3) the finalization of the agreement on direct flights between 
the USSR and Israel. "'8 Virtually every Arab country had publicly expressed its 
dismay at the influx of Russian-Jewish immigrants to Israel. To rub salt into the 
wound, there was growing evidence to support suspicion that the hard-line Likud 
government in Israel, led by Yitzhak Shamir, was deliberately deploying tens of 
thousands of these latest additions to the Israeli population to settlements in 
occupied Arab territories. The motive behind such a move was hardly subtle; to 
tilt the demographic status of these areas so heavily in the favour of Jews, and the 
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Israeli army was active in removing Arabs from their homes whenever they 
obstructed the growth of Jewish settlements, that the outcome to any potential 
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations would be severely in favour of Israel. That the 
Soviet Union was seen to be directly contributing to this plan greatly affected 
Moscow's standing in the Arab world. Ironically, it was the United States, 
through the tough talking Secretary of State James Baker, who in diplomatic 
aphorism twisted the arm of Shamir by threatening to withdraw U. S. loan 
guarantees worth $10 billion to aid Jewish settlements if he continued to house 
Jews on disputed territory. This episode further confirmed the growing belief that 
Washington was the only effectively acting superpower in the Middle East while 
the Soviet Union was seemingly struggling to rediscover itself. 
A further blow to Moscow were moves by Israel which discouraged Soviet 
participation in the proposed Middle East peace process. In 1990, the Likud was 
clearly dragging its feet over an international peace conference, insisting as it had 
done in the past on direct country-to-country negotiations with its Arab foes. In 
December of that year Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Arens openly undervalued 
the Soviet role: "After events in Europe (in reference to the collapse of the Soviet 
backed regimes), the idea of viewing the Soviet Union as a superpower equal to 
the U. S. needs examination. "'9 
As a result of the rapidly diminishing status of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, 
and the rest of the world, Gorbachev seemed to briefly slow down the advances 
made with regard to Israel. There was also pressure from internal conservative 
forces who were arguing with increased confidence that the Gorbachev- 
Shevardnadze policy was not paying any dividends, with the latter bearing the 
brunt of most of the criticisms. On 24 May, 1990, Gorbachev retreated from his 
efforts to push through an emigration bill on the Supreme Soviet's legislative 
agenda. The bill, which would have placed a legal stamp on the de facto 
emigration of Soviet Jews, had been long promised to President George Bush. 
The fact that the United States had linked the emigration law with Moscow's much 
sought-after Most Favoured Nation trade status added to the significance of this 
retreat. 
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In retrospect, Gorbachev's hardened stand was a counter-measure to the growing 
strength of the anti-reform conservatives made up from the military-industrial 
complex and the Communist Party apparatchiki who felt most undermined by the 
changes. Following the failure of the leaders of these groupings to oust Gorbachev 
in August 1991 in that infamous televised fiasco, Moscow was quick to make up 
for lost time in its relations with Israel. One month after the unsuccessful putsch 
Moscow reversed its position on the UN Declaration that Zionism Equals Racism, 
and soon afterwards the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot, signed an agreement with 
Israel establishing direct emigrant flights from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Tel 
Aviv. Eventually, full diplomatic relations were agreed upon just in time before the 
international peace conference was held in Madrid on 30 October, 1991. 
The Soviet Union and its Arab `allies' 
Earlier in October the new Foreign Minister Boris Pankin visited Syria to explain 
Moscow's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. He was given a 
hostile reception by his Syrian counterpart Farouk Shara. "The spate of 
exclamations and rhetorical question, expressed in a language not suited to 
diplomacy, let alone to Middle Eastern courtesy, did not let up until I proposed 
half-seriously to my colleague that I should go back to the airport, " Pankin recalled 
in his memoirs. 20 For Pankin this behaviour was ironic because it left the 
impression that it had been Syria which supported the Soviet Union for all those 
years. "This stupidity dated back to Khrushchev's time, when it sufficed for a 
leader or regime to call themselves `socialist' and they automatically became our 
bosom friends. i21 In his remark, Pankin expressed the genuine change in attitude 
that had became prevalent in Moscow under Gorbachev. 
Pankin recalled that on the first day of taking office he was given a clear view of 
the new priorities held by Gorbachev. This was particularly relevant in the light of 
the failure of the coup in 1991. Pankin was told, "talk to Primakov, he has good 
contacts with the Saudis. Their king is a strong supporter of our democracy. We 
must change priorities, get rid of prejudices. Yasser Arafat, Gaddafi - they call 
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themselves our friends, but only because they dream of our returning to the past. 
Enough double standards. "22 
Soviet-Arab differences due to New Thinking were initially kept private, but in 
November 1989 USSR Ambassador to Damascus, Aleksander Zotov, publicly 
suggested that Moscow no longer supported Syria's goal of achieving military 
strategic parity with Israel. The Gorbachev-Shevardnadze plan was to steer Syria 
in the direction of a negotiated settlement with Israel but with a greater 
commitment than ever before. In the words of one observer, "the idea of holding 
some kind of conference was not new; it had been a key element in the joint 
statement on the Middle East made by Gromyko and [United States] Secretary 
Cyrus Vance in October 1977. From 1987, however, it became central to 
Moscow's agenda. "23 
Moscow's new diplomatic efforts appeared to be accompanied by a reduction in 
military supplies to the region. In Syria's case "actual arms deliveries fell from the 
previous average of $2.3 billion per year to no more than $1 billion per year in the 
period 1985-89. Moscow also delayed deliveries of Syrian-requested MiG-29 
aircraft, providing them first to India and Iraq (which was at war with Iran). 5)24 
Other factors placed a heavy burden on Syrian-Soviet relations after Gorbachev 
assumed power. While the Damascus regime was the most closely associated with 
Moscow, it was largely isolated in the Arab world. Moreover, Asad was facing 
growing internal unrest due to chronic economic difficulties which had resulted in 
food and goods shortages and a growing gap between the elite and the poor. Syria 
was also shunned by the West because of its alleged links with international 
terrorism. When in 1986 the United States launched extensive air raids against 
Libya, killing among others Colonel Qaddafi's adopted baby daughter, Washington 
warned Syria that it could receive similar retaliation if it persisted in its support of 
various terrorist groups. 
Soviet foreign policy makers sought to take advantage of Asad's weakness to 
force him to step in line with Moscow's new objectives. The Kremlin demanded 
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that Asad's neo-Ba'athist party find a truce with the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and 
scale down its support for Tehran. The bitter feud between Asad and Iraq's 
Hussein meant that Syria was among the few Arab states supporting Iran in its war 
with Iraq. Moscow also wanted Asad to lessen his support for the Shi'ite Amal 
militia in Lebanon and to make his peace with Arafat. The PLO position in 
Lebanon had been seriously weakened as a result of Amal's Syrian-backed military 
offensives against Palestinian camps. 
During Asad's 23-25 April 1988 visit to Moscow there was evidence to suggest 
that the Syrian leader had agreed to concede to most of the Soviet demands. A 
positive outcome of this were agreements amounting to new economic and 
technical co-operation for the development of Syria's phosphate and oil industries 
as well as the construction of the hydro-electric Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates. 21 
Both sides agreed to reschedule Syria's $15 billion debt and to send a new 
shipment of arms including the sought-after MG-29s, which were suddenly 
arriving more promptly than when they had been requested before. In another 
sphere, a Syrian cosmonaut took part in the Soyuz TM-3 space mission on 22 July 
1987 with Gorbachev describing the event as "a striking page in the annals of 
development and strengthening of Soviet-Syrian friendship. "26 
But sources of tension remained, mainly because as soon as Asad had secured his 
economic and military agreements, he reverted to his old policies of a bellicose 
position towards his neighbours, particularly Iraq and Lebanon. In February and 
March 1989, visits by Shevardnadze and Defence Minister Dmitrii Yazov, which 
was the first of its kind since Andrei Grechko's visit in 1972, were aimed at 
reminding Asad of his obligations. In particular, Moscow was concerned about 
Syrian attacks on the Lebanese Christian leader Gen. Michel Aoun, who launched a 
war of liberation aimed at ousting all foreign armies from the Lebanon. The Soviet 
position on Lebanon had conflicted with that of Syria because Moscow wanted to 
maintain independent and direct channels to the various political and ethnic 
groupings. Until 1987, the official line of the Soviet media did not show any signs 
of differences on the Lebanese question. Thus, when in February of that year 
Syrian troops were deployed in west Beirut, it was described as a "mission of 
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maintaining peace and security"27 at the invitation of the Speaker of the Lebanese 
Parliament, the Shi'ite Hussein Husseini, who was known for implementing many 
of Syria's political objectives in the small war-torn country. Perhaps there was a 
touch of irony when the report spoke of `maintaining peace and security' as some 
of the worse fighting in Lebanon's history had just been taking place. 
The PLO, too, was prodded and nudged towards finding an acceptable agreement 
with Israel, and whatever Moscow regarded as being an unhelpful element of 
Arafat's position was firmly frowned upon. In the words of one academic, "Soviet 
diplomacy played a significant, if unadvertised, role in bringing about a more 
moderate Palestinian position on the Middle Eastern settlement, " by stressing in all 
its contacts with its Arab counterparts the importance of a political rather than 
military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 28 Arafat's public renunciation of 
terrorism was to a large extent a credit to New Thinking and the unambiguous 
explanations by both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to the Palestinian leadership 
that terrorist acts against innocent civilians would only serve to undermine 
Moscow's support for their cause. This highlighted a qualitative transformation 
from the Brezhnev era when terrorism was often justified as part of what Moscow 
categorised as a national liberation struggle. Many Arab groups and governments 
were irritated by Moscow's new position because in their view it took attention 
away from Israeli violations of international law, such as the assassinations of PLO 
activists who were often unconnected with the military (or paramilitary) wing of 
the organisation. However, Moscow attempted to adopt a balanced view by 
strongly condemning such Israeli violations and by supporting the intifada as a 
legitimate popular uprising against military occupation. There was also advice by 
senior Foreign Ministry and International Department officials to the PLO 
leadership that it should avoid antagonising U. S. and Israeli opinion by such 
actions as unilaterally declaring a state or forming a government-in-exile. 29 
There were mild personal criticisms of Arafat and his leadership of the PLO. In a 
diplomatic snub he did not receive an invitation to Moscow while he was trying to 
generate support for a Jordanian and Western-backed peace plan among his own 
organisation. The disagreements among the PLO leadership regarding the Arafat- 
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Hussein peace plan became so sharp that it threatened to rupture the organisation, 
with the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the second largest 
PLO faction after Arafat's Fatah led by hard-line Leninist George Habash, 
withdrawing altogether. Ironically, a compromise between the various factions 
was eventually reached with extensive mediation efforts by the Soviet Union so 
that all the parties returned to the fold, once again under the chairmanship of 
Arafat. The PLO leader publicly thanked the Soviet Union for effectively 
providing him with a political lifeline since a fractured organisation would have 
seriously undermined his international standing. 
As a signal that tensions between Arafat and Moscow were eased, the Palestinian 
leader was finally able to travel to Moscow in November 1987 as head of an 
official PLO delegation. Once more, public pressure on Arafat to recognise 
Israel's security needs all seemed to indicate Gorbachev's eagerness "to participate 
in a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, therefore, greater willingness to 
meet certain U. S. -Israeli demands. i30 Moscow's role in convincing the Arabs to 
recognise the existing political reality was influential in changing the whole 
landscape of the Middle East and setting the scene for the peace agreements in the 
1990s. 
Gorbachev and pro-Western states 
The rapprochement with Egypt signalled Moscow's changed attitude towards pro- 
Western in the region. The watershed year was 1987 when the former Soviet ally 
had become re-integrated into the Arab ranks, partly due to Egypt's high profile 
support for Iraq in its on-going war with Iran. Gorbachev felt it necessary to end 
the state of no-contact with Cairo, particularly since there remained outstanding 
debts that Egypt owed to the Soviet Union. Diplomatic contacts between the two 
countries increased until the spring of 1990 when Gorbachev hosted President 
Hosni Mubarak in the Kremlin. A breakthrough was achieved "with the Soviet 
agreement, more than 15 years after the original Egyptian request, to reschedule 
Egypt's military debts (believed to total approximately $3 billion, to be repaid over 
a 25-year period). "" The occasional criticisms of Egyptian policy in the media 
under Gorbachev tended to be more balanced than the outbursts against the 
61 
murdered Sadat. For example, in 1990 a report in Pravda criticised "the brutal 
repression of strikes allegedly plotted by religious organisations and communists, 
but it quoted President Mubarak as saying that he opposed such use of force. 5132 
Jordan's King Hussein, long regarded as staunchly pro-Western, was given full 
diplomatic honours on his official visit to Moscow in December 1987. 
Shevardnadze returned the visit in February 1989 as part of his Middle Eastern 
diplomatic tour, unprecedented by a Soviet Foreign Minister. The improvement in 
relations, which Moscow highly valued under Gorbachev, led to a Joint Soviet- 
Jordanian Economic Commission which met in the summer of 1989 and agreed to 
expand trade to a level of $50 million annually. 33 In February 1990, an agreement 
was reached to stretch out repayment on a $168 million loan to Jordan and to 
accept most of the balance in goods. 34 
The economic aspect of Soviet foreign policy was a major pillar in Moscow's 
vision of a new international order. For this reason, the opening up of relations 
with Saudi Arabia, which by virtue of being the Middle East's wealthiest nation 
enabled it to carry substantial political weight, was an obvious target for 
Gorbachev. There were however serious obstacles to Soviet ambitions, not least 
of which was the occupation of Afghanistan, regarded as a serious threat to Gulf 
Security. Saudi Arabia's King Fahd deliberately made a point of changing his title 
of reference from His Majesty to Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (of Mecca 
and Medina), underlining his commitment to Muslims far beyond his national 
realm. 
From Moscow's point of view a positive step forward had been recorded in 1985, 
when ties were re-established with Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, 
which belonged to the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Kuwait, also a member, 
had already established diplomatic ties with Moscow. From the Soviet 
perspective, the jewel in the GCC crown was without question Saudi Arabia. 
According to one observer Gorbachev hoped to establish full diplomatic relations 
with Riyadh "in order to exploit Saudi resentment of American support for Israel. 
(The Saudis in turn would probably like Soviet help with Iran). "35 While the latter 
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statement was accurate, with regard to the former Moscow hoped to exploit this 
resentment, born particularly from Washington's preference of Israel in the field of 
sales of advanced arms despite Saudi Arabia's leading role in combating 
communist and Soviet influence in the Muslim world and in moderating the general 
Arab stand against Israel. For example, with regard to Afghanistan, Riyadh was 
the first and most generous supporter of the Mujahedeen in their resistance to 
Soviet occupation. 
With each announcement by Gorbachev that he intended to halt the Soviet 
adventure in Afghanistan, relations between the two countries moved to a higher 
and more co-operative sphere. In January 1987 Saudi Petroleum Minister Hisham 
Nazer paid a visit to Moscow as part of an Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries delegation. One year later, in January 1988, Saudi Foreign Minister 
Prince Sa'ud Al-Faisal visited the USSR as head of a GCC delegation. In February 
of that year, Soviet envoy Vladimir Poliakov, in the first such visit in 50 years, was 
an official guest in Riyadh. When the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan had been 
complete, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud Al-Faisal went to Moscow in September 
1990 to resume diplomatic ties. "Two months later, the de-ideologization of 
Soviet policy paid off, in the form of a Saudi loan of almost $4 billion. "36 
The development of Soviet-Turkish relations showed a similar pattern of 
improvement, though there continued, as was the case with Egypt, occasional 
outbursts against the treatment of Communists and leftists in Turkey. A report in 
Pravda in 1987 welcomed a referendum that month which allowed for greater 
individual rights for the Turks, but it noted that "the Communist Party, other leftist 
political organisations and democratic trade unions... are still illegal ... 
[and]political 
prisoners continue to languish in Turkish prisons. , 37 Nonetheless, Turgut Ozal, 
who dominated the Turkish political scene for much of the 1980s, was highly 
supportive of Gorbachev's reforms. He made his first visit as Prime Minister to 
Moscow in 1986 in which his accommodating diplomatic intentions were reflected 
by his willingness to consider legalising the Turkish Communist party following 
decades of Soviet pressure. 
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In reality, Turkey's biggest source of concern, or perhaps irritation, came to the 
south of its border in the form of Syria. Among the many issues of contention was 
the long-standing dispute with Turkey over the Sanjak'of Alexandretta, with Syrian 
maps continuing to show the area as part of its territory. In addition, its "proximity 
to the important Nato and Turkish installations of Iskenderum, Lucirlik, and 
Mersin" left them vulnerable to Syrian missile attacks. "Syria is also known to 
train and arm PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) terrorists who continually infiltrate 
into Turkey and cause havoc. s38 Ankara recognised that forging a good 
relationship with the Soviet Union could help curb the activities of its principal 
Middle Eastern `client', Syria. The next visit by Ozal to the USSR was as 
President, taking with him a trade delegation which helped reach an agreement 
between the two countries to increase the volume of trade to $9 billion by the year 
2000.39 
Moscow and the Iran-Iraq dilemma 
One major dilemma for Gorbachev in 1985 was in choosing between Iran and Iraq 
in their bloody war that had already been raging for five years. Iraq was a more 
co-operative and traditional ally but Iran was potentially more important in geo- 
strategic and political terms. The Soviet Union had dithered until February 1986 
when an Iranian military breakthrough placed its army within reach of the major 
city of Basra and not too far away from Kuwait. Moscow quickly responded to 
provide necessary military assistance to Iraq. But to the annoyance of most Arab 
regimes, Moscow procrastinated on the idea of imposing an international arms 
embargo on Iran, and as the Soviet Union was denouncing Iranian military 
advances in 1986, in February of that year Moscow envoy Georgi Kornienko 
travelled to Tehran on a mission to improve bilateral economic relations. 
Despite religious outbursts in Iran about the `evil atheism' of Communism, bi- 
lateral relations steadily increased until February 1987 when Iranian Foreign 
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati travelled to Moscow in what was the highest ranking 
visit by an Iranian since the revolution. The fact that Iraq's President Hussein had 
been to Moscow at the end of 1985 and received assurances of support was not a 
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contradiction but only strengthened the USSR's potential role of mediator between 
the two warring parties. Former U. S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger wrote 
at the end of the war that Moscow's "long-term objectives in the region are to 
establish and broaden its hitherto generally weak relations and influence with the 
Gulf States and, more generally, to counter the U. S. position in the region. The 
Soviets also seek to maintain their position with both Iran and Iraq and to emerge 
as a major extra-regional power in the post-Gulf war period. "40 By continuing to 
dwell on the competitive aspect of relations, Weinberger's comments suggested 
that there was a failure in Washington in understanding the altering developments 
in the Soviet Union. 
However, in the early Gorbachev years there were strident criticisms of 
Washington's role in the Iran-Iraq war. The disclosure that Iran had received U. S. 
weapons in the Irangate scandal and the Iranian offensive in which they captured 
the strategic Fao peninsula also placed a great strain on relations between Tehran 
and Moscow, leading to Soviet suspicion about U. S. intentions in the Gulf. The 
USSR's reaction to the Iranian interception of a Soviet ship bound for Kuwait 
added a new dimension: "In this new flexing of Moscow's power projection 
capability, [Gorbachev] has emulated Washington, which informally started 
escorting some of its ships in early 1986; he is determined not to be outbid or 
outmanoeuvred by Washington in the high-stake great game in the Gulf. "al 
However, it was debatable whether or not Gorbachev was competing for regional 
dominance and the naval engagement in the Gulf was most likely simply trying to 
protect Soviet shipping, not necessarily at Washington's expense. 
Towards the final stages of the Iran-Iraq war, Moscow was repeatedly calling for a 
cease-fire which was in effect a subtle tilt favouring Iraq because Iran was the party 
rejecting mediation efforts. The official Soviet position, as it had been before 
Gorbachev, was for "for both sides to show political will, prudence and a desire for 
mutually acceptable accords that take the legitimate interests of both Iraq and Iran 
into account. i42 But the Soviet press during Gorbachev's time seemed less 
sympathetic towards the Iranian position: "Teheran continues to reject these [Iraqi] 
calls, just as it has rejected efforts at mediation on the part of the UN... insisting 
65 
instead on `war until victory' . 
774' A few articles also cast doubt about Iran's real 
motives in the light of Irangate, in which the Islamic republic, supposedly violently 
opposed to the `Great Satan' (the United States) received weapons from that 
country which enabled it to carry out successful offensives against Iraq. It was 
also recalled that the Khomeini regime's most decisive internal action was to 
obliterate the Iranian Communist Party (the Tudeh), which boasted the largest 
membership in the Middle East, in the first years of his rule. The fact that 
Khomeini was allowed to leave from France (ie the West) to oust the dying Shah 
had puzzled many international observers. The implication of this was that the 
United States hoped Khomeini would be a better alternative than a communist 
take-over in Iran. In 1987, Pravda reported complaints by T. Ramadan, First 
Deputy to the Iraqi Prime Minister, on his visit to Moscow that Washington 
provided Iraq with false information about Iranian offensives: "The Americans' real 
aim was to drag out the war and use the Iranian threat to put pressure on the Arab 
countries, " Pravda quoted Ramadan as saying. 44 And when the Iranian Foreign 
Minister visited Moscow, Tass quoted Gromyko telling Velayati: "Our assessment 
of that war and your view of it do not coincide... We repeat what we have told the 
Iranian leadership more than once: Even one day of war is worse than five years of 
negotiations. "45 
When the Soviet Union was to begin protecting Kuwaiti oil tankers by sailing them 
under Soviet flags, it felt compelled to deflect Iranian criticisms that it was taking 
sides in the war. I. S. Osminin, General Director of Sovkomflot (Soviet merchant 
fleet) told Izvestiia: "The case at hand has to do with the leasing of available Soviet 
tankers by a Kuwaiti company for the purpose of shipping petroleum. In 
concluding this agreement, Soviet ship owners have pursued purely commercial 
interests. "46 This terse response was in keeping with the principles of New 
Thinking; that commercial priorities should supersede ideologically motivated 
policies. It was also in line with a general shift in Soviet policy under Gorbachev 
which, on balance, seemed to favour Iraq. 
As the nationalities issue began to acquire more urgency in Soviet political life, 
some members of the Soviet elite began to accuse Tehran of stirring up ethnic and 
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Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim territories of the Soviet Union. For 
example, a report by the influential Igor Beliaev in Literaturnaia gazeta reflected 
"Moscow's concern that Iran was behind Islamic unrest in the USSR in a warning 
[by Beliaev] that Moscow could support the Azerbaijanis who make up more than 
one third of the Iranian population. "`" (Although there has not been a reliable 
consensus of Iranian population trends in recent times, it was highly unlikely that 
the Azerbaijanis made up a third of the Iranian population. ) However, Iran showed 
similar concern about ethnic violence on its borders by urging both Azeris and 
Armenians to resolve their differences in order not to give "Moscow a pretext to 
keep troops on the Iranian border. "48 
Although the more militant imams in Iran were vociferously supporting an Islamic 
rebellion against the communist system of the Soviet Union, their actual control 
over the Azeri groups was minimal. Although 75 per cent of Soviet Azerbaijanis 
were, as the majority of Iranians, Imami (twelver) Shias, this did not guarantee 
their loyalty to Iranian religious leaders. 49 In 1989, Iranian military units were sent 
to the border area after Azeris attacked Soviet border installations. Soviet 
Azerbaijani nationalist demonstrators were fired upon by Iranian troops at the 
beginning of January, 1990, when they attempted to do the same with Iranian 
border posts, indicating that they were driven by nationalist rather than religious 
motives. 
The Soviet strategy of not antagonising Iran finally succeeded in bringing results 
when in 1989 Iran's pragmatic leader President Hashemi Rafsanjani went to 
Moscow where a major economic package was signed, in which the Soviet Union 
undertook to carry out a range of projects, costing up to $6 billion dollars over a 
ten year period. In return, Iranian export of three billion cubic meters of gas per 
year would cover 90 per cent of the costs. 5° 
The breakthrough with Iran was to be negated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 3 
August, 1990. Iraq's President Hussein paid no heed to a joint Shevardnadze- 
Baker statement demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. The most obvious 
victim within the Soviet Union of Iraq's invasion was to be Shevardnadze, though 
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Gorbachev's personal prestige was also to take a severe knock. In keeping with 
the principles of New Thinking the Soviet Foreign Minister uncompromisingly 
criticised the actions of the Iraqi leader, but he found himself opposed by 
conservative forces who argued that Soviet standing in the international 
community would be seriously undermined if Moscow did not stand by its long- 
time ally and co-signatory of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. 
From the viewpoint of the opponents of New Thinking, Shevardnadze's seemingly 
obsequious reactions to Washington's diktats were regarded as unacceptable. To 
make matters worse for the Soviet conservatives, Shevardnadze suggested that 
Soviet troops should be sent to the Gulf as part of the coalition against Iraq. Yet 
Shevardnadze's opponents had actually failed to recognise the subtleties of his 
suggestion and took this proposal to be yet another example of Soviet kow-towing 
to U. S. policies. In fact there was nothing strikingly radical about such a proposal, 
which he had made during the last stages of Iran-Iraq war with the purpose of 
replacing the then-growing U. S naval presence with international forces under a 
UN flag. Shevardnadze was actually seeking to block the U. S. monopoly on 
peace-keeping/peace-enforcing missions by including Soviet and other neutral 
troops. 
In the light of New Thinking, Shevardnadze's reaction to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait was completely rational. "Now that a new world order is being built based 
on co-operation and interaction, to commit an act of aggression meant to commit 
suicide. It was not possible, I thought" wrote Shevardnadze in his memoirs, "for 
Saddam Hussein not to understand this. s51 But the conservative forces were not 
impressed and regarded the crisis as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to regain 
some of the losses it had recently endured. Gorbachev opted for a compromise 
option which perhaps characterised his last two years of leadership. The Soviet 
leader sent Evgenii Primakov, a leading foreign policy adviser with long-standing 
ties with Arab leaders, particularly Saddam Hussein, on a mission to find a peaceful 
solution, principally by convincing the Iraqi leader to withdraw from Kuwait, and 
save the world from impending war. It was hoped that this strategy would give 
credit to the Soviet Union for playing the role of international peace-maker. 
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Primakov was despatched to Baghdad on October 4-5, and again October 28-30, 
1990. On both occasions Primakov failed to convince Hussein to withdraw 
unconditionally, and in effect Gorbachev had no choice but to support whatever 
action was taken by the United States. On the positive side, "Soviet verbal support 
for the UN resolutions earned Moscow a $1 billion credit line from Kuwait, $4 
billion loan from Saudi Arabia, and a $175 million investment in a joint Soviet- 
Saudi bank in Alma-Ata. 5)52 Unfortunately for Shevardnadze, this vocal support 
was to cost him his job as he was forced to resign under a barrage of communist- 
nationalist pressure, warning that a dictatorship in the Soviet Union was looming. 
Although the oil-rich monarchies provided generous compensation for the Soviet 
stand in the Gulf crisis, Gorbachev would have been informed that his country 
stood to lose an estimated $6 billion in payments for unfinished projects as well as 
the possibility of repayment of an estimated $5 to $10 billion debt for arms 
purchases. 53 
According to Anatolii Cherniaev (speaking at the London School of Economics on 
18 October, 1994) who had spent years working at the International Department 
and later became a Gorbachev aide, the Politburo, once the fulcrum of decision- 
making in Moscow, lost virtually all its powers by the time of the crisis. The 
Soviet leader had set up a special operating group to monitor the conflict which 
included Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, Defence Minister Marshal Dmitrii Iazov, 
KGB head Kriuchkov, and MVD head Boris Pugo. It is worth noting that all the 
members of this group were either directly or indirectly (Bessmertnykh) implicated 
in the August coup against Gorbachev in 1991. The absence of New Thinking 
chiefs, such as Shevardnadze and lakoviev, confirmed that Gorbachev had been 
forced to concede ground to the more reactionary forces of the Soviet system. But 
despite this Gorbachev had evidently negotiated some form of compromise with 
the hard-liners that prevented Moscow from pursuing a collision course with the 
United States. One author described the following scenario had Gorbachev and 
New Thinking not left their imprint on Soviet foreign policy: "The Soviets would 
have maintained close military and political ties with the Iraqi regime right up until 
the invasion, would have strenuously tried to dissuade Hussein from actually 
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crossing the border in force (if they had known about his plans), would have failed 
in their endeavours but would in any event have continued to support him 
afterward. "54 
The crushing military victory by the United States had sent a clear message to all 
leaders of the Middle East as well as the Soviet Union that Washington was the 
world's only superpower. The consequence of the Gulf war was also to have a 
negative effect on Gorbachev's New Thinking. "All the parties involved in the 
conflict were given an object-lesson in world politics: Force remains the most 
decisive and intelligible argument. Mikhail Gorbachev, the `prophet' of New 
Thinking was weakened as a direct result of the war. "55 To make matters even 
worse, there was once more a shadow cast upon the quality of Soviet-made 
weapons. Defence Minister lazov was forced to admit to a parliamentary 
committee that Soviet defence systems had "failed in most cases" and that the 
lessons of the war had forced his ministry to find "new defence concepts. "56 
One major beneficiary of the Gulf War was Syria, which took part in the U. S. -led 
coalition and was rewarded by being reaccepted into the international community. 
Damascus also took the opportunity to reaffirm its friendship with the Soviet 
Union by sending Minister of Defence Mustafa Tlas in February 1991 to sign new 
bilateral military agreements. In May of 1991 Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksander 
Bessmertnykh toured the Middle East, stopping in Syria, Jordan, Israel and Egypt. 
The trip reflected the new Soviet standing in the region, with diplomatic relations 
open to all. 
The consequences of New Thinking 
Whatever the arguments about strong social, economic and political undercurrents, 
Gorbachev for the most part helped bring many chapters of Cold War conflicts to a 
peaceful close. A nuclear threat remained; but it was more likely to come from 
North Korea, Iran or Israel rather than Russia. The situation in the Middle East 
did not become more stable simply because the Soviet Union retreated from its 
previously more competitive role in the area. But Gorbachev's retreat was noble 
as he sought to make the most of what had been an irretrievable situation. 
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In the last months of power, Gorbachev strove to change every detail of the 
diplomatic service. Pankin described the system before the reforms when "every 
Embassy was divided between Foreign Ministry diplomats and the KGB, `the 
neighbours. "' It was the Communist Party rather than the Ambassador which 
"wielded enormous influence there through resident Party Secretaries appointed by 
the Central Committee and beyond the control of either the Foreign Ministry or the 
KGB. 1)57 Communist Party Secretaries held meetings in which the ambassador sat 
as an ordinary member on a regular basis. These Party Secretaries effectively 
ensured that the Ambassador followed the party line and they had the power to 
force his departure. Gorbachev ordered a complete review of this overlapping 
system which greatly burdened the implementation of foreign policy. The old 
guard was tenacious in its will to keep a hold of its power and influence. As 
Shevardnadze complained: "Suddenly, I would find out that people were 
manipulating things behind my back, damaging our hard-won reputation as a 
reliable partner, and undermining our diplomatic successes. "58 
But the elevation of the likes of Karen Brutents and Primakov because of their 
expertise rather than their political reliability and loyalty was surely a positive step. 
Alexei Vassiliev, who was consultant to the Foreign Affairs Committee and Deputy 
Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, represented a new breed of Middle 
East specialists in Russia whose thinking broke with the past. He explained his 
country's new policy in a leading Arab journal: "The Soviet Union's omission of 
ideology in foreign policy means the preservation of long-standing relations with 
radical regimes, but with wider co-operation and mutual interest to include all 
states, regardless of the path of development it had chosen. "59 Vassiliev, 
countered criticisms by hard-line Arab regimes critical of New Thinking that 
"Soviet-U. S. relations do not work against the Arabs. For example, the efforts of 
the Soviet Union and the United States helped to stop the Iran-Iraq war, and there 
were also shared efforts with regard to Lebanon. i6o 
Others from the Soviet old guard criticised Gorbachev for incompetence and 
argued that Gorbachev should have taken a leaf out of Stalin's book by covering 
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up weaknesses with a hardened stand and by bluffing the West with carefully timed 
bluster into making concessions. The theorists behind New Thinking, however, 
pointed out that such arguments completely missed the point. Moscow genuinely 
wanted to create an atmosphere of trust, by building clearly definable borders to 
foreign policy, such as having good relations with Israel and Gulf Arab states while 
maintaining ties with traditional allies and encouraging them to adopt a more 
moderate line. Gorbachev often liked to state: "We want political and legal 
methods to prevail in solving whatever problems may arise. Our ideal is a world 
community of states based on the rule of law subordinating their foreign policies to 
law. "61 
In addition, the principle of democracy and openness had become firmly set by the 
last two years of Gorbachev's rule. This factor played a key part in the failure of 
the anti-Gorbachev putsch in August 1991. Immediately after Gorbachev's return 
to the Kremlin, efforts were quickened to establish full relations with Israel. One 
senior Soviet diplomat was quoted as saying that "Israel proved through its pro- 
democracy stance that they want to establish sincere and business-like relations. i62 
The same attitude was adopted with moderate Arab states such as Jordan, Lebanon 
and Saudi Arabia. 
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New Thinking was intended to move awa Brezhnev's ambiguous and somewhat 
fork-tongued policies which led to a growing gulf of mistrust between the USSR 
and the Arab world. Besides, there was an economic dimension to this policy: 
"The Soviet search for participation in the international economic system and for 
credits from and trade with the West necessitates a new, less threatening Soviet 
image. "63 However, even liberals such as Andrei Kozyrev, as late as 1989, foresaw 
a socialist compromise with the West as a stable world system. Writing with 
Alexei Shumikhin, Kozyrev was in line with the view of New Thinking that the 
"transference of the confrontation between West and East to the arena of 
developing countries, assisted by both sides, added to their unprecedented 
backwardness. "64 He called on the world's economic giants to encourage an 
international model that was similar throughout the globe. This could be a 
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"realistic practicability, and not a globalist `class' plan, " based on the 
harmonisation of capitalist and socialist models. 65 
Another influential foreign policy adviser under Gorbachev later to become a 
Foreign minister for his arch-rival Boris Yeltsin was Primakov. Perceived to be 
less Western- oriented than Kozyrev, Primakov's statements and views (written 
before Kozyrev) seemed to fall smoothly in place with New Thinking. Chiefly, 
Primakov argued that "the security of some cannot be ensured at the expense of 
the security of others. i66 Thus, the beginnings of the rejection of the zero sum 
game was taking shape. The impact of the Gorbachev leadership was highlighted 
by the prevalence of a new view among the country's leading foreign policy 
thinkers. Was it Kozyrev or Primakov who wrote the following? "It is important 
to note that the growing interrelationship of today's world is expressed not only in 
the problem of survival, which is common to all parts of the world, but also in the 
existence and development of a world economy and in the presence and 
intensification of common human interests" such as those of environment and 
Third World poverty. 67 
One contemporary observer pointed out that "Gorbachev explicitly acknowledges 
his intellectual debt to Khrushchev, " but with regard to foreign policy he correctly 
made the crucial distinction that the last Soviet leader stressed "the co-operative 
rather than the competitive dimension of U. S. -Soviet relations. 1168 Nonetheless, 
Moscow drew the line at the point where compromise could have been mistaken 
for capitulation. In the words of Primakov, during his mediation efforts in the Gulf 
crisis: "We are a superpower and we have our own line, our own policies, we are 
demonstrating this point. i69 
Indeed, the Gulf War was a severe lesson to Moscow that the idealism of New 
Thinking would be a hollow horse if it was not filled with the solid material that 
took into account national security and national interests. New Thinking also 
changed the outlook from Moscow about the inevitability of a bipolar world, and a 
new concept was developed which encouraged the co-ordination and co-operation 
of key regions, thus Europe, the Far East and eventually the Middle East began to 
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have a growing significance of their own. It was observed at the time that "Soviet 
diplomacy must no longer view world politics exclusively through the prism of US- 
Soviet relations. "70 In other words, Soviet interests in Israel or Iraq for example, 
whether economic or geostrategic, would not be related to the way superpower 
relations were going at any given period. At the same time, such interests were 
pursued carefully so as not to cause a rupture in relations with the United States. 
While Gorbachev (and Shevardnadze, Iakovlev et al) put an end to many 
established features of Soviet foreign policy, the lessons learned from that 
turbulent period also helped to lay the ground-work for his successors in the new 
Russian Federation. 
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Chapter IV: Problems, Debates, Ideas: forming a national foreign policy 
under Yeltsin. 
The break-up of the Soviet Union did not ease Moscow's geo-strategic concerns, 
but added to them. Russia remained a huge country, spanning Asia from the Far 
East to Europe. Such an imposing geographic factor had always been impossible 
for Moscow's policy-makers to ignore, whether they were Tsarist, Communist or 
democratic. This was, in the words of one historian, reflected in the "continuity 
and consistency of Soviet strategic thinking over the past 60 years (and Russian 
perceptions for 300 years before that). "' The emergence of many new and often 
volatile neighbours led to a new range of difficulties which needed consideration. 
Russia's multi-continental form united different nationalities and creeds. Its distinct 
cultural heritage was neither Eastern nor Western, yet it took something from both. 
Authors and poets, as epitomised by the great Dostoyevsky, lauded the spiritual 
purity of the Russian people, whose suffering in their history was undeniably bitter 
and unrelenting. This experience, Russia's artists believed, provided their country 
with a special message for the world. Discarding this interpretation of the Russian 
psyche and world view for being unscientific would miss the point that foreign 
policy, as any strategy, requires a motivating idea. 
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Gorbachev's reforms reoriented Soviet 
foreign policy firmly towards the West. Ultimately, the Soviet Union was beyond 
salvation and Gorbachev was replaced in Moscow by Boris Yeltsin. The 
democratically elected leader of the Russian Federation had markedly different 
practical considerations from his predecessor. Nonetheless, the age old dilemmas 
that plagued Russia's relationship with the. outside world continued to divide its 
political elite. But before looking at relations between Russia and the key 
countries of the Middle East (in the following chapters), this chapter will take a 
general look at the administrative reforms and political and ideological debates 
which characterised Russia's foreign policy in the first five years under Yeltsin. 
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The end of the USSR 
Yeltsin appointed Andrei Kozyrev as Russia's Foreign Minister in October 1990 
although there was still a Soviet Foreign Minister. Yeltsin's actions of 
undermining the Soviet Union were fruitful from his personal political perspective, 
but it was nonetheless a gamble which threatened stability both within the former 
Soviet borders, and on the international arena. Yeltsin conspired for a Russian 
breakaway from the USSR in order to undermine the Soviet system: "The process, 
touched off by Yeltsin's Russia in June[1990], was not only disruptive of the status 
quo but also undermined the effort at political reform of relationships between the 
centre and the republics launched that spring with work on a new Union Treaty. i2 
The relevance of this point was that it left lingering doubts over his personality and 
style of leadership throughout his presidency. 
When he saw his opportunity, Yeltsin moved quickly to seize power and push 
Gorbachev aside. On August 23 1991, during a televised appearance at the 
Russian Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin openly undercut Gorbachev, one day after his 
return from the coup by physically pushing him aside as he decreed the suspension 
of the Russian Communist Party. These developments were of much concern to 
Moscow's Middle East allies, and to the Central Asian republics, most notably 
Kazakhstan. As the largest of the so-called Muslim republics, Kazakhstan was in 
reality heavily populated by Russians, with close historic links to its northern 
neighbour. It shared with the other four republics of Central Asia a fear that a 
break-away from Russia would have a devastating economic effect. Despite such 
fears, by the end of December 1991 the inevitable had happened and each of the 
fifteen republics followed its own path: the USSR was replaced by a loose political 
entity known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On 24 
December 1991 Russia took over the UN Security Council seat previously 
occupied by the USSR. 
The most immediate concern for Moscow under Yeltsin was to maintain order 
within the Russian Federation and sustain a level of acceptable military security for 
the new borders. The armed forces, with all their military resources, had to find a 
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new strategy based on Russia's security rather than that of the Soviet Union. 
Russia's international military capacity was greatly compromised by the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and by the eruption of local conflicts in neighbouring republics, 
particularly in the Caucasus region. The creation of new republics had a far- 
reaching impact on relations between Russia and the Middle East because it meant 
that there were no longer any common borders between the Russian Federation 
and Turkey and Iran. In the past, the Soviet command post for possible Middle 
Eastern operations was in the Trans-Caucasus Military District, but in the post- 
Soviet period Moscow became ever more dependent upon the co-operation of 
local governments for the right to station troops in an area which was of vital 
strategic importance for Russia. 
In internal affairs, Yeltsin faced a strong and vocal opposition composed of 
powerful groups from the Soviet era which, as in Gorbachev's time, were highly 
averse to reform. By 1993 there was a paralysis in decision making as Yeltsin's 
backing in the Congress of People's Deputies, the parliament established by 
Gorbachev, had declined to below 200 out of a body of over one thousand 
members. The Russian President won a victory over parliament and his rivals in 
April 1993 in a tightly fought referendum and in September he dissolved the 
Congress of People's Deputies and announced new parliamentary elections. His 
leading political rivals, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi and Parliamentary 
Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, claimed that this was an auto-coup by the president 
and made their own bid for power, leading Yeltsin to use army tanks to crush the 
resistance. The conclusive assault on the Parliament building on 4 October 1993 
was followed by new parliamentary elections in December. The use of the army 
and the results of the new parliamentary elections to the Russian Duma were 
damaging to Yeltsin and highlighted the importance of the military in the country's 
political battles. The political instability and the perception that there was deep 
hostility towards the West from senior army ranks and other important political 
institutions, in a view directly contrary to that of Kozyrev's, had a significant 
bearing on Yeltsin's original foreign policy objectives. 
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Yeltsin and the West 
By far the most important priority for Yeltsin, in terms of foreign policy, was to 
maintain good relations with the West, a continuation of Gorbachev's. New 
Thinking. Diplomatic relations with Europe and the United States warmed, and 
co-operation replaced conflict, though both sides continued to target their nuclear 
weapons at each other. Sympathisers of Gorbachev had argued that the West had 
hesitated to support him fully, despite the rhetoric of its leaders, because there was 
an unwillingness to rescue the Soviet Union after being a bitter enemy for so many 
years. It was therefore expected that the establishment of a democratic Russia 
with political, economic and social ideals similar to those of the West might 
convince Washington and its allies to bring the new country into the fold. 
In the hopeful days immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
question of what would happen if Russia's vital interests were not harmonious with 
that of the general mood of the international community did not seem to arise. In 
his first year in office, Kozyrev was a leading proponent of the view that Russia 
should pursue a totally pro-Western policy. Only the West had the means to 
provide economic assistance, he argued, and it also offered a shining example of a 
successful democratic system, which was still fragile in Russia. Until the summer 
of 1992, Yeltsin gave his Foreign Minister full backing to this radical pro-Western 
view. In that time, Kozyrev "enjoyed unprecedented dominance" in the foreign 
policy sphere, allowing him to follow "an uncompromising pro-Western line aimed 
at integrating Russia into what he called `the democratic Northern Hemisphere. s13 
That this pro-Western approach would inevitably sacrifice relations with traditional 
`Eastern allies' hardly bothered the Kremlin elite in early 1992. Iraq, Syria and 
Iran, for example, were facing immense economic difficulties which made them 
more than a burden than a benefit. The new government was seeking to transform 
the state economy from its dependency on arms sales to a more diverse economic 
system. In effect, there seemed to be a genuine and well-defined vision which 
placed Russia in the Western family. Kozyrev assured the West: "[Russia] will be 
a normal great power. Its national interests will be a priority. But these will be 
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interests understandable to democratic countries and Russia will be defending them 
through interaction with partners, not through confrontation. i4 
However, the failure of `shock therapy' to produce immediate economic results 
damaged the radical reformers, and Western refusal to provide the necessary funds 
to rescue their economic plans placed yet another nail in the coffin of the pro- 
Western radicals. Russia and its CIS partners found themselves in a similar position 
to countries of the less developed world, "negotiating from weakness with the 
Western powers over terms for aid, investment, and technology transfer, and for 
access to their raw materials, markets, and cheap labour forces. "5 This growing 
realisation that the relationship between Russia and the United States was not 
based on an equal basis led policy makers in Moscow to re-evaluate the nature of 
bilateral ties. 
There were also reasons directly linked to foreign policy which greatly weakened 
the position of the pro-Western radicals. Kozyrev, who was a leading figure, was 
partly responsible for the failure to assert the position of the Foreign Ministry at a 
time when various other state institutions took it upon themselves to follow their 
own foreign policy line. One commentator observed that in Soviet times the 
Politburo was at the top of a pyramid which implemented foreign policy. During 
the early period "each branch of power considered itself a Politburo and thought it 
had the right to pursue its own diplomacy. t56 There was an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and chaos in the direction of the country's foreign policy, making it 
"difficult to predict whether Russia would follow a path of gradual 
institutionalisation, consensus building, and partnership with the Western powers 
or slide into political decay, demagogy, and dictatorship, " which would lead to 
aggressive international behaviour. ' It was widely recognised that the challenges 
facing Kozyrev were not easy: reforming the relationship between state and 
government institutions; organising new mechanisms for foreign policy making; 
formulating a new policy which was in touch with the political elite and public 
opinion. But Kozyrev failed even to begin tackling these problems. Instead, 
despite claiming to want to establish a pragmatic foreign policy, Kozyrev pursued 
an ideologically driven policy in which he became closely associated with a group 
81 
of thinkers who wanted the Westernization of Russia's political, economic and 
cultural spheres. This label adhered to Kozyrev despite his later efforts at 
consensus building. 
The rejection of a policy seeking to imitate and aggrandise the West had many 
roots in Russian society. There were historic reasons dating back to Tsarist and 
Communist suspicions of Western moral decay and U. S. neo-imperialism, as well 
as cultural reasons which rejected excessive individualism. In addition, it was not 
in the interest of certain political groups to encourage political reform, and they 
sought to win public support by criticising the government's pro-Western policies. 
These parties, ranging from neo-communist to extreme nationalist, were able to 
exploit the hurt national pride of many Russians. They were successful, to some 
extent, because they played a part in forcing Yeltsin to tone down his pro-Western 
line and adopt a more consensus-building approach. However, a crucial point must 
be made which is central to this thesis: The rejection of the approach adopted 
during the first year under Yeltsin was not simply for the sake of political 
expediency, but because of a genuine realisation by the Kremlin leadership that 
the policies of the radical pro-Western liberals were essentially flawed. 
Both the government and its opposition had concluded by 1993 that the $24 billion 
of promised Western aid was unlikely to be fulfilled. Radical reformers in the 
government became discredited or were under extreme political pressure, with 
many being gradually replaced by moderate reformers. This internal shift of 
power was to have an impact on the country's international outlook. One Russian 
diplomat noted that the radical Atlanticists, as they were referred to in the early 
1990s, viewed "the United States as a senior partner and as the recognised leader 
of the Western, democratic, free world. " As a natural consequence, Moscow had 
tacitly accepted a subordinate role to Washington. 8 But with the discrediting of 
the leaders of this policy it became politically impossible to include them in a 
government which was increasingly under pressure to create an independent and 
pragmatic foreign policy. 
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Some interpreted the weakening position of the radical reformers as indicative of 
the undermining of Russian democracy and reform in general, and the re- 
emergence of belligerent and anti-democratic forces. Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze, the last Soviet Foreign Minister, told an audience in London's 
Chatham House as late as 1995 that he believed that a return to the Cold War was 
not impossible: "Having spent a lot of money on ending the Cold War, the West 
did not invest in support of democracy and freedom. "9 Shevardnadze had first 
hand experience of Russian military involvement in his country's civil war which 
forced Tbilisi to compromise its national independence and recognise Moscow's 
dominance in the area of the former USSR. Yet Moscow's reorientation away 
from the West was largely forced upon it by the growing instability around it, 
rather than as a direct response to anti-Western forces in the country. Speaking in 
1993 about possible threats to Russia, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said that 
"the most probable scenario is not a direct armed invasion of Russia but her 
gradual entanglement in conflicts in neighbouring nations and regions. Given the 
complex interrelation and interdependence of the various states and peoples, any 
armed conflict may evolve into a large-scale war. "lo 
Washington's actions in the early 1990s did not help the leadership in Moscow in 
their efforts to justify closer co-operation with the West. When Yeltsin came to 
power the main bone of contention with the West had been the war in the former 
Yugoslavia. The Russian leadership became increasingly vocal in its opposition to 
Washington's efforts to weaken Serbia and its Serb allies in Bosnia. The events in 
Bosnia had important implications with regard to Yeltsin's international policy by 
reflecting the Kremlin's wish to regain lost prestige in the international community, 
and perhaps more importantly, from the Russian people. The Kremlin began to 
underline Moscow's responsibility for Russians at home and abroad, claiming to act 
as their political and military guardian. This pledge appeared to include some 
responsibility for the Christian Orthodox Serbs, who were regarded by Russians as 
ethnically related. Ethnicity and nationalism seemed to replace communism as 
Russia's ideological guiding force. Russia's relations with the West were also 
strained as plans for Nato's eastward expansion began to unfold. Opposition to 
the prospect of a Western military alliance incorporating Eastern European 
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countries, which had historically been regarded as part of a security zone, did not 
only include Russian extreme nationalists or neo-communists but ordinary people. 
For decades under communism "Soviet peoples were indoctrinated with the dogma 
of so-called `capitalist encirclement. ""' It was never properly explained to 
ordinary Russians why the West needed Nato expansion if the Cold War had 
supposedly ended. Plans for Nato expansion strengthened the hand of policy 
makers whose thinking was within the framework of Russian national security 
interests rather than close co-operation with the West. Defence Minister Igor 
Rodionov's words explicitly revealed the limits of co-operation with the West: "Of 
course, Nato countries are free to decide what to do in their own house. But when 
imminent changes alarm its neighbours and threaten their security - that is 
inadmissible recklessness. " 12 
Despite differences over Nato expansion and Bosnia, there was a very low 
possibility that Yeltsin would antagonise the West to the point of re-igniting the 
Cold War. By 1996, Russian foreign policy was being presented to the West as a 
pragmatic, conciliatory policy without ideological enemies. But it was also a policy 
which became more direct about asserting its national interests. Russia's efforts to 
become more involved in the Middle East were closely tied to the Kremlin's 
attitude towards the West. The early ascendancy of democratic forces prevented 
closer ties with traditional allies in the region because "in its values, Russian policy 
[was] based on, and aimed at, the promotion of fundamental Western values. " 
Kozyrev's definition of this was "individual liberty and market economy. 2M As 
Foreign Minister, Kozyrev sought to reconcile these principles with the growing 
practical problems confronting his government such as domestic political 
opposition and international crises and situations which tested Russia's co- 
operation with the West in the light of pressing national interests. Kozyrev's 
effective dismissal as Foreign Minister was a consequence of his failure to do this. 
Russia's redefinition of the Middle East 
s 
The construction of a policy guided by national interest ran parallel to revitalised 
activity in the Middle East, particularly after 1992. According to a leading 
Moscow academic and government adviser, what had developed in the first five 
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year period since 1991 with regard to the Middle East was a reappraisal of 
priorities and perceptions. Thus, whereas in the Soviet era certain countries in the 
Middle East were supported for ideological reasons, under Yeltsin there was a 
higher emphasis placed on the geo-strategic and economic aspect of relations. 
Consequently, "while in the Soviet Cold War era Egypt was one of the most 
important places where the USSR was confronting the United States, it no longer 
constituted any strategic value for Russia. Turkey and Iran, on the other hand, 
have become much more important than they used to be. " 14 
As Moscow placed a greater emphasis on CIS security, the need for a more stable 
and productive relationship with Turkey and Iran acquired a greater urgency. 
Countries such as Iraq and Syria remained important for strategic reasons as well 
as for their ability to consume Russian technology and weapons. Just before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, one author poignantly reminded his readers that while 
Moscow stopped supporting "Syrian aspirations for strategic parity with Israel, a 
further impoverished USSR might be tempted to sell arms for hard currency. "" A 
struggling Russian economy would likely have been similarly attracted to the 
prospect of quick profits through arms sales. By contrast, Palestinian-Israeli 
relations, or Jordanian-Israeli relations had little effect on Russia's national 
security; thus they were of little importance for Moscow other than the possibility 
of enhancing its prestige. 
The influence of countries such as Iran, Turkey and to some extent Saudi Arabia, 
on the Muslim republics of the CIS ensured that Russian foreign policy makers 
paid attention to these potential rivals. The 1980s were characterised by 
Gorbachev's New Thinking, the end of the Cold War, the liberation of Eastern 
Europe and German unification. However, the post-Soviet period was described 
by some as "the time of the new independent states which are erecting their own 
foreign policies on the ruins of the Soviet empire. i16 Existing within these newly 
independent states were aspirations which threatened to seriously curtail Russia's 
regional influence, as for example "in Uzbekistan, the longing for a vast Central 
Asian state, a revival of the old idea of grand Turkestan, " became a living 
aspiration. l7 
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Moscow had to take into account the Muslim factor, "that is, a policy by the 
Muslim republics oriented towards and possibly determined by interests in links 
with the Muslim countries of the Middle East and Asia. "" In addition, the 
growing friction between Russia and its neighbours, particularly over the 
potentially explosive issue of Russians living in the former Soviet republics, 
strengthened the identification of the Central Asian people with Islam. 
Moscow's preoccupation with considerations that were, geographically speaking, 
on its doorstep, masked the trend that Russia was setting its sights further. During 
Yeltsin's first year in office, Russia had ostensibly very little interest in the Middle 
East, with its influence perceived as being marginal. Israeli Foreign Minister and 
former Prime Minister Shimon Peres bluntly expressed this point in reference to the 
Middle East peace talks: "The United States contributed more than any other 
country to the success of these negotiations. The Americans set the time and 
venue for the meetings, and guaranteed that Russia be given its rightful place as 
co-sponsor. i19 Here Peres's most telling remark was the implication that it was 
Washington's generosity which guaranteed the Russian status; otherwise, its role 
might have been in doubt. Critics of the Soviet Union, such as Israel, suggested 
that Soviet withdrawal from the region had the positive effect of lessening the 
threat of war. Tel Aviv generally showed hostility to the possibility that Russia 
might return to the region in force because it did not want a strong counterbalance 
to its U. S. benefactor. Moscow's exclusion had removed "the potential threat to 
world peace caused by the superpowers being drawn into confrontation with each 
other through the actions of their uncontrollable Middle Eastern proteges. X20 
There was the equally tenable argument that the superpower rivalry maintained its 
own checks and balances and indirectly helped preserve the status quo in the 
Middle East by preventing one side in the Arab-Israeli conflict from over-running 
the other. The Russian leadership was well aware that a more forceful drive to re- 
enter the Middle East would have led to renewed confrontation with the West 
under certain circumstances; for example if Russia unilaterally had declared a 
resumption of full relations with Iraq. While this did not take place, and was not 
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seriously contemplated in the first five year period, it raised one interesting 
question: How much was Moscow prepared to risk in order to regain a strong 
position in the Middle East? Russia's limited capabilities, considering that it had 
little to offer except weapons which were recognised as being inferior to Western 
military equipment, made a substantial contribution towards answering that 
particular question. The so-called `Atlanticists versus Eurasianists' debate was 
essentially a struggle to dominate Russia's foreign policy outlook, and had 
potentially decisive repercussions on relations with the Middle East. This 
polarisation of views posed for Moscow an uncompromising dilemma: Washington 
wäs highly likely to be antagonised if old alliances, such as those with Syria, Iraq 
and Iran, were upgraded, yet Russia faced the prospect of losing old partners if it 
was to kow-tow to U. S. demands in the Middle East. Syria was a good example 
of a country finely balanced between the two powers. Clinton's meeting with 
President Asad and Syria's participation in the U. S. -led peace talks was largely due 
to Moscow's lack of assertiveness and a recognition that only Washington had the 
ability to influence events in the Middle East. With regards to Iraq, Russia faced 
strong competition from France to win important contracts 
But predictions during the first year of Russia's political scene that "the post- 
communist Russian leadership will go even further than Gorbachev in its retreat 
from the Third World, " were ultimately mistaken. 21 The reverse actually took 
place, with the post-Soviet leadership gradually distancing itself from various 
initiatives associated with the Gorbachev era. For example, Kozyrev's visit to Iraq 
in November 1994 added weight to Baghdad's claim that it had agreed to recognise 
the Kuwaiti borders, which was in effect fortifying the call for the sanctions to be 
lifted. This diplomatic manoeuvre was highly publicised and it restored Moscow's 
position as favourite over its foreign competitors with the ruling regime in 
Baghdad. The Russian move was a bold one because it did not meet Washington's 
approval. Moreover, it could have risked relations with pro-western Arab states 
such as Saudi Arabia, which was a leading player in the anti-Iraq coalition, as well 
as with Israel. Al-Hayat and Asharq Al Awsat, two of the most influential Arab 
papers (both Saudi funded) had front page photographs of Kozyrev comfortably 
seated next to Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz at a parliamentary session 
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with the portrait of a youthful Saddam Hussein hanging behind them. The front 
page headline in Asharq Al-Awsat read; 'Kozyrev Witnesses Saddam's Decision to 
Recognise Kuwaiti Borders'. The sight must have shaken the Gulf monarchies who 
dreaded a resurgent Saddam Hussein taking his revenge and who were haunted by 
the image of a split in the Security Council alliance against Iraq. The Kozyrev 
visit, which lasted several days, was also great political capital for Hussein who 
used the visit to tell his people that the days of the sanctions and the hardships 
were numbered. As for Russia, it signalled to the Iraqi people that the blame for 
their problems rested squarely on the shoulders of the United States and Britain. 
Kozyrev's visit was clearly measured and thought out, signalling that Russia was 
not quite ready to give up its position in the Middle East. In substance though, 
Russia made no unilateral effort to undermine the United States and the whole 
event was diplomatic theatre. Nonetheless, the visit did come at a time when the 
United States was on the verge of taking decisive action to help the Bosnian 
government against the Bosnian Serbs and their Serbian allies, and there was more 
than a hint by Moscow that Russia could still be a disruptive force if Washington 
failed to show enough respect for its opinions. Nonetheless, Yeltsin and Clinton 
were determined to prevent any cracks from emerging at such an early stage of the 
relationship between the two countries. No further steps were taken, either in 
Bosnia or Iraq, which would have antagonised the two parties. When just forty 
days later, at the end of December 1994, Russian planes were flattening the city of 
Grozny in Chechnia at the cost of many lives, Clinton's response was that the small 
Muslim republic was part of the Russian Federation and that such `teething 
troubles' of Post-Soviet Russia were to be expected. High ranking officials from 
Moscow were despatched to all of Iraq's neighbouring states, including a visit by 
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to the Gulf Co-operation states, around the 
time of the Iraqi episode, to consolidate and enhance trade links with those 
countries. 
Writing in the leading Arab newspaper, AI-Hayat, Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor 
Posuvaliuk attempted to explain Russia's position in the area. An interesting 
feature of the article was its tone, which was not apologetic, but critical of the 
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Arabs. He conceded that Russia was undergoing a difficult transition period. `By 
- the same token, many of those who beat the drum of Russia's weakness don't wish -- 
to discuss their difficulties and problems, and let's be honest, they exist and they 
are not minor. "22 Posuvaliuk provided various examples of the way Russia's 
position in the Middle East differed from that of the United States. Namely, he 
pointed out that Moscow rejected Washington's `all or nothing' approach 
regarding sanctions against Iraq. Russia, he said, supported the idea of rewarding 
the Iraqi regime for every positive step it took towards becoming a responsible 
member of the international community. Posuvaliuk also cited the fact that 
Moscow played a key role in convincing Iraq to recognise Kuwaiti sovereignty and 
the existing borders between them. In addition, he noted that Russia's position 
towards Iran, Libya and Syria did not agree with that of the United States. Then 
he rhetorically asked the Arab reader to consider which country other than Russia 
took such an independent line from Washington with regards to the Middle East 
and had the potential to influence international affairs: "Other than being a great 
power and permanent member of the Security Council and a neighbour, it is also a 
Eurasian country with no comparison. , 23 
Posuvaliuk did accept that Russia's policy in the Middle East had changed 
considerably from the past. Moscow did not only seek relations with anti-Western 
countries but with all the states of the region. This included Israel and the Gulf 
Co-operation Countries. This was indicative of Russian objectives in the area of 
building slowly but widely by keeping relations healthy and productive with as 
many countries as possible. 
Debates, Reforms and the Middle East 
In the first year of government under Yeltsin, the debate over foreign policy 
continued in the same vein as that which had existed under Gorbachev. There was 
a split between those who perceived that Russia's interests were overwhelmingly 
linked to the Western world, and those who were highly suspicious of the West in 
general and the United States in particular. The former group, generally referred 
to as Atlanticists, argued that Russia had nothing to gain from old Soviet ties with 
dictatorial regimes such as those of Syria and Iraq. The latter group were more 
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complex in that it was a combination of neo-communists, Russian 
nationalists/fascists, interest groups (mainly in the arms industry) who were wary - 
of reforms, and people who had simply been deeply indoctrinated about Western 
conspiracies to undermine their country. The term Eurasianist was most 
commonly accepted to describe this amalgamation of opinions, despite certain 
flaws. For example, a major element of Russian nationalism did not wish to be 
associated with either European or Asian cultures but regarded itself to be superior 
to both. However, broadly speaking, the term was accepted because it implied that 
Russia was a great power in both Europe and Asia and that its national security 
demanded that it gave priority to its position in both continents. 
Francis Fukuyama and other Western analysts suggested that there were historic 
examples which contradicted the view of the Eurasianist approach as inevitable. 
He cited the example of the founding fathers of modem Turkey following the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire who cast away plans for a great Turkic empire and 
adopted the principle of "a 'small Turkey'... X24 Hence for modern day Russia too, 
the geostrategic factor "can be of uncertain or ambiguous meaning and subject to 
rapid erosion as a result of technological advance. "25 Sergei Stankevich questioned 
this argument by pointing out that Turkish aspirations remained alive but the 
country had been forced to bow to direct European advances which contained it to 
its current borders. Turkey's efforts of expanding its influence were highly visible 
in Central Asia, Cyprus and the Middle East where it faced hostility from the Kurds 
and disputed borders with Syria. Moreover, friction existed with Bulgaria and 
Greece. 26 The Russian comparison was on a far larger scale, and its nuclear status 
threatened a potentially far greater impact. 
Influential foreign policy makers in Moscow began openly favouring for Russia the 
pursuit of a course protecting its traditional interests, particularly in the Middle 
East. Vladimir Lukin, the parliament's foreign affairs committee chairman, pointed 
out that Russia had "deep, historic interests" that needed to be "protected not only 
to avoid regional imbalances, but also to prevent the disruption of the social and 
political balance inside Russia itself. "27 And referring specifically to relations with 
Turkey and Iran, Lukin added that "Russia's primary interest lies in preventing 
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open conflict with third countries for influence in the developing vacuum of Central 
Asia and the Transcaucasus. "28 
Kozyrev and his neglect of relations with countries outside the Western world 
became the target of bitter criticisms from the media and senior Russian political 
figures. A barrage of anti-Kozyrev reporting portrayed the Foreign Minister as 
weak and dominated by the West. Aleksei Pushkov interpreted Kozyrev's policy in 
the following way: "[Russia] should obediently follow the United States... This was 
the source of Kozyrev's idea of a strategic partnership that assumed a subordinate 
role for Moscow in matters of world politics. In exchange for Russia's consent to 
be America's younger brother, Washington was expected to provide financial 
assistance, a flow of investment, and technological modernisation. "29 This 
approach was seen by the radical pro-Westerners of Russia as part of the German- 
Japanese path to development following their defeat in the Second World War. 
This perspective was deemed as being unacceptable by Pushkov and many others 
in Moscow because, they pointed out, Russia did not lose a military war in the 
way that Germany and Japan did, when the victors dictated the terms for peace. 
The changes that took place in the Soviet Union were to a large extent caused by 
internal dynamics rather than external forces. Moreover, the lack of financial 
means and limp political will in Washington to save the new democratic Russia 
created the general impression that any possibility of "a strategic alliance between 
Russia and the US was doomed to failure from the start. 00 Kozyrev's refusal to 
make sufficient compromises on his foreign policy principles and his labelling of all 
those who criticised his views as part of the 'Red-Brown' alliance was also 
criticised by the media. Kozyrev's mission, argued Pushkov, was not to promote 
national interest but to achieve a victory in the sphere of ideological debates. 31 
More specific subdivisions were to gradually evolve from the more general 
Eurasian-Atlanticist schism, with many scholars contented to establish a basic Left- 
Right-Centre approach as a general explanation of the political divisions in 
Moscow. Margot Light categorised the debate as being between Liberal 
Westernizers, "who favoured a market economy and held pro-Western views, " and 
Fundamentalist Nationalists "to describe the people who combined extreme 
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Nationalism with antipathy towards economic reform. s32 After 1992, she argued, 
there was a spread of nationalism which created a new group of Pragmatic - 
Nationalists, "who proposed a more integrationalist stance towards the other 
successor states" as well as "a more independent policy vis-ä-vis the West. i33 The 
Liberal Westernizers and Pragmatic Nationalists shared the belief that democracy 
should be consolidated in Russia and that a market economy was desirable. Alex 
Pravda and Neil Malcolm both accepted these general lines of division, with the 
former linking them to domestic political battle lines. Pravda saw the categories of 
debate in foreign policy as being a carbon copy of splits in domestic affairs between 
the Radical Reformers, Conservative Oppositionists and Centrists. The first group 
was characterised by the early Kozyrev period when market reformers where 
dominant in the government and represented by the likes of Egor Gaidar. As 
Kozyrev changed his policies, the Centrists became more dominant in the 
government, in response to the growing electoral strength of the opposition. 
According to Pravda, the Pragmatic Nationalists "were concerned to ensure that 
i adical conservatives did not manage to appropriate patriotism and use it to 
legitimise Fundamentalist Nationalism. "34 
The above interpretation, while generally useful, did not point to the more subtle, 
and sometimes obvious, differences which existed between the groups. From 1993 
to 1996 five distinctly identifiable groups had evolved: pro-Western radicals, 
pragmatic pro-Westerners, centrist-nationalist, pragmatic 
nationalists/occidentalists and extreme nationalists. The pro-Western radicals 
were dominant until late-1992, with Kozyrev representing a policy of seeking to 
join the Western family at the expense of Russia's Eastern links. In this sense there 
is agreement with the interpretations of Light, Pravda et al. However, it was 
incorrect to place the broad range of opinions between the Liberal Westernizers 
and Fundamentalist Nationalists under the heading of Pragmatic Nationalists 
because within this middle ground there were important divisions. The second 
category of my list, the pragmatic pro-Westerners, embodied Kozyrev and other 
former pro-Western radicals who in principle remained highly committed towards 
Western ideals and towards Russia becoming a part of the Western family, but who 
also accepted that the domestic political climate and international scene did not 
I :" 
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allow for this to take place as quickly as had been originally hoped. Therefore 
Kozyrev was forced into reversing his former neglect of relations with former 
Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucasus as well as with key states in Asia 
such as China, India, Iran and Iraq. 
It was also inaccurate to place the Fundamentalist Nationalists under the banner of 
the one anti-Western opposition movement because a distinction arose between the 
pragmatic nationalists/occidentalists and extreme nationalists. The latter group, 
which received wide media coverage because of the antics of its figure-head 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii, had in reality a non-existent effect on Russian foreign policy. 
Its ideas of restoring the Russian empire, by force if necessary, were widely 
perceived to be eccentric and clownish by most Russians. However, the proposals 
of the Communist opposition, headed by Gennadii Ziuganov, did partially succeed 
ink changing the government's policy of concentrating too heavily on the West for 
the sake of economic rewards. This pragmatic nationalist view noted that Russia 
remained a great power with important historic and political links with the East, 
which would enable it to form strong alliances to balance Western power and 
ultimately serve Russian interests. This group was in its core suspicious of the 
West and argued that Russia needed to remain vigilant in order to protect itself 
from Western intentions. However, Ziuganov and his allies also noted that a 
strong Russia could co-exist peacefully with the Western world. 
The nationalist-centrist position was epitomised by the policies of Foreign Minister 
Primakov in 1996. Malcolm et al, and many other scholars, failed to point out that 
his policies were not simply formed as a consequence of merging domestic political 
debates by taking the most acceptable arguments and espousals from the pragmatic 
pro-Westerners and pragmatic nationalists. Instead, it was a policy in its own right 
which was totally non-ideological, and in principle neither opposed nor in favour to 
the East and West. It simply sought to follow what was best for Russian geo- 
strategic and economic interests, taking into account the diminished strength of the 
country vis-a-vis the West. Contrary to Pravda's linkage of domestic divisions 
with the foreign policy debate, Primakov sought to extract the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs from the domestic political scene altogether. In this sense at least, 
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Primakov sought to emulate the British Foreign Office's reputation for strong 
loyalty to the state rather than to any particular political party. 
According to some scholars, the differences of views and tones in Russian political 
circles were so great that it was better not to attempt to seek labelling them at all. 
One such observer argued that his seven groupings were not enough to cover the 
full spectrum of opinions: "Westerniser, Liberal Moderate Reformer, Moderate 
Reformer, Conservative Moderate Reformer, Democratic Socialist, Communist, 
and Nationalist. Beyond these differences of perspective, however, the politics of 
foreign policy is also complicated by antagonisms, not necessarily related to policy, 
between cliques and factions in different governmental agencies. "" But it would 
be useless to take into account too many varying nuances; therefore the five 
groupings already mentioned best describe the emergence of the main groups by 
1996. On the whole, the policy making elite, and public opinion, made a gradual 
but clear shift from the position of the pro-Western radicals to that of the centrist- 
nationalists between 1991 and 1996. 
The evolving policy under Yeltsin was accompanied by major structural reforms 
and underwent three key phases. The first lasted until late 1992, when the pro- 
Western radicals were strongest; the second phase was an uncertain period 
between late 1992 and the end of 1995; finally, a stable and recognisable policy 
was established in 1996 which coincided with the appointment of Evgenii 
Primakov as Foreign Minister. Yeltsin's election victory in the middle of 1996 
added to the sense of consistency to Russia's policies, including that directed 
towards the Middle East. The President, particularly after the 1993 Constitution 
was adopted, took personal charge in the field of foreign policy. The Directors of 
the Federal Security Service (FSB) and of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), 
and the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Troops were all members of the 
Presidential staff. Moreover, the Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs, 
who were answerable to Yeltsin as members of the government, also reported 
directly to him as "members of the President's Security Council. s36 
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The reversal of the early enthusiasm under Kozyrev did not go unnoticed in the 
West. An article by James Meek in The Guardian, written at the time of Iraq's 
recognition of Kuwaiti borders, asserted that "Russia's determination to be the 
acknowledged godmother, if not midwife, to Iraqi recognition of Kuwait signals 
Moscow's growing belief that, while it can no longer sway world politics single- 
handed, it can be a serious counterweight to the United States when acting in 
concert with a second country. 07 In becoming more ambitious in his foreign 
policy, Yeltsin was "not simply trying to pander to the country's current nationalist- 
patriotic mood, " but "taking a realistic view of Russia's best prospective trading 
partners. " These were not so much the United States and the European Union but 
the major Asian and Middle Eastern powers. 38 Iraq for example was among the 
few Third World nations capable of repaying its £4.5 billion debt, once sanctions 
were lifted. 
The earliest signal of change under Kozyrev was the formulation of a foreign 
policy doctrine despite his earlier reluctance to do so because he had argued that 
the ideologisation of foreign policy in the Soviet era had had a negative result on 
the country. Kozyrev's acquiescence was in part due to the force of old habits, 
and partly because it informed (and assured) other governments about where 
Russia stood on various issues. But according to one analyst, the practical and 
beneficial purpose of a foreign policy was "probably internal to the Foreign 
Ministry itself s39 Many Foreign Ministry officials in Smolensk Square and in 
embassies around the world simply did not know where Russia stood on various 
issues, and considering the tumultuous changes that had taken place in 1991, it was 
hardly surprising that there was a need for a consistent set of guidelines and 
policies. 
The low morale of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not helped by many 
practical problems which were threatening the institution's whole operation. Poor 
pay and the lure of working for the private sector for the highly sought-after 
Ministry officials led to a staff drain. Some figures showed that by the middle of 
1993 the number of employees in Moscow was cut by almost 25 percent, "to 
around 3,000, of whom 60 percent were described as diplomats. " It was also 
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estimated that resignations numbered "around 500 a year (twenty times the rate in 
the 1960s and 1970s), " leading to a serious failure to fill empty posts with 
qualified personnel. " 
Overall, the initial phase of Moscow's foreign policy until the summer of 1992 had 
been highly reactive: with the immediate aims of defining Russia's strong position 
within the CIS, inheriting the Soviet role in international organisations such as the 
United Nations, and complete co-operation with the United States. This approach 
faced strong criticisms, which were to a large extent fair, that Russia was a great 
power without a long term vision of itself in the world. Consequently, in August 
1992 the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, a non-governmental organisation 
which included leading figures from the foreign affairs and defence-security 
establishments, published `A Strategy for Russia. ' This document was 
simultaneously released with a Concept on Foreign Policy (WA) which 
underwent fiery debate and many revisions until it was finally presented to 
parliament February 1993. The most striking aspect of both documents was the 
growing emphasis on the Near Abroad, which was reference to the other CIS 
countries and the Baltic states, and the implication that relations with the United 
States had cooled down from the earlier euphoria. The Concept was finally 
approved by Yeltsin in April 1993, taking many ideas from the Strategy for Russia. 
A second `Strategy for Russia' was published in May 1994 which was even more 
hard-line than the earlier draft, though it was critical of senior government officials 
who were prone to `great power rhetoric'. It vehemently opposed Nato expansion 
into Eastern Europe, and encouraged Russia to be more active in the Near Abroad. 
The overall tone of the updated proposal was that in its relations with the United 
States, "unnecessary deterioration of relations should be avoided, but at the same 
time Russia's own interests should not be undermined . 
"41 By 1994, the voice of 
the pro-Western radicals was almost completely silenced. Their vision, which 
dominated in early 1992, was seen as "an aberration, or at least naive and 
utopian. "42 The lack of trust from Russia's defence and security elites towards the 
Foreign Ministry over relations with other CIS countries led to major inter- 
departmental differences. It was often observed that the Ministry of Defence 
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"appeared to usurp diplomatic functions, " to the dismay of the Foreign Ministry, 
which was sometimes not even consulted about decisions. 43 
The Russian media, backed by influential political figures, began to point to an arc 
of instability which stretched from Central Asia (particularly Tajikistan), through 
northern parts of the Middle East and the Caucasus, up to the Balkans. This 
volatile area, Kozyrev's critics argued, could not be neglected for the sake of 
bridge-building with the West. Leading figures in Moscow began to point to the 
Muslim factor, which had been much less prominent in Soviet times. It was being 
'regularly reminded in the press that in the territory of the former Soviet Union 
there were 80 million Muslims, as well as the tens of millions in countries 
neighbouring the CIS. "The geopolitical significance of the Muslim East demands 
not only the consideration of people as a resource, and of the extensive territory, 
but in the strategic location of the region, with trade-economic opportunities 
powered in the spiritual-historic potential of the Islamic Community. '" 
It was uncoincidental that the multi-ethnic aspect of Russian nationalism, as it 
became more widespread, carried implications of unifying the civilisations of the 
East, and in 'particular the historic interaction between Orthodoxy and Islam. It 
was also recognised that such manifestations would inevitably lead to a distancing 
from the Western world. The close interaction between Russia and the Muslim 
world, one report suggested, "could predetermine the attraction of our country too 
soon, towards traditional eastern civilisation, than is allowed for her to show in 
certain countries of the `rich north. "'45 
In certain respects it was ironic that the democratic climate in Russia undermined 
the most democratically-minded political leaders in Moscow. With regard to the 
domestic scene, Russia had a genuinely pluralistic political system where 
differences and disagreements were aired and shared and secrets became more 
difficult to keep. Unlike former foreign ministers Gromyko and Molotov for 
example, Kozyrev's foreign policy had to be justifiable to the Russian Duma and 
ultimately to the people. In one instance, Kozyrev's trip to Iraq was criticised by 
Vladimir Lukin, as likely to "antagonise the US. "46 
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A few academic figures interpreted this pluralism to be a sign of chaos and 
disorder. In the words of one such observer: 
"Far from being unified, the contemporary Russian State consists of an agglomeration of semi- 
autonomous bureaucracies organised in a loose hierarchy, on top of which sits the President. He 
wields considerable formal powers but has much less practical and operational control over his 
nominal subordinates ... The very term `Russian 
foreign policy' is in many cases inherently 
misleading, since it implies that the Russian state is a unitary `rational actor. m4? 
Yeltsin's decision to create the posts of his own foreign-policy aide, Dmitrii 
Riurikov and a national-security aide, Juni Baturin who both undertook diplomatic 
missions, seemed to add to the confusion by adding separate tracks to foreign 
policy making. Yet it could similarly be argued that in the Western world, 
particularly the United States, there existed plurality in foreign policy making. In 
Washington D. C., political, ethnic, military, industrial and countless other lobbies 
operate to influencepolicy. The President of the United States also has to balance 
the policies of the State Department, Congress, the Defence Department, 
intelligence bureaux, his own national security advisers and sometimes public 
opinion and the media. In all, despite dangers of miscommunication and a clash of 
interests (and even in the United States mistakes sometimes do occur in foreign 
policy making), such diversity is an acceptable part of a pluralistic democratic 
society. Therefore, in defence of the Russian example, efforts to broaden the base 
of opinions and ideas should not be negatively perceived as a sign of chaos but 
rather as a positive shift away from the Soviet model when the fate of hundreds of 
millions of people was decided by two or three ageing men, immersed in the 
propaganda of inevitable class conflict. 
It was acknowledged by the Kremlin that while different ideas were welcome, there 
was a distinct failure by Kozyrev to adopt a far-reaching set of policies which 
would somehow bring together the mainstream collection of arguments about the 
best course for the country, and deal with the most immediate problems facing 
Russia, such as relations with the CIS and other important Asiatic neighbours. 
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There was also an urgent demand to break the institutional gridlock which had 
made decision-making impossible by 1993. To counter accusations of disorder, 
Yeltsin acted decisively to ensure a more coherent foreign policy. The new 
Constitution of 1993 served to change the relationship between government and 
parliament to the detriment of the latter. The Russian Constitution until then had 
given the parliament the right to lay the framework of foreign policy making for the 
President to implement. Until October 1993, the Russian Parliament had shown 
itself to be increasingly defiant and acting independently from the Kremlin and the 
Foreign Ministry. This, and rivalry between various government bodies led 
11 'President Yeltsin to issue a decree on 3 November, in order to reassert the position 
of the Foreign Ministry. It stated that the "Russian Foreign Ministry will be 
entrusted with the function of co-ordinating and monitoring work by other Russian 
ministries, committees and departments to ensure a unified political line by the 
Russian Federation in relations with foreign states... i48 
The task of finding a new and more prominent role for the Foreign Ministry 
seemed to overwhelm Kozyrev. Yeltsin's State Secretary Gennadii Burbulis, an 
ally of Kozyrev, sought to resolve the disarray in Russia's foreign policy-making by 
encouraging a more direct presidential involvement. However, the Kremlin was 
heavily weighed down by domestic crises and challenges and could not afford to 
use up limited resources over the details of international affairs. Kozyrev's 
inabilities were becoming increasingly apparent, both in international affairs and in 
making his ministry more effective in dealing with internal political debates. 
Yeltsin's patience with his Foreign Minister was being increasingly tested, until he 
openly complained that "everyone who feels like interfering does so, and all the 
Foreign Ministry does is to shut itself up in its own diplomatic debates and 
visits. "a9 
The 1993 Constitution, in attempting to unify the whole decision-making process, 
stated that "the President `directs the foreign policy of the Russian Federation' 
(within the framework set by the constitution and laws of the country) 
(Art. 80,86)... He forms and presides over the Security Council and conducts 
international negotiations (Art. 83). s5° Yeltsin accompanied this with a change of 
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emphasis in the country's national policy in order to fit a broader consensus. While 
Russia's retreat from Latin America and most of Africa was seen by most political 
factions as logical, the pro-Western radicals' neglect of important regions such as 
the Middle East was heavily criticised. But Moscow's re-emerging interest in the 
area was not encouraged by the United States. By 1993, it was already being 
noted that "serious security co-operation may not materialise in the future between 
the two nations... with abundant signs that deep-rooted suspicions will be hard to 
eradicate. "" Powerful lobbies in the United States argued that for Washington to 
protect its international interests, such as those in the Middle East, it should halt 
cuts in the defence sector, which also employed a large workforce. 
Military leaders in Moscow argued that Russia would "have to be armed against 
ever more sophisticated weaponry among (unnamed) nations to the south, and 
perhaps even against independent armies being established by some of the former 
Soviet republics. 02 While border issues were tangible aspects of geo-strategic 
politics, there were more invisible conditions which were difficult to ignore. The 
arms trade, world energy prices, Islamic fundamentalism and of course the threat 
of nuclear attack, whether it was intercontinental or local, all undermined 
Moscow's outlook on the world. Consequently, the middle ground of Russian 
foreign policy making became more pragmatic in its thinking by the start of 1993, 
and Kozyrev was at the forefront of this shift from a radical to a pragmatic pro- 
Western position. This meant that the main priority of seeking close co-operation 
with the West would remain unchanged, but a new and special emphasis was given 
to relations with other CIS countries and regions which were of particular interest 
to Russia. In addition, the zealous and ideologically-driven association with the 
Western world was substantially toned down. 
As the pro-Western thinkers were to split into ideological and pragmatic factions, 
the so-called Eurasianists were to do the same. Most importantly, the ideas of 
extreme Russian nationalists, or neo-imperialists, were rejected by parties and 
groups who had to appear electable to government. The Russian Communist Party 
was the main threat to Yeltsin's government and was a genuine contender for 
election victory after 1993. Its political agenda was based on the failure of the pro- 
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Western leadership to succeed in its Western-backed market reforms, which 
included the ending of subsidies for services and goods which had been taken for 
granted in the Soviet era. Their counterview was that Russia possessed all the 
material and human resources it needed to follow its own unique course. It had 
also inherited from the Soviet Union a network of friends and allies in key regions 
which would enable it to trade and re-establish its role as a great power. The 
West, they believed, would then acknowledge Russia's great power position and 
the two powers would learn to coexist peacefully, each dominating its own 
geopolitical space. 
This should be contrasted with the extreme nationalist view, mainly represented by 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party, which had some bizarre 
perceptions of world affairs. Zhirinovskii argued for a restoration of the Russian 
empire and its expansion so that Russians could have direct access to the 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. It took the Eurasianist idea to the extreme, 
with visions of massive spheres of influence based on East-West frontiers. Rabidly 
suspicious of U. S. intentions and their idea of a new world order, "they saw a plot 
by America to construct a world government. "53 They did not rule out the use of 
military force to achieve national objectives and xenophobia was a dominant strand 
in the thinking of its leading members. 
Needless to say the neo-imperialist view remained on the fringes, but the pragmatic 
occidentalists/Russian nationalists gained a great deal of public and media 
sympathy and some of their suggestions were actually adopted by the ruling elite. 
According to one author, this was an unsurprising "reassertion of Russian 
nationalism, " considering the country was facing a major "identity crisis. s54 But 
the` increasingly nationalist tone of Moscow's policy was not praised by all. Pro- 
Western thinkers were concerned that Russia was falling back into the trap of 
thinking it was much stronger than it really was. They argued that placing too 
much emphasis on great-power status demanded "a strong economic base, capable 
of sustaining massive military power over extended periods, " and warned that 
Russia was "in danger of becoming a supernova state, expanding slowly outwards 
on its periphery while collapsing internally! '" 
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But despite such risks, Russian foreign policy evolved into a national, pragmatic 
policy, as epitomised by Primakov, whom some in the West mistook for being a 
hard-liner, or anti-Westerner. In fact, he was neither, but simply a realist centrist 
whose style was less idealistic than that of Kozyrev or Shevardnadze. The Yeltsin 
leadership had to take into account the general disillusionment with the West, 
which provided political ammunition for the Russian nationalist armoury. Under 
Stalin, Moscow's chief concern was to create a buffer zone in Eastern Europe and 
. to concentrate on major southern neighbours such as 
Turkey, Iran and China. 
Khrushchev revolutionised Moscow's thinking by urging his bureaucrats to adopt a 
more globalist world view. Gorbachev too attempted to impose a more globally- 
aware outlook from Moscow but the two men shared the unfortunate position of 
being the only leaders to be deposed from power since 1917. Moscow's political 
establishment and Russian public opinion in general regarded the two former 
leaders as being failures, both domestically and in foreign policy. 
Washington's energetic drive to expand Nato and to openly reject plans for 
Russian involvement in key regions, including the Middle East, nullified many of 
the arguments of the radical pro-Westerners. Moscow's chief concern was that 
Nato expansion would leave Russia' too vulnerable because it would become 
completely surrounded by powerful and potentially dangerous international 
regional threats. This would include Nato to the West, the Muslim countries to the 
south and China to the East. Moscow's leadership almost unintentionally found 
itself confronted with potential threats that were close to its borders, and this 
included the Middle East, where Iran and Iraq were regarded as being "perennial 
sources of trouble in the Southern Theatre of Operation. "56 The efforts by Iran 
and Turkey for closer ties with the Muslim republics in the CIS was also being 
closely monitored in Moscow, and the deployment of US forces in the Persian Gulf 
region since 1991 was an added source of concern for Russia's foreign policy 
chiefs. 
The perception that the move towards a less Western-oriented policy was brought 
on by the October 1993 clash with parliament and the electoral successes of 
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Zhirinovskii failed to acknowledge the changes taking place within the 
establishment. As already noted, the central apparatus itself began to change its 
position and this dated back to May 1992 with the publication of a draft of 
Russia's Military Doctrine, which was adopted in November 1993. Under the 
heading `Possible Causes of War', it listed the "violation of the rights of .. persons 
who identify themselves ethnically and culturally with [Russia) 2257 The Foreign 
Ministry's own doctrine of April 1993 echoed the Military Doctrine when it stated 
that Russians in the Near Abroad would have their rights secured by Moscow 
"through persuasion, and in extreme cases also through the use of force. s58 
These forceful statements were misinterpreted to mean that Russia was actively 
seeking confrontation in the quest for reasserting its domination over the former 
Soviet territories. But the doctrine was only a part of the wider recognition that 
the country needed to create basic guidelines for its military forces. In the words 
of one defence analyst in the United Kingdom: 
"There are excellent reasons why a military doctrine should be published. It is somewhat 
analogous to a defence White Paper. Democratic accountability demands it. Russia's potential 
and actual security partners, not to mention neighbouring states in the `near abroad', need to 
know about Russia's attitudes if they are to trust the country and co-operate confidently with it. 
The armed forces themselves need the direction given by an open security policy, for every officer 
and soldier needs to know what he is training for and why... "59 
One consequence of Kozyrev's failure was that many of the agreements he signed 
with the West were viewed with suspicion by various ministries, particularly by the 
Defence Ministry and President Yeltsin himself, who sharply rebuked his Foreign 
Minister several times, leading to his forced resignation. For many of Kozyrev's 
rivals, the natural replacement for the existing policy would be "the creation, in 
response to Nato's planned expansion, of a military-political bloc of CIS countries; 
an emphasis in foreign policy and foreign trade on such countries as Iraq, Iran and 
other radical Arab regimes, " and the return to the special relationship with Cuba. 60 
Pushkov represented the general trend of opinion which rejected Kozyrev's world 
view. In its place, it was argued that Russia should isolate regions of top priority - 
Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East - by virtue of 
its geostrategic position as an Eurasian power. 
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Moscow used the various levers of influence it had to become directly involved in - 
the affairs of its former Soviet neighbours, whether it was the civil war in 
Tajikistan or Georgia's fight with Abkhazian separatists. This led the Georgian 
Ambassador in Moscow to say that his country's "independence depended to a 
great extent on the position of Russia. "6' Russia's involvement was not only by 
military means, but it had at its disposal other methods. This was made abundantly 
clear in Kozyrev's warning to the government in Almaty in 1993: "Russia is 
prepared to defend its citizens living in Kazakhstan... and in this purpose will use 
all-its power, including economic sanctions and credit and financial policy. "62 
The radical pro-Westerners were highly concerned that the increasing 
entanglement in the affairs of Russia's Asian neighbours would serve to undermine 
the reforms intended to create a society based on Western democratic and 
economic ideals. "Historically, Russia's tremendous space seemed to demand an 
authoritarian form of government, " and historians noted that the imperialist policy 
of "co-optation by Russia of other nations at different stages of economic, cultural, 
and political development played a very significant role in obstructing the process 
"63 of democratisation and the path of economic development. 
According to one observer, by 1994 Russian foreign policy had become 
"hardnosed and aggressive, taking on precisely the character that President Boris 
Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had vocally resisted in 1991 and 
1992. i64 An article in a Russian newspaper by Kozyrev entitled 'Peace With a 
Sword', highlighted this shifting rhetoric. He stressed that only Russia was 
responsible for the stability of the region of the former Soviet Union and criticised 
those in the West who attacked Russia's actions as a continuation of past ambitions 
by suggesting that "perhaps their suspicion of Moscow's 'neo-imperial plans' 
conceals their own similar ambitions. 05 
Iri September 1993, Kozyrev was quite direct in his assessment of what Russia 
needed to do in the Near Abroad: "If we do not master the political will and 
practical means - that is to be blunt, troops and equipment - to conduct 
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peacekeeping missions in the zones of the former Soviet Union, this vacuum will 
-- be filled by other forces, first of all, by the forces of political extremism, which, -- 
ultimately, threaten Russia herself. "66 
An article in The Daily Telegraph in early 1996 which quoted the views of a 
Russian ultra-nationalist sought to imply that his views were becoming more 
prevalent in Moscow. Anton Surikov, a leading voice of the old Soviet military- 
industrial complex had called for the restoration of nuclear weapons in Belarus "to 
deter the eastward expansion of Nato, and the Russian army should prepare to 
invade the Baltic states, which were allowed to escape the Kremlin yoke in 1991, 
unless they treat their Russian minorities better. n67 The article pointed out that "his 
ideas might have seemed ludicrous a year ago. But such is the swing in Russian 
politics to the old, Soviet way of thinking that his views have become fashionable 
in the military establishment. X68 Yet the article actually reflected the failure of the 
Western media to understand the real motives of Russia's foreign policy and to 
distinguish between the views of loose-cannon individuals and the influential core 
of Moscow's policy-making elite. 
Although Primakov took over at the beginning of 1996, Kozyrev's end had been 
forecast since the Autumn of 1995. From then on, a clearer definition of Russia's 
foreign policy was in place. In the words of Sergei Karaganov, "the formation of a 
rather broad consensus on foreign policy is quite likely now. But it was unrealistic 
to expect such a consensus to form around Kozyrev. i69 In his last years in office, 
Kozyrev changed his position too often, until he was no longer trusted by neither 
democrats nor by the so-called hard-liners with the West. Kozyrev was too closely 
"associated with the early years of his tenure at the Foreign Ministry, when his 
policy of 'what can I do for you? ' evoked strong feelings of humiliation among 
Russia's elite, whether they supported the policy of rapprochement with the West 
or not. 1170 In fact Kozyrev's weak position at the end of his tenure of office reached 
the point that one commentator noted that the Defence Minister, and "not the 
head of the diplomatic office (as would normally be the case)... ellipse is achieving 
foreign policy results. i71 
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There were a few who were prepared to spring to Kozyrev's defence. One 
observer wrote that claims that Kozyrev had changed his position in his last years 
were not accurate. Instead, it was argued that he had stayed "true to what was 
practically his first declaration [as Foreign Minister] that the foreign policy he 
intended to conduct was the 'president's policy'. Faithful to that declaration, he is 
evolving along with the 'general line'. "72 However, with 1996 being election year, 
Yeltsin correctly assessed that Kozyrev had become a political liability and 
replaced him with the widely respected head of the SVR, Primakov. Once 
Primakov had assumed the position of Foreign Minister, Moscow's policy was 
dominated by his centrist position. It was essentially a combination of the views of 
the pragmatic nationalists and the pragmatic pro-Westernisers. The basic tenet of 
this position was that "since the international system is a self-help world, states 
must treat security as their highest priority to survive, assuming that even a benign 
political environment in which no obvious threats exist can change rapidly. "73 
While the centrists believed that Russia had a unique role in the world, they did not 
in principle reject good relations with the West as long as they did not conflict with 
Russia's interests. 
Conclusion: Primakov hones a national policy 
In his first year, Yeltsin went a step further than New Thinking by completely 
abandoning the socialist model, "eliminating ideological ambiguity, and expanding 
the basis for common U. S. -Russian values and objectives. "74 But this was not 
enough, as a more thorough basis for international affairs was required for post- 
Soviet Russia. The transformation within the Russian system did not alter the 
basic geographic and diplomatic concerns of that country. By 1996, Moscow had 
been modestly successful in founding a recognisable, steady and broadly acceptable 
foreign policy. 
In 'an interview with Izvestiia in March 1996, Primakov told the interviewer that 
there was widespread consensus between the foreign ministry and the ultra- 
nationalist/neo-communist-dominated parliament. When asked about the proposed 
expansion of Nato, Primakov's answer was no less direct: "The expansion of Nato 
106 
is not in the interest of Russian society, and it seems to me that it has also 
. manifested 
the unity of Russian society, and the unity of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with all factions in Parliament. The expansion of Nato is created for the 
weakening of our geopolitical situation. 05 
Primakov also criticised Russian foreign policy in the first two years since 1991, 
thus indirectly making his point against Kozyrev. The new foreign minister said 
that in this "defining stage we followed everything in order to balance relations 
with Washington]. Here I quote Mao Tse Tung who said: 'when you want to 
straighten it is necessary to bend. ' We had bent excessively. 06 He rejected the 
concept of a strategic alliance with the United States in favour of a more pragmatic 
relationship based upon a'civilised partnership'. 
Primakov was highly popular among Russia's political elite and the media. He 
represented a professionalism and sense of purpose which was missing under 
Kozyrev. One article reflected the widespread praise being heaped on Primakov 
following his visit to the UN, in New York, where he "dined with counterparts 
from 30 different countries. " Among the countries they represented from the 
Middle East were Iran, Israel, Iraq and Kuwait. He then met Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali "and then, as an after-dinner cigar, he gave an interview to CNN. "77 
In the new spirit of pragmatism which was a dominant characteristic in 1996, there 
was no longer a rejection of everything related to the Soviet era. There was a new 
rationale which stated that some aspects of Soviet foreign policy were useful, 
therefore it would be folly to discard it simply because it was linked to that time. 
Newspapers portrayed former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in a 
positive light. In an interview with his son, Anatoli Gromyko, the long serving 
Cold War warrior was described as a thorough professional and referred to as a 
first class diplomat. 8 In another article, Gromyko was praised for his ability to 
"show that compensating for internal weakness by means of a successful foreign 
policy is, to a certain extent, a possibility and thus stood to be essential. "79 The 
author of the article was Karaganov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and 
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Defence policy and member of the Presidential Council, who had an influential 
voice in foreign policy-making circles. 
The Presidential elections in the spring of 1996 appeared to settle many of the 
uncertainties of the national foreign policy. Yeltsin cleverly neutralised his 
opponents on this issue by stealing their thunder. "The appointment of Evgenii 
Primakov led to almost a complete absence of debate in the country about foreign 
policy, " wrote Karaganov in another article. 80 One article suggested that "Yeltsin 
and Ziuganov, the main contenders in the presidential elections, tried to outbid one 
another in Russian patriotism. "" The incumbent president had skilfully linked 
foreign policy and domestic affairs by including the centrists to broaden his base. 
But the facts showed that the changes were also being spurred by national 
considerations. For example, in 1995 "Russian arms exports reached $3 billion, an 
increase of 80 percent over 1994. s82 
The first major test of Primakov's policy in the Middle East was in April 1996, 
when Israeli jets bombed Lebanon in an operation called Grapes of Wrath. 
Primakov announced that Russia intended to raise its profile in the region. But the 
new Foreign Minister found himself embroiled in the complexities of the Middle 
East, and was undermined by the determination of the United States to prevent 
third parties from getting involved, leading the Izvestiia correspondent to say it 
was "Primakov's first defeat. i83 The United States and Israel worked together to 
ensure Russia's exclusion from a peace-making role. But the real blow was that 
President Asad of Syria, Russia's ostensibly long-time ally, did not demand the 
participation of his `friends' in Moscow in the Monitoring Committee set up to 
oversee the cease-fire on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Indeed, considering that 
Primakov was supposed to be a specialist on the region, his failure to achieve 
anything during his trip to the capitals involved in the fighting must have been a 
deep source of frustration, if not embarrassment for him. 
But overall, Moscow's political elite highly valued Primakov's expertise and 
experience. Aleksandr Iakovlev, who helped Primakov's career rise under 
Gorbachev, defended the Foreign Minister by saying that the "democrats are 
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wrong for taking a hostile line against him, calling him a conservative. He is not a 
conservative, but simply doesn't rush to conclusions. "" Russian foreign policy 
had, perhaps for the first time since the demise of the Soviet Union, become more 
predictable and consistent. It laid a special emphasis on regional security, 
particularly within the CIS, but not upon "the principle `let's restore the USSR' but 
according to the principle `let's restore what's good for Russia and its citizens. `85 
Moscow's direct military intervention, some would call it invasion, in Chechnia 
underlined the Russian government's determination to defend national interests 
even at the risk of losing support from the international community as well as the 
domestic electorate. Many liberals in Moscow, including former acting Prime 
Minister Egor Gaidar, criticised Yeltsin's actions as contrary to his democratic 
agenda. 
The most important backing that Primakov received was from the President 
himself. Yeltsin, who was preoccupied with the elections and pressing domestic 
issues, needed a Foreign Minister who could be trusted to act on his own initiative. 
Presidential support strengthened the position of the Foreign Ministry and unified 
policy-making. Following law changes affecting foreign policy, it was established 
that "no document pertaining to this sphere may be submitted to the President's 
staff unless it has been cleared by the Foreign Ministry, [and] no representative of 
the executive branch (except diplomats, of course) may express an official view of 
foreign policy matters. s86 
Primakov also proved dextrous in dis-associating himself from domestic political 
rivalries. When asked in an interview if he could work with the country's main 
power brokers, Chubais, Lebed and Rodionov, the Foreign Minister's answer was 
neutral yet to the point. "I am interested above all in their understanding that the 
MFA is the inter-co-ordinator of the foreign policy course of Russia. All three 
understand this. Moreover, Chubais, Lebed and Rodionov want to strengthen the 
position of the MFA as the central policy-making organ of the state. "87 
In 1994, one Russian observer had protested that Moscow should be clear about 
its intentions: "This would put an end to false rumours, speculation and hints that, 
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unlike its democratic path in domestic policy, its foreign-policy course may be 
reversible and that, if need be, it may resort to power methods of restoring its 
superimperial grandeur. " " Moscow was largely successful in redressing this 
situation by 1996. Russia's policies were reinvented to create new priorities for 
itself. This included the Middle East as much as any region. A senior Foreign 
Ministry official explained to me in October of that year how Russia had come to 
see the world. "There are established rules and interests in bilateral relations which 
govern them and govern alliances in different areas of the world. Therefore, I see 
the status of the Middle East as having, and going to have, a very high place in the 
list of priorities. " He added that Russian interests could be damaged "if we are not 
properly prepared at key moments with regards to developments in the Middle 
East. "89 
However, towards the end of 1996, it was the head of the Foreign Ministry who 
provided the most telling description of Russia's international outlook. "When I 
say that Russia does not have permanent enemies but that it has permanent 
interests, I am not presenting anything new-But during the Soviet period we 
swerved from this. National interests were often sacrificed for the sake of the 
struggle against a permanent enemy or the support of permanent allies. "90 
Primakov rejected the strategic alliance with the West, espoused by Kozyrev, and 
promoted the idea of equal partnership. According to him, the former "is when the 
parties join their interests to fight a common enemy or when they even sacrifice 
some of their interests to the struggle against that enemy. On the other hand, 
partnership is when the two sides each have their own interests, but when. there 
are, in addition, fields of coinciding interests. 2591 
Domestically, he argued that foreign policy should be based on a broad consensus 
of what is good for Russia. Effectively, a national policy based on solid 
foundations which prevents it from being blown off course by the prevailing 
political wind. "Foreign policy differs from domestic policy in that it should be 
based on national consensus. Take the example of other countries: Is US policy 
partisan? If Labour come to power in Britain, would it change the strategic course 
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of Great Britain? "92 Primakov's success in creating a coherent and steady policy 
laid the framework for less confused relations with the West and the Middle East. 
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Chapter V: Russian-Israeli Relations: Facing the Inevitable 
One of the most startling transformations of Russian policy in the Middle East in 
the early 1990s was the nature of relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv, 
considering that in the Soviet era, until Mikhail Gorbachev took power, Israel was 
regarded as an enemy of the USSR and a prime threat to its interests in the region. 
But because Gorbachev had already initiated so many drastic yet unexpected 
turnabouts in foreign policy (in Europe, Afghanistan and so on), by the time the 
two countries had established diplomatic relations in 1991 the world hardly 
noticed. 
A few days after the Soviet ambassador took up residence in Tel Aviv the USSR 
had disappeared as a national entity. Yeltsin persisted in the course of improving 
relations inherited from Gorbachev but certain practical difficulties, such as those 
relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute, seemed to re-impose themselves with the 
passing of time. The U. S-Israeli alliance, Israel's aggressive policies towards its 
Arab neighbours and Russia's co-operative relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran all 
created tension in bilateral relations, which by 1996 were no longer concealed by 
Moscow. But there were new aspects to the relationship between the two 
countries which helped solidify the links between Russia and Israel and give 
Moscow a more balanced role in the region as a whole. One such important 
development was the flourishing trade between the two countries. 
Problems of the past in Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations 
Ironically, Stalin was first to recognise the Jewish State in 1948 but then suddenly 
cooled relations because of his concerns regarding `Western imperialism' and the 
influence an Israeli state might have on his own Jewish population. These concerns 
were in one way or another present throughout the Soviet era up until its very last 
days. 
Soviet antipathy towards Israel continued with Brezhnev, who took decisive action 
in June 1967 by breaking off all forms of ties with Tel Aviv to compensate for the 
embarrassing defeat of its Arab allies. Moscow then played an active role at the 
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United Nations Security Council where it adopted a series of measures calling on 
Israel to return land that had been taken from Arabs during the Six Day War. The 
animosity between Moscow and Tel Aviv continued throughout the 1970s, despite 
detente, as tension in the Middle East remained high. The Soviet Union provided 
the Arabs with an ever increasing quantity of modern weapons and technical 
assistance through manpower, and some Israelis suspected without concrete 
evidence that a number of Soviet troops were front-line participants in the 1973 
war. 
According to UN Resolutions 242 and 338, Arab-Israeli negotiations were to be 
based on the principle that Israel would return Arab land occupied since 1967 in 
exchange for recognition of Israel's right to exist. However, it was felt by some in 
Moscow that the 1967 decision to sever relations was a blunder because it 
seriously limited Soviet diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. The restrictions 
imposed on Moscow by its decision to break relations were made more evident 
when the United States had brokered a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, 
which was concluded in 1979. Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
wanted to avoid any situation which would lead to a direct confrontation between 
the superpowers. This possibility worried the United States to the extent that 
President Richard Nixon warned in a televised interview on 1 July 1970 that "the 
Middle East is terribly dangerous, " and the situation threatened to push the 
superpowers "into a confrontation that neither of them wants. "1 
During the 1970s, attempts by Moscow to restore relations with Israel in order to 
devise a peace plan for the area were met with various obstacles. First, there was 
the October War of 1973 in which Moscow could not appear to betray the Arab 
countries it had supported for so many years. And when in the late 1970s Egypt 
signed the peace treaty with Israel, Moscow's chief allies Syria, Libya and the PLO 
had formed the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation aimed at countering 
Washington's efforts to break the Arab coalition against Israel. The USSR 
believed it was vital to back this coalition as it was perceived to be a solid platform 
to check U. S. influence in the area. For Washington's foreign-policy makers, Arab 
countries which could be prized away from the confrontationist bloc to make peace 
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with Israel would mean a loss for the Soviet-led world and a gain for the United 
States. Washington's most successful envoy in those important years of the early 
1970s was Henry Kissinger who was known for his shuttle diplomacy between 
Hafez Asad of Syria, Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Israel's Golda Meir. The Soviet 
Union, in comparison, refused to deal directly with Israel which seriously 
undermined its own efforts of mediation. 
The first comprehensive U. S. peace plan had been devised under Secretary of State 
William Rogers and while Israel's response was critical of both procedural and 
substantive aspects of the plan, it was a first step in opening the way for Kissinger 
to work for a mediation. Israeli misgivings about the Rogers Plan actually served 
to enhance the image of the United States as an honest broker. Meanwhile, the 
Soviet Union had since 1967 found itself enmeshed in Arab politics and was unable 
to extract itself from the Arab-Israeli conflict without risk of losing strategic gains 
it held in the area. Between 1967 and 1973 there was increasing Soviet 
participation in Egypt's air defence, "posing danger of a direct clash with Israel... "2 
The loss of Egypt, however, allowed Moscow to concentrate its attention on Syria, 
which became Israel's most outspoken enemy and Russia's most important ally in 
the Middle East. In other words, from Israel's point of view the Soviet Union had 
shown continuity in its support to the most violent anti-Israeli regimes, whatever 
the composition of its leadership or the country they ruled. 
Soviet policy presented the Jewish state as nothing more than a `tool' of the West. 
In reality, the relationship between Israel and the United States was far more 
complicated and differences often arose. Israel was by far the largest recipient of 
U. S. aid, $3 billion annually, which included the most up-to-date military hardware. 
Nonetheless, there were many points of friction in the relationship including the 
decision by Washington to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia, which was to some 
extent elevated to equal status with Israel in the fight against Soviet and pro-Soviet 
expansion in the 1980s. The first instance of this was in 1978 when Washington 
sold F-15s and other advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia despite a visit to 
Washington by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin aimed at preventing such 
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action. On realising that the Carter administration would not be swayed the Israeli 
leader openly criticised the United States. 
The bombing and destruction of the French-built Iraqi nuclear research facility 
(Osirak) near Baghdad on 7 June 1981 by Israeli jets (U. S. supplied F-16s, 
escorted by F-15s), a mission undertaken without prior consultation with the 
United States, led to a direct criticism from the State Department the following 
day: "The United States government condemns the reported Israeli air strike on the 
Iraqi nuclear facility, the unprecedented character of which cannot but seriously 
add to the already tense situation in the area. Available evidence suggests US- 
provided equipment was employed in possible violation of the applicable 
agreement under which it was sold to Israel... 153 Despite Israeli misdemeanour, no 
action was taken because of the special relationship between the two countries and 
the strength of the Jewish lobby in the United States. 
Attitudes and perceptions 
Soviet criticisms of Israel were often laced with doses of anti-Semitism. What 
worried many Israelis was that many of the Soviet propaganda scriptwriters and 
foreign-policy makers continued to hold influential positions in post-Soviet Russia. 
Soviet insinuations about a world Jewish conspiracy to dominate the political 
institutions of Washington and the banking centres in New York as well as the 
media were evident in the Soviet press through political commentaries and 
cartoons. The situation worsened when the United States under Jimmy Carter and 
later Ronald Reagan pressed Moscow to permit Jews to leave the Soviet Union. 
Western insistence regarding this matter, which it termed a human rights issue, 
made Soviet leaders even more suspicious of their Jewish population and more 
critical of Israel and its policies. From the Soviet perspective, Israel was a tool 
that Washington was using to chisel away at Soviet interests abroad, and at the 
internal social stability of the USSR itself. 
One study (by Yeshanyahu Nir in 1976) looked at the Arab-Israeli conflict through 
Soviet caricatures. One cartoon, drawn in 1979, depicted an Israeli soldier (with 
an eye-patch resembling that of Moshe Dayan, the former Israeli Defence 
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Minister), drawing with his bayonet a Star of David made from human bones. The 
painter (soldier) in the cartoon wrote above the star `Greater Israel' (in Russian) 
and the caption under the cartoon read: `The ExpresSIONIST from Tel Aviv. 74 
Some Soviet anti-Israeli propaganda likened Jewish settlers to Nazis, something 
that Moscow would have known to be a sensitive issue to Jews. One cartoon, for 
example, depicted a Jewish worker carrying a bloodied axe marked with the Star of 
David and the shadow of this worker was a deliberate resemblance to Adolf Hitler 
except that the axe was marked by a Swastika. The cartoon was titled `In His Own 
Shadow. 'S Since Gorbachev's New Thinking such attacks became much less 
common and blatant anti-Semitism rarely transpired from the ruling elite. 
During the run-up to the 1996 Presidential elections there was concern, particularly 
from the pro-Israeli Jewish lobby in the United States, that there was a revival of 
anti-Semitism in Russia. Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party was 
clearly anti-Israeli and not sympathetic to Jews. However, it was Gennadii 
Ziuganov, the principal challenger to Boris Yeltsin, who was the target of 
accusations by Jews in Israel and their counterparts in the United States. 
According to reports in the Israeli-friendly press in the United States, "top officials 
of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, " met with Strobe Talbot (U. S. 
ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union) as part of a campaign to lobby 
President Clinton "over a new wave of Russian anti-Semitism. "6 
One report listed a series of events which were intended to support this view: "The 
April 3 decision by the Yeltsin government to withdraw accreditation of the Israel- 
based Jewish Agency, which has been supporting the revival of communal Jewish 
life in Russia; the April 19 bombing of a Jewish communal centre in Yaroslavl, 130 
miles north of Moscow; the interruption of Jewish history classes and instruction 
on emigration to Israel by Interior Ministry agents in the town of Piatigorsk on 
April 30; the mailing of notices to large numbers of Jewish youths warning them 
that they may be drafted into the Russian army; the release of a new security edict 
that, if endorsed, could make emigration from Russia more difficult. "7 Ziuganov's 
comments in his book, Beyond the Horizon, that the Jewish diaspora held a 
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controlling interest in the West's economic life was taken to mean that he endorsed 
the world Jewish conspiracy theory. 8 
However, such allegations were largely due to hypersensitivity on the part of the 
Jewish-backed media and were usually prevalent in less credible journals, 
particularly as there was negligible evidence to suggest that the Kremlin or the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraged anti-Jewish activity. The real differences 
between the two countries were largely political; concerning Russia's role in the 
regional conflict. There was also friction over Israel's reluctance to transfer legal 
rights to Russia from the Soviet Union of valuable land holdings in Jerusalem. It 
would have been an impossible task for Israeli foreign policy-makers to prove that 
there was an inherent anti-Semitism among Russians and particularly among its 
ruling elite. Foreign policy makers from both countries made a special effort to 
relegate such suspicions for the sake of national interests. 
Russian national interests and Israel 
With regard to Israel, the first year under Yeltsin saw little activity because 
Moscow needed time to find its feet as a new state, to face more pressing external 
problems such as relations with the other independent republics of the former 
Soviet Union and maintaining co-operation with the West. But Moscow's 
aspiration to re-establish itself more broadly in international affairs re-emerged. As 
Hannes Adomeit observed in one article, "There is hardly an opportunity let slip 
these days [January, 1995] by Russian officials to proclaim Russia once again to be 
`a great power. "'9 Russia's retreat was described as a temporary measure and a 
"return to a more assertive and unilateralist policy was therefore to be considered 
quite normal and indeed predictable. i10 
To a varying degree, pragmatic and extreme nationalists called for a return to the 
old Soviet policy of supporting traditional allies in the region such as Syria and 
Iraq against pro-US states such as Israel. These groups argued that the policies of 
Moscow in the late 1980s and early 1990s were naive to expect close partnership 
with the West. " Demands from these anti-government forces to move away from 
such a policy were not necessarily built on the basis of conflict as much as it was 
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out of a belief that Russia's `great power' status gave it the right to have its own 
spheres of influence in the same way that Washington did. 
Radical pro-Westerners countered that Russia's policy of diversifying relations 
applied to the Middle East and so having relations with Israel was seen as a normal 
state of affairs. Moreover, efforts to have good relations with Israel were 
encouraged because of the possible benefits, mainly economic and technical, that 
could be gained from such ties. Relations with Israel would also enable Moscow 
to play a more meaningful diplomatic role as an arbitrator in the Middle East peace 
process, and Brezhnev's earlier error of neglecting this point served as a reminder 
to those opposing this view. Those favouring good relations with Israel, which 
included all pro-Westerners and centrist-nationalists, pointed out that the Arabs 
had already made large strides in terms of recognition and peace agreements with 
the Jewish state. Therefore, Moscow's policy would have appeared to be reactive 
and short-sighted if it stood by one or two hard-line regimes while the rest of the 
Arab countries raised the level of diplomatic and economic relations with Israel. 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's belief that policy planning had to be free 
from past ideas and constructed within the framework of a completely changed 
world order did not dampen Israeli pleasure with Moscow's subdued role in the 
Middle East. Rabin belonged to a generation of leaders in Israel who viewed the 
Soviet Union in a certain light, as his comments, made in 1993, showed: "I would 
say that today no Arab leader, be he Saddam Hussein - and he learnt the hard way - 
President Asad or Qadhafi, can rely anymore on the Soviet umbrella under which 
he has sheltered for 31 years.. . the 
Syrians cannot rely anymore on the prospect 
that, in time of war, when events turn against them, the red phone from Moscow to 
Washington will ring and the request will be sent: `stop the Israelis"`. 12 
The Soviet Union's standing as a major military supplier, which was of concern to 
the Israelis, had become substantially diminished in the first years of Yeltsin's rule. 
According to one source, global sales fell from "a fairly stable $12 billion a year in 
the 1980s to $7.8 billion in 1991, $3 billion in 1992 and $2.5 billion in 1993, " and 
in ranking it dropped from first, or second behind the United States, to sixth -as 
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Russia- in 1993.13 Such statistics infuriated Russian nationalists and centrists 
because they believed that acquiescence to Washington was costing their country 
billions in lost revenue, and they argued that "participation in the sanctions against 
Iraq, Libya and the former Yugoslavia alone had cost the country up to $30 billion 
in lost contracts. " 14 
Israel, however, continued to be unhappy with the amount of weapons being sold 
by Russia to its regional foes especially since countries such as Iran and Iraq were 
not participants in the peace process and had not compromised on their aim to 
retrieve lost Arab lands by any means, including force. Rabin noted that "the arms 
procurement policies of these countries has as much bearing on regional peace as 
those of the parties to the negotiations, if not more so. i15 Israel possessed 
sophisticated missiles and a nuclear capability, which was justified by its leaders as 
being necessary to maintain a balance with its much larger neighbours. Rabin 
pointed out that "the name of the game of the arms race today in the region, and 
particularly in the Arab and Muslim countries, is weapons of mass destruction, and 
long range delivery systems, which, in the Middle East context, means essentially 
ground-to-ground missiles. "" Israeli political and military leaders were greatly 
concerned that economic collapse in Russia would lead to a decision from Moscow 
to supply their enemies with large quantities of such missiles. In the first five years 
Russia had shown restraint in sales of weapons of mass destruction, and long range 
delivery systems procured by Syria and Iran originated from the Far East, namely 
China and North Korea. 
Rabin had made it clear that he was unhappy with Russia's role in arming Iran, 
which he believed to be the biggest threat to the Middle East. However, while 
Tehran supported militant Islamic organisations, it was highly unlikely for Iran to 
launch a full scale conventional military attack on Israel, considering that its armies 
would have to cross several countries to reach Israel. Iraq and Jordan were certain 
to refuse Iranian troops on their soil even if it was for the cause of `liberating' 
Palestine. Secondly, Israel's fear of a missile attack through biological or chemical 
weapons was also not too strongly founded because it possessed a far more 
destructive nuclear deterrent. Iran's huge expenditure on military hardware was 
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actually aimed at sending a message to its most immediate neighbours - particularly 
the Arab world. Iran was also worried about instability in Central Asia, 
Afghanistan and another potential nuclear state, Pakistan. Hence the war of words 
between Iran and Israel were mainly seen as an exercise in propaganda aimed at 
satisfying domestic political needs rather than a genuine fear of a full-scale war. 
In long-term thinking, Israeli concerns about the nuclearisation of the region were 
based on solid arguments. Iran's missile technology was relatively basic in the 
early 1990s, but its modernisation threatened to alter the strategic balance of the 
region because of Israel's disadvantage in terms of size. Moreover, Israeli 
leaders" felt that the relatively pragmatic influence of President Rafsanjani was 
under pressure from radical Islamic fundamentalists, particularly as the economic 
situation of the country was rapidly deteriorating. 
Israeli fears about Russian military supplies to the region indirectly served to make 
bilateral relations more valuable. Because Iran had an agreement with Russia 
worth billions of dollars for the supply of conventional weapons - MiG-29s and Su- 
24s - and with countries of the Far East for ground-to-ground missiles and the 
development of nuclear capabilities, Rabin made it his policy to work with, rather 
than against, both Russia and China in an effort to entice them away from closer 
relations with the regime in Tehran. The Jewish state instigated relations with 
China in January 1992. Israel promised greater assistance in technological 
development and other sectors in return for a pledge from Moscow (and Beijing) 
not to provide certain types of weapons to Iran and other `dangerous' states such 
as Syria. This example highlighted the point that Russia was still regarded as being 
important by the Middle East states, and in turn, Moscow gradually found that it 
had much to gain from keeping a noticeable profile in the region. 
The Middle East peace process 
Under the Labour government of Yitzhak Rabin, and then Shimon Peres, Israel 
made the strategic decision to counter the threat of war by making peace with its 
neighbours. Israel's strategy went beyond making peace with individual countries, 
but instead endeavoured to create a regional peace in the Middle East "where there 
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will be a common infrastructure of energy, of water, of roads, open skies... " 
according to Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin. '8 Throughout the 
history of the Arab-Israeli dispute, forces dedicated to conflict had the upper hand, 
but Beilin remarked in 1994 that "today there is something new for the first time in 
many years - there is a coalition of the moderate forces, of the pragmatic forces in 
the Middle East... i19 From this perspective the role of Russia was important: Israel 
wanted Russia to use the remaining influence it had with the opponents of the 
peace process in order to show them that that there were no other options but 
negotiations. Syrian consent to enter into negotiations with Israel was largely 
because Gorbachev had made it clear to President Asad that the Soviet Union 
refused to provide further support in his objective to reach strategic parity with the 
Jewish state. 
The problem faced by Moscow was that the two major political parties in Israel 
were generally dismissive about direct Russian involvement in the peace process. 
Rabin's successful election campaign placed a strong emphasis on promoting 
relations with the United States. One of the very first episodes which reflected 
Israel's lack of concern for Russian sensibilities was during the third round of 
peace talks held in Moscow when members from Moledet and Tehiya (two right 
wing parties in the Likud coalition) withdrew from the government to disrupt the 
talks in Russia. "Delegates had begun to address the granting of transitional 
autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. "20 Such behaviour 
by the Israeli delegates was unlikely to have taken place in Washington. 
Rabin came to power as leader of a left-wing-based coalition on 23 June 1992 at a 
time when relations between Israel and the United States had been severely tested 
by the behaviour of Rabin's predecessor Yitzhak Shamir, leader of the ruling 
Likud, who had been deliberately attempting to block Washington's efforts to 
initiate the peace process. One interesting suggestion was that Likud had, in 
August 1991, claimed that one of a number of conditions to which Washington 
"had agreed in return for Israel's participation in the regional peace conference 
scheduled for October was the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations with the 
USSR. 'M The explanation for this was straightforward; Shamir wanted to speed 
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up the rate of Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel, though the full extent of 
his plans upset world opinion because he wanted these immigrants to expand 
settlements on occupied lands which would in effect have concluded the outcome 
of negotiations over territories (in Israel's favour) before they had even began. 
Shamir's decision in January 1992 to deport 12 Palestinians added to the tension 
between Washington and Tel Aviv. Officials from the Israeli government protested 
to the United States over the wording of the UN Security Council Resolution 
condemning Israel's planned deportation, objecting to the reference to `occupied 
Palestinian territories', which Israel did not accept. But the lowest point in the 
history of relations between Washington and Tel Aviv, also in 1992, was when the 
Bush administration withheld $10 billion of loan guarantees until Israel made a 
commitment to halt settlements on occupied Arab land. The pugnacious Shamir 
responded through Israeli army radio: "I think almost all the political factions in 
Israel would not accept a situation in which the American administration would 
dictate our policy, whether about settlements today or about other territorial issues 
tomorrow. , 22 
Russian leaders found it increasingly difficult not to criticise Israel for actions 
which were in obvious breach of international law, despite efforts to create a more 
positive working environment between the two countries. When Shamir met 
Russian officials in January of 1992 the two sides discussed possibilities of 
improving bilateral ties, especially in ways Israel could help in updating 
telecommunications networks and in the storage of agricultural produce. The 
purpose of the visit by the Israelis was to attend the Moscow round of the peace 
conference but in his speech Foreign Minister David Levy reflected his country's 
attitude towards the Russians compared with the United States: "My deep 
appreciation to the host, the government of an independent Russia [but]... special 
thanks goes to the U. S. nation and President for the exemplary, brave leadership 
which the entire world has witnessed and to US Secretary of State Baker for his 
contribution and determination in moving this historic wheel: the peace process. "23 
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In March of that year Levy indirectly criticised Russia soon after he announced that 
he would be again travelling to Moscow. His criticisms were actually aimed at 
Syria but the Russian government could not have failed to miss the point: "Syria is 
following its Iraqi sister, and the missiles it is purchasing are noted for their even 
more precise technology. Syria is also making an effort to develop chemical 
weapons, and deals for the procurement of advanced Russian and East European 
tanks are being struck. 7724 The comparison of Syria with Iraq was not unintentional, 
nor was the implication of Russian involvement. Levy was a moderate in the Likud 
camp and he found it difficult to agree with his more belligerent leader, Shamir. In 
fact Levy resigned in March in protest at Shamir's neglect of the special 
relationship between his country and the USA. "Although the US did not identify 
with Israel's policy and the two countries differ on matters of substance, " Levy 
argued that the relationship should be "cherished because there is no substitute. "25 
Rabin's election victory in June was in large part due to his promise to restore 
good relations with Washington, and to pursue the peace option. 
At a Labour Party conference Rabin told his audience that "in terms of Israel's 
relations with the world, we have always known, and we learned... just how 
important friends are. Most important to us is the friendship of the only large 
superpower. "26 While Rabin's coming to power led to more harmonious relations 
between Israel and the United States, it did not change Israel's continued 
occupation of Palestinian territories and its poor human rights record towards the 
Arab population, which often led to strained relations between Tel Aviv and 
Moscow. For example when the speaker of the Russian parliament Ruslan 
Khasbulatov arrived in Israel in January 1993, the Jewish state was being 
internationally criticised for the deportation of 415 Palestinians to the mountains of 
southern Lebanon. On 6th January Khasbulatov was forced to comment despite 
his efforts to avoid direct criticisms of the Israeli government. "We in the Russian 
parliament have a profound appreciation of the Rabin government's policy of 
negotiation and substantive concessions, but we do not think the expulsions 
promoted that policy. "Z' 
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When the United Nations threatened to impose sanctions for the expulsions and the 
peace talks were in danger of collapsing, Russia was unable to play a constructive 
role and had to resign itself to being overshadowed by the United States. This 
point was acknowledged by Rabin: "The USA, for its part, undertook to prevent 
decisions in international forums -I do not want to say where, you can understand 
that for yourselves - to prevent any decisions which have operational significance 
for Israel. i28 Throughout 1993, Russia generally played a very small role in the 
Middle East peace talks and bilateral relations between the two countries were not 
substantial. In July Yossi Beilin, Deputy Foreign Minister, went to Moscow but 
only to meet with the Palestinian representative Faisal Husseini. In September 
Rabin met Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoli Adamishin and asked him to 
use his country's influence with its Middle Eastern `friends', primarily Syria, for 
their support of the Declaration of Principles signed between the PLO and Israel. 
Russia was represented at the signing ceremony, in September 1993, though many 
commentators pointed out that they were hardly noticed. An Israeli reporter 
summed up the feeling in his country about Russia when he wrote that Moscow 
was not "an active participant in the process, nor is it briefed on developments on a 
regular basis. The Russians are merely invited to the White House to sign 
documents already agreed upon, perhaps out of nostalgia for the Madrid 
Conference where Russia was co-sponsor. "29 
In turn, some quarters in the Russian press had shown similar scepticism about 
Israel's commitment in the peace process, but they did agree with their Israeli 
counterparts that Washington and not Moscow would instigate the real changes. 
An article written just before the Madrid Conference argued that the peace process 
would be detrimental to the Palestinians and he rightly predicted that Israel would 
continue to expand and build settlements. Beliakov argued, with fair accuracy, 
that the United States and Israel would bring Yasser Arafat into their camp to 
control Palestinian militants, and to further undermine Moscow's influence in the 
Middle East by taking away one of its last remaining allies. The peace process 
would in effect "become an instrument to twist the Palestinian arm. "30 
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Yeltsin's government did display a shift to a more balanced tone in statements 
regarding Israel. For example, when Israeli jets bombed southern Lebanon in July 
1993 Moscow's response echoed that of most European countries except Britain, 
which generally followed Washington's lead. A Russian Foreign Ministry 
statement on the attacks said that "Moscow considers Israel's reaction to the 
actions of extremist groups to be disproportionate. i3 ' By the standard of Soviet 
statements regarding Israel, the fact that the attacks were described as a `reaction' 
was a considerable difference to the old rhetoric of militant Zionist expansionism. 
And a report from (the non-governmental) Izvestiia was even more understanding 
of the Israeli position: "Continuing shelling of Israel by Hezbollah militia men using 
rocket launchers is forcing the Israeli Army command to continue the 
operations... For two hours before each attack, Israel warns Lebanese village 
residents by radio of planned strikes against Hezbollah command centres and bases 
located in their areas, thereby giving the population a chance to clear out. "32 
Similar language emanated from Moscow when Israel bombed Lebanon in early 
June 1994, again as a response to Hezbollah Katiusha shelling. "Only at the 
negotiating table can agreements be reached guaranteeing both the restoration of 
the territorial integrity of Lebanon and the mutual security of this state and 
Israel, 1133 a government statement suggested. Thus, it was not the Israeli presence 
in Lebanon which was regarded as the problem, as was explained as being the case 
before the Gorbachev era, but the military actions of both sides to resolve the 
dispute in their favour. This position was established to a large extent because of 
the lingering influence of New Thinking and the early influence of the pro-Western 
radicals around Yeltsin since 1992. The pro-Western radical influence in 
government in the early years under Yeltsin led to the contention that support for 
militant fundamentalist groups such as Hezbollah could no longer be justifiably 
supported. It was believed to be necessary for Moscow to distance itself from the 
Brezhnev era, when support for terrorist organisations was deemed as an 
acceptable part of the struggle against Western imperialism, for the credibility of 
post-Soviet Russia as a new democratic state to have any value. 
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The pro-Western pragmatists and centrist-nationalists rejected the ideological and 
political hostility displayed towards Israel by the pragmatic and extreme 
nationalists, arguing instead that while Russia had a right as a democratic state to 
criticise Israeli violations of international laws, efforts to promote the positive 
aspects of relations were both desirable and beneficial to national interests. The 
new Russian position was described by Adamishin as part of a new policy that was 
guided by a different perspective. "Now, with more pragmatism, we try to have 
good relations with a greater number of countries, certainly not considering one 
country against another, but having a conception of all for peace and stability. "34 
Obstacles in Russian-Israeli relations 
Russian foreign policy in the region since mid-1993 began to attribute to itself 
more importance for its role in the peace process as a consequence of the growing 
criticism of Kozyrev's policies. During the Israeli bombing of Lebanon in July 
1993 a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that "this dangerous relapse into 
military confrontation in the Middle East is especially alarming in light of the fact 
that the Russian and American co-chairmen of the Middle East peace process are 
currently trying to narrow the differences between the positions of the talks 
participants. "" 
The Russian Foreign Ministry's aim to play up its role in the peace talks was not 
helped by Rabin's constant and deliberate remarks about Washington being the 
only real power-broker. Moreover, the fact that Moscow was often left 
uninformed about latest developments in negotiations placed its leaders in an 
awkward position when trying to justify the importance of their position. Under 
Kozyrev, the Russian opposition media was merciless in its mockery of the Foreign 
Ministry's pretensions. One writer remarked that "formally speaking, Russia is 
also a sponsor of the Washington meetings, but it has been relegated to a 
supernumerary role, playing the part of a character who appears onstage when it's 
time to utter the historic phrase `dinner is served. "'36 The views of the author, Iuri 
Glukhov, reflected those of Russia's pragmatic and extreme nationalists, bitter at 
what they saw as their country's decline in the international order. With regard to 
Israel's continued attacks on southern Lebanon, the author lamented that the 
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Russian Foreign Ministry had "spoken out after a long silence, calling the Israeli 
actions `inappropriate to the situation'. That's all. Without any condemnation or 
indignation over the international banditry. , 37 
The motivating factor behind such arguments was that Russian interests were more 
closely linked to its traditional Arab allies than the conclusions of the pro-Western 
democrats' assessment of the world order. A Russian foreign policy study, 
sponsored by the Foreign Ministry, pointed out that Moscow's aims for the Middle 
East would be "ensuring the country's national security; preventing the spread of 
politico-military fires in the Middle East, which would cause even greater 
instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia; and making effective use of the Arab 
countries' considerable potential to help solve Russia's economic problems during 
its renewal process. , 38 In light of this, one Russian commentator asked the 
question: "Just how do we intend to build relations with the enormous Arab world 
when we fail to say clearly that part of it is occupied, that we see this and that we 
will help liberate these lands? "39 
In a meeting between Peres and Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvaliuk in 
August 1994, the latter attempted to involve Moscow in an Arab-Israeli settlement 
over Jerusalem, partly because of Russia's substantial church holdings. The 
Russian envoy's expectation that he would be given a more sympathetic hearing 
was firmly suppressed by Peres, who stated that "the issue of Jerusalem is 
politically closed... i40 While Moscow had a non-existent role in the Israel- 
Jordanian peace agreement, signed on 26 July 1994 in Washington, Moscow's 
policy makers expected the Syrian-Israeli track to give them a more prominent 
role. However this ambition became a major source of tension between Russia and 
Israel, as reports that the Foreign Ministry was "drafting its own proposals for a 
solution to the Golan Heights problem, ))41 were met with cynicism by both 
Washington and Tel Aviv. Israel's Labour leadership maintained a clear aim to 
work on the Syrian track in tight co-ordination with Washington without any 
outside interference, and Moscow was often left uninformed about various 
proposals and developments in negotiations. For example, when on 22 June 1994 
Foreign Minister Peres announced that new proposals to the Syrians were made, 
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the Deputy Director of the Near East and Africa Department Alexander Sheim 
admitted that "the Russian Foreign Ministry knows nothing about [such] proposals 
to Syria" which were aimed at finding a way out of the then suspended peace 
talks. 42 
After the Hebron massacre on 25 February 1994, when a Jewish settler machine- 
gunned dozens of Palestinians praying in a mosque, Russia's efforts to step up its 
involvement in the region became more overt. The event had threatened to turn 
into reality what many commentators were beginning to warn against; that 
extremists on all sides of the dispute were regaining the upper hand so that the 
region would once again become embroiled in conflict. Kozyrev arrived in Tunis 
on 11 March to try to breathe new life into the peace process, and in particular into 
the Gaza and Jericho First agreement which provided the Palestinians with limited 
autonomy in return for a PLO pledge to end its armed struggle. 
Posuvaliuk, Yeltsin's special representative to the Middle East who accompanied 
Kozyrev on his trip, spoke in rather abstract terms about the best way of furthering 
the peace process in which, "as a phenomenon that involves combining two 
viewpoints, no compromise is ideal if you look at it from only one of the sides. 7A3 
This seemed to contradict calls from Russian nationalists to take a moral and 
political stand with the Arabs because the policy supported neither the Israeli nor 
Arab position but the agreements which both sides were concluding as a 
consequence of the negotiation process. This effectively made Russian policy 
more favourable to the Israelis who were in a stronger position and who already 
had powerful support from Washington. Critics of this policy in Russia and the 
Arab world argued that Moscow's support for the peace process at any cost was in 
fact peace at the expense of Palestinian rights, which complemented the U. S. - 
Israeli position. When Posuvaliuk was asked to answer criticisms that the PLO- 
Israeli peace agreement had failed to deal with key issues such as the fate of Israeli 
settlements on occupied territories, the status of Jerusalem and of possible 
Palestinian statehood, the Russian envoy said that it was correct not to do so 
because "the boat could not be overloaded. "44 The Foreign Ministry had sent an 
envoy to the Middle East in March of that year, Igor Ivanov, who did adopt a 
130 
position less favourable to Israel. He backed PLO calls for an international force 
to be present in the occupied territories, a point strongly rejected by Israel because 
they preferred the Palestinian cause to be forgotten as a world issue and wanted to 
deal with it as a local problem. 
On 24 April, 1994, Rabin headed a delegation on an official visit to Moscow. This 
was the first such visit in the history of the two countries. The result of the visit 
was the signing of six agreements between the two governments covering the fields 
of scientific-technical, cultural-educational and medical-touristic co-operation. 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who represented the Russian side, said that "Russia 
and Israel have favourable prospects for expanding co-operation in various spheres 
including the economy and military spheres. "45 Chernomyrdin also assured him that 
Russian Jews were safe from anti-Semitism. Commenting on the visit, Posuvaliuk 
said that Russia's praise for Arafat in the past should be extended to include Rabin: 
"In our view these are courageous political leaders... For Rabin it is an enormous 
psychological strain to drive around the city and see everywhere `Rabin, Rabin the 
traitor. "146 
Posuvaliuk's praise concealed some deep-seated differences between the two 
countries and the political reality revealed that Russian interests with Israel's 
enemies made it difficult for Moscow to take relations with Israel much further 
beyond the point they had reached. Russian arms sales to Israel's enemies began 
to increase aller 1993, leading to renewed concern about Moscow's role in the 
region. The United Nations arms register - published 14 October 1994 - listed that 
"Russia exported 100 tanks, 80 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), and one 
warship to Iran in 1993, making the latter Russia's largest arms customer. "47 
Moscow's stepping up of its activities in the Middle East led to a warning from 
Rabin "against the involvement of Russia in the peace process without co- 
ordination with the Americans. 5748 Igor Ivanov responded to the statement by 
saying that since Russia was also a co-sponsor in the peace process it had as much 
right as the United States to attempt to "adopt separate initiatives. "49 This remark 
upset the Israelis and the United States, forcing Kozyrev to reassert that Moscow 
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sought co-operation with Washington: "We are in daily contact, we are acting in 
unison, in complete accord, " the Foreign Minister claimed. 50 Nonetheless, the 
Israelis (and many Russians) felt that Russian interests were ultimately tied with the 
Arabs and that Moscow's leadership spoke in a language that contradicted their 
country's actions. For example, Yeltsin had promised Rabin in May 1994 that 
Russia would not deliver military equipment to Syria. Yet soon before this, Vice- 
Premier Oleg Soskovets had visited Damascus and "signed an agreement on the 
sale of the latest arms to Syria. " It was also widely reported that Moscow 
"proposed strategic co-operation to Damascus. "s' 
In October 1995 Deputy Foreign Minister Eli Dayan travelled to Moscow with the 
purpose of expressing Israel's expectations from Russia. In an interview with the 
newspaper Moskovskie novosti he openly requested from Russia's leaders a role 
that would enable a breakthrough in the peace talks between Israel and Syria. 
Dayan diplomatically announced that his country had "complete trust in Russia. "52 
He added that Washington's role on this particular track of the peace talks faced 
certain obstacles: "We understand that their capabilities are not limitless. Now the 
ball is in Russia's court, and, drawing on its traditional connections in the Arab 
world, it can achieve a real breakthrough in the peace process. "53 The Israeli 
government had chosen to take this step because of a marked increase of activities 
by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon which was costing Israeli lives on a regular 
basis. But it would have been politically suicidal for the Labour government to 
withdraw from southern Lebanon without proving to the Israeli electorate that a 
watertight security arrangement was assured. Iran and Syria were exploiting this 
entrapment to put more pressure on Israel for their own political advantage: 
Tehran's proxy-militia Hezbollah gained support and strength in Lebanon giving it 
a more weighty voice in Middle East affairs while Damascus used its alliance with 
Iran and support for Hezbollah as a strong card on the bargaining table. In this 
context, Dayan explained that the purpose of his visit was "to convince President 
Asad to agree to an Israeli-Syrian summit... We would also like Russia to convince 
Syria and Iran to renounce attempts to destabilise the situation in southern 
Lebanon and to back terrorists from Hezbollah. '°sa 
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Evidence suggested that in early 1995 Israel had held some hope that Russia could 
play a beneficial role, indicating that Moscow's policy in the region was bearing 
some fruit. Tel Aviv understated differences over increased armed sales to Iran 
and Syria, with Israel's Ambassador to Moscow, Professor Aliza Shenhar, saying 
she was "fully satisfied" with Moscow's general arms sales and policy in the 
Middle East. 55 She added that the Chechnia conflict was an internal matter for 
Russia and Israel "cannot bring more pressure as far as human rights are concerned 
because Israel faces similar problems. , 16 These problems were in reference to 
terrorist attacks by Palestinian groups (allegedly backed by Iran and Syria), which 
opposed the peace agreement between the PLO and Israel. Russia's condemnation 
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad was equal to those of the United States and Israel in 
their clarity. Kozyrev was personally committed to the peace process because it 
promised a new democratic and more secular order in the Middle East that was 
close to his beliefs. He also knew very well, as was the case in his own country, 
that there were groups prepared to use any means to resist the establishment of this 
new order. Following a bomb attack in late-Spring 1995 on an Israeli bus in Tel 
Aviv, Kozyrev warned that "opponents of the peace process still exist... [and that 
we] must not lull ourselves into believing that resistance to the process is on the 
i57 wane. 
Bilateral relations increased and on 6 June 1995 Moscow hosted Russian-Israeli 
consultations under the chairmanship of Deputy Foreign Ministers Posuvaliuk and 
Beilin. The Israeli delegation was met by Kozyrev and both countries seemed to 
have high expectations from the meetings. Both parties agreed that "a working 
committee will operate on a regular basis, overseeing its workings twice a year 
taking it in turns between Russia and Israel. "" In September 1995 Rabin made yet 
another visit to Moscow but the Russian side was unhappy at his insistence on 
discussing the sale of nuclear equipment to Iran because it wanted to shift the focus 
on issues concerning Russian-Israeli relations and the Russian role in the Middle 
East peace process. Nonetheless both sides were able to agree that they should 
enhance military co-operation. This was to be the last visit to Russia by Rabin until 
he was assassinated by a Jewish extremist on 4 November 1995. 
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Despite the loss of Rabin, who alongside Arafat, played a central role in the 
making of war and peace in the region, Russian-Israeli relations maintained their 
earlier momentum. In December 1995, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev went to 
Israel, the first visit of its kind, with the purpose of establishing military and 
technical relations between the two countries. The visit was hailed in Russia as a 
breakthrough for Russian influence in the Middle East. As one commentator 
noted: "Russia is establishing relations in a very important and delicate sphere with 
a state that plays a key role in the region. "59 Grachev's success was at the expense 
of Kozyrev, who had lost all credibility in Moscow, making the work of the 
Foreign Ministry largely superfluous. Towards the end of 1995, constant rumours 
in the Russian press that Kozyrev would be released of his position by Yeltsin 
added to the paralysis that existed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kozyrev was 
finally replaced by Evgenii Primakov in early 1996, who was regarded as well- 
connected in the Arab world and more suspicious of the West and Israel. 
Primakov and Israel 
Israel's Ambassador Shenhar immediately played down the new Foreign Minister's 
connections with the Soviet system: "Even though Primakov was part of the Soviet 
foreign policy, he now sees Middle Eastern problems in a different light. "60 This 
diplomatic politeness however was soon submerged by the difficult realities of 
bilateral relations. In early February, for example, Russia expelled an Israeli 
diplomat who was accused of espionage. Meanwhile, Israel accused Russia of 
stepping up its covert activities in the Jewish state, a claim that was denied by 
Moscow in a rather unconvincing manner: "Russian intelligence officers do not do 
anything in Israel that their Israeli counterparts would not do in Russia. "61 
With regards to Palestinian-Israeli relations, Primakov was consistent with 
Kozyrev's line of strongly condemning terrorism and he continued to support the 
negotiations between the two parties. When an Iranian backed group executed a 
suicide bomb plan in early March 1996 Primakov sent a telegram to his counterpart 
Ehud Barak condemning the attack and others that had preceded them. Russia's 
response to such violence differed from that of the United States in that 
134 
Washington's statements were highly interactive with Jewish emotions and 
sentiments at the expense of more rational explanations. Russia's position, as 
represented by Primakov, was similar in tone and substance to most West 
European reactions. For example, following the suicide bomb attack in early 
March, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin stated that Russia "decidedly 
condemns the criminal, irrational acts of extremists who are fighting against the 
real wishes of both the Palestinian and Israeli people for peace... i62 
The spate of violence in the Middle East resulted in the convening of an 
international conference against terrorism on the sea-side resort of Sharm al- 
Shaykh in Egypt on 13 March. Yeltsin spoke in a language that attributed much 
stronger support to Israel than was usual for his Foreign Ministry. He stressed the 
urgency of saving the peace process which for most of 1996 seemed to be close to 
collapse: "How can this goal be achieved? First, all of Israel's healthy forces, the 
authorities led by Prime Minister Peres, should know that they enjoy not only 
moral but also practical support of the world community. This should give Israel 
confidence that continuing the process of peaceful settlement to the conflict with 
the Arabs is the only path. "63 Yeltsin's support for the government of Peres, which 
was facing elections at the end of May, was identical to Bill Clinton's strategy 
since the opposition Likud party took a far more belligerent line. However, Yeltsin 
was not blindly following Washington's line, though it was possible that the 
presence of his U. S. counterpart could have had an influence on the tone of the 
speech. Moscow had supported the idea of a Middle East peace process since the 
Brezhnev era, but the break from the Soviet past was that the Russian President 
could be relied upon to play a leading and constructive role in such a Sharm al- 
Shaykh conference. 
In Russia, support for Israel was not as naturally inclined as Yeltsin's official 
policy. The Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskii never had 
enough support to be a legitimate threat to the leadership by democratic means, 
but his extreme nationalist views were a manifestation of populist, if not slightly 
twisted, views that many Russians held. In a message to Pat Buchanan, during his 
bid for the leadership of the Republican leadership in the United States in late 
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February, Zhirinovskii wrote: "You describe the US Congress as an `Israeli- 
occupied territory. ' It is the same case with us in Russia. That is why in order to 
survive, the United States and Russia could use part of their territories to allot 
places for the settlement of this small but importunate tribe. "64 
The views of Zhirinovskii never had any real bearing on Yeltsin's foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. Nonetheless, events in April 1996 led to some of the 
strongest criticisms from Moscow of the Jewish state since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The launch of Israel's military attacks on Lebanon, called Operation 
Grapes of Wrath, met with an immediate response by the Foreign Ministry in 
Moscow: "We cannot fail now to be concerned by the fact that once again 
Lebanon's sovereignty has been violated and it is difficult to call the Israeli army's 
action an appropriate response to the actions of the extremists. s65 In addition, 
Moscow demanded Israeli compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, 
which stipulated that only the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon 
would lead to the security of both countries. 
A few days later, when Israeli war jets targeted civilian targets and the capital city 
Beirut, Russia's diplomatic language became more critical: "It is inadmissible to 
resort to air strikes against an independent and sovereign state, including the 
residential quarters of its capital - Beirut. s66 Anti-Israeli groups, including the 
communist faction of the State Duma, and some sections of the Russian press 
called the Jewish state the only real terrorist in the Middle East and not the Islamic 
group Hezbollah. But the Israeli attack on the United Nations base in south 
Lebanon, which was sheltering Shi'ite refugees, resulted in the strongest criticisms 
from the most senior sources of the Russian government. President Yeltsin's 
statement on the tragedy was without ambiguity: "I must say with absolute 
certainty that what is happening in Lebanon is totally unacceptable.. . The Israeli 
military operation in Lebanon must be halted immediately. One must put an end to 
this total infringement of the sovereignty of Lebanon, which will lead to a real 
humanitarian catastrophe in that country. 110 
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Primakov was dispatched to the Middle East in the hope that Moscow could 
genuinely prove to Israel and the world that it had a useful part to play. Cynics 
could have argued that the presence of the French and U. S. foreign ministers - as 
well as the Iranian - during the crisis would have made Russia's absence an 
admission of failure in the country's policy in the region, thus it was imperative to 
at least make a show of playing an important role. However, in this case Primakov 
genuinely believed that something could have been achieved. Israeli Prime 
Minister Peres wanted to broker a cease-fire with Hezbollah that would protect the 
Jewish villages of northern Israel and Primakov sought to convince Peres that he 
could play an important role because of Russia's `special' relationship with Syria 
and Iran, who were Hezbollah's puppet masters. Unfortunately for the Russian 
Foreign Minister, the whole affair was to back-fire, leaving Russia embarrassed and 
totally excluded from the eventual settlement. Both the United States and Israel 
made it clear that Russian interference was not helpful. 
Primakov tried to claim on his return to Russia that his tour of the region in April 
1996 was successful in that he met with leaders of Syria, Israel and Lebanon as 
well as foreign ministers from France, Italy and Iran, but he could not boast of any 
tangible achievements in resolving the crisis. While he joined the international 
community in condemning Hezbollah shelling, he added that "only until the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, will it be possible to transfer 
full responsibility [for Hezbollah's actions] on the Lebanese and Syrian 
governments, whose troops are also deployed in Lebanon. "68 Primakov's 
statements clearly placed the blame upon the Israelis for being the cause of 
instability, but reading between the lines, there was not a detectable hint of support 
for Hezbollah as a political group. Instead, the government in Beirut was 
encouraged to take responsibility for Lebanon's southern border with Israel. In 
addition, the reminder that Syrian troops were also deployed in Lebanon implied 
that Israel was not the only occupying force on Lebanese territory, a reference that 
would hardly have been welcomed in Damascus. President Yeltsin called upon 
both Israel and the pro-Iranian group "to immediately stop fighting and find an 
agreement. i69 
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Primakov was offended by Israeli suggestions that his efforts in the conflict added 
to the chaos of an already complicated situation, and the fact that Secretary of 
State Christopher carried on in his diplomatic efforts during the crisis without 
giving Russia any significance added to the Russian Foreign Minister's sense of 
frustration. His counter-response to the U. S. -Israeli attitude was defiant: "We 
have our own interests there [the Middle East] and our own responsibilities... We 
are valued as a co-chairman of the Madrid Conference. This was especially 
noticeable in the Arab countries. "70 This omission of Israel's lack of appreciation 
of the Russian role was not accidental, but sent a deliberate message that if Tel 
Aviv and Washington continued to neglect Moscow's efforts in the region, then 
Russia had ample friends in the Arab world to make its presence felt despite them. 
Primakov also added a direct criticism of Washington's insensitivity to Moscow's 
work saying that he found it easier to co-operate "with France and the European 
Union, regrettably, more than with the USA. "" 
The Russian media did not fail to notice the failings of their Foreign Minister in his 
mission. The Russian daily Segodnia pointed out that it was the United States 
which held all the important cards in the Middle East. Even with regards to Syria, 
it was reported that Peres had requested from Christopher "his help in finding 
progress with Syrian President Hafez Asad regarding the peace process. "72 The 
main irony of this situation was that Primakov was appointed, in part, because he 
supposedly had many contacts in the Arab world. He studied and spoke Arabic 
and his appointment to the post of foreign minister was welcomed by most Arab 
leaders. But despite the antagonisms with the United States and Israel, Moscow 
did not over-react or make extreme comments in favour of the Arabs. 
Domestically, Primakov did not pander to the views of the pragmatic and extreme 
nationalists by reverting to Soviet-style slogans of Zionist aggression and U. S. 
imperialism in the Middle East. Primakov's message was consistent, as it was 
throughout 1996, in that he wished Moscow to play a meaningful role in a 
settlement that would bring the Arabs and Israelis together in order to avoid the 
possibility that Russia would be excluded from the region altogether. 
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In general, Primakov's centrist views were in line with the mainstream of Russia's 
media and political elite, which had become increasingly convinced by 1996 that it 
was necessary for Russia to maintain some role in the Middle East because of geo- 
strategic and economic reasons. Israel's importance was two fold: Economically, 
it was a dominant force in the region which could provide Russia with important 
technology in the fields of agriculture and medicine amongst many. Politically, 
winning the goodwill of Tel Aviv would almost certainly have allowed Russia to 
play a more influential role in the Middle East and lessen Washington's strong-hold 
there. In addition, good Russian-Israeli relations would dampen suspicions in the 
West about Moscow's intentions in the Middle East, particularly among those 
circles which perceive Russia to be a supporter of hard-line regimes, and enhance 
its image as a serious and constructive player in the region. Primakov found it 
difficult to reconcile these aims with Israeli and U. S. demands that Moscow should 
lessen its co-operation with some of Israel's enemies such as Syria and Iran, largely 
because of fruitful economic and political links with countries which happened to 
be enemies of Israel. But it was also because Russia, in line with most countries of 
the international community, genuinely found certain aspects of Israeli policy such 
as the expansion of settlements on occupied land, the refusal to negotiate over the 
status of Jerusalem, and the bombing of civilian targets in Lebanon, morally 
difficult to justify. Washington's zealous support for Israel was interpreted in 
Russia (as in most of the world), as not being based on international law, or a sense 
of righteousness, but on the more direct assessment of U. S. national interest. 
Russia's foreign policy in 1996 was crafted with the purpose of being non- 
antagonistic and digestible to popular opinion, perhaps to redress the failures of his 
predecessor Kozyrev. Moscow did not want to appear to be in line with the 
United States and Israel simply for the sake of being pro-Western, at the expense 
of its national interest. Nonetheless, Primakov did not take Middle East policy to 
the level encouraged by extreme nationalists. There were many forces in Russia 
which were very antagonistic towards the state of Israel, a view epitomised by the 
Pravda correspondent Israel Shamir. His regular articles changed very little from 
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the Soviet era which warned the reader of Israeli plots with U. S. connivance to 
dominate the Middle East and completely isolate Russia. 
One such article, entitled "Five Percent Justice", highlighted the plight of Peter 
Boutros, a Palestinian Christian from the village of Ikrit in northern Galilee, whose 
land had been owned by his family for generations, "but instead of feeding them, it 
belongs to a Jewish Kibbutz. Boutros, like hundreds of his countrymen, was 
deprived of his land, his home, his village, because he is Christian, Palestinian Arab, 
and not Jewish. "73 The article recalled the history of the village back to 1948 when 
the Jewish army gave the inhabitants 24 hours notice to leave their land. Shamir 
wrote that terrorism was part of Jewish military strategy, and when the Arabs left 
the village, "Israeli troops blew up their homes with dynamite, surrounded the 
fields with fences and gave the land to Jewish settlers. 04 In 1994, the Rabin 
government established a parliamentary commission, due to pressure from left- 
wing and Arab MPs, to examine the plight of the displaced Palestinians of Ikrit and 
it was decided that compensation was in order: "Those who lived in Ikrit (and the 
neighbouring village of Biram) received a refund of 5 percent of their land, " and 
only a few were allowed to return to their village, though they were "forbidden to 
work on their own land - they can only work as farm labourers or hired workers in 
neighbouring Jewish farms. "75 
The significance of the writings of Shamir and others like him was not that they 
were political statements about the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, or the reasons 
behind the violence in the Middle East, but because they were a reflection of the 
Russian sense of morality, which was opposed to what they regarded as Western 
materialistic tendencies and the Israeli-US interpretation of justice: might is right. 
Although the Soviet Union had disintegrated and the Cold War long been declared 
as ended, perceptions continued to exist in Russia expressing the sentiment that 
Moscow should uphold virtue and justice in its inner society as well as in 
international affairs. 
Cynics argued that such views disguised the self-interest and hard political aims of 
certain cliques in Russia which were closely associated with the Soviet system and 
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who feared Western influence. But such cliques, and their political methods and 
aims, did not only belong to the neo-communists or ultra-nationalists but had also 
become increasingly associated with Yeltsin. In other words, the mainstream 
political parties of Russia resembled each other more than they differed in the 
general thrust of their foreign as well as their domestic outlook. Primakov, as head 
of the Ministry in Smolensk Square, personified the new outlook which came into 
existence by 1996. 
The victory of hard-liner Benyamin Netanyahu in the Israeli elections in June 1996 
created tension and international concern that the region would become embroiled 
in conflict once more. The official response from the Russian Foreign Ministry 
was mildly optimistic: "We proceed on the assumption that after the new Israeli 
government comes to power the development of mutually beneficial Russian-Israeli 
ties in various spheres will continue in the interests of the people of our 
countries. "76 Yeltsin sent a telegram congratulating Netanyahu on his victory in 
Israel's first universal elections. Unofficially, there was concern in Russia that 
Netanyahu was seeking confrontation and would damage the fragile peace in the 
Middle East. Judging by the reaction of the world press, Russia's attitude towards 
Israel was not in any way unusual or extreme. In fact, the European media had 
shown sympathy towards the Palestinians whose future was bleak in view of 
Netanyahu's promise to encourage more Jewish settlers to move into their land. 
Foreign Ministry officials in Moscow insisted that Netanyahu's victory did not 
necessarily entail worsening relations between the two countries. In one interview 
with an Arab paper soon after the Israeli elections, Deputy - Foreign Minister 
Posuvaliuk spoke in a very non-committed way about Israel, saying that he did not 
want "to cast a dramatic dye" upon the election of Netanyahu and the stalled peace 
process. He added: "In the last months we felt a lack of importance from the Peres 
government in bilateral relations in one respect, but on the contrary we heard 
assurances and declarations from Netanyahu and his supporters that bilateral 
relations had been neglected in the past from the Israeli side, and that they will 
redress this situation upon attaining power. "" 
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Under President Jacques Chirac, France was to significantly raise its profile in the 
region and cause controversy by adopting an overtly pro-Arab balance. Chirac's 
visit to Israel in October 1996 caused a storm when he was filmed publicly arguing 
with Israeli security officials, sent a Minister to the PLO office in Jerusalem, and 
called on Netanyahu to accept a Palestinian state. The tour was "intended to 
demonstrate his contention that France, and more broadly, Europe, should assume 
a role in Middle Eastern politics in keeping with their aid to the region. "78 
Moscow's reaction to French behaviour was ostensibly supportive. According to 
Russian officials, their main concern was U. S. hegemony in the Middle East; 
therefore the emergence of a counterbalance to Washington was being welcomed. 
Moreover, Moscow suggested that close co-operation between Europe and Russia 
in the Middle East would provide a healthy balance in the conflict and help spur the 
stalled peace talks. However, France's actions were in many ways detrimental to 
Russia, not least because Paris had taken up the mantle of friend of the Arabs and 
as the only country capable of standing up to the United States and Israel in the 
region. In other words, the impotence of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East 
was greatly magnified by the actions of Chirac. 
Posuvaliuk backed Primakov's calls for a more active role for Moscow in the 
region. Recognising that the peace negotiations had reached a difficult stage, 
Posuvaliuk said that "we intend to pursue an increasingly active policy of our 
own. i79 The Deputy Foreign Minister openly admitted that this policy was partly 
motivated by the need to sell arms in the region, and for other economic reasons. 
Posuvaliuk warned that Russia could not afford to lose its position in the region 
because: 
"as soon as we walk out of anywhere, someone is always ready to step into our shoes... in the 
next five years, various Middle East countries intend to buy a total of 60 to 80 billion dollars 
worth of arms, and it is our duty to find a niche of our own in those plans. But big arms supplies 
require a big-time policy ... those who order 
large batches of combat hardware want a lot of 
political strings too. i80 
Posuvaliuk refused to be drawn into taking sides in the Palestinian-Israeli 
negotiations saying that Moscow would not play the part of advocate for either 
side. He said it was inevitable that Netanyahu would soften his hard-line stance 
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because "a speech for an election campaign differs from the action of a prime 
minister once in the seat of power. i" But he did suggest that Russia had its own 
interest in the negotiations, particularly with regard to Jerusalem. "I would like to 
take this opportunity to confirm that Russia has the largest Christian Orthodox 
community in the world, as well as numerous Muslims, so we ask that our concern 
for the future of the Holy City is put under consideration. s82 
In September 1996 there was major rioting in the West Bank following an Israeli 
decision to open one of the tunnels near the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for 
tourism purposes, but which was seen by the Palestinians as another scheme by 
their occupiers to control their national and religious affairs. This took place at a 
time when there was already a tense situation caused by Netanyahu's retraction on 
agreements signed by the former Israeli government and the PLO leadership. 
Commenting on the rioting, Demurin made a direct criticism of the Israelis. He 
explained that "the fact that the Israeli authorities have unilaterally opened a tunnel 
near the Muslim shrine - the Al-Aqsa Mosque - provoked a spontaneous protest by 
the Palestinian population. i83 
But in parallel to the trade aspect of Israeli-Russian relations had a positive bearing 
for both countries. Both the Foreign Ministry and the press were pointing to the 
multiplying intensity of bilateral trade: 84 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Trade volume 70 million 100 million 280 million 400 million 650 million 
in US$ 
Contracts signed in 1996, including the construction of a power plant in the Negev 
desert, were worth $450 million alone, and overall trade was being targeted to 
reach one billion dollars towards the end of the millennium. In the words of one 
article written that year, "the Jewish state is today one of Moscow's leading trade 
partners in the region, leaving behind the traditional friends of the Soviet Union 
143 
such as Syria... "s' In the light of the growing emphasis on economic relations, 
Moscow's relations with Israel were provided with an added dimension which was 
highly valued. 
One significant turn of events was the visit of Natan (formerly Anatolii) Sharansky, 
the leading dissident in the Brezhnev era who eventually became Israel's Trade and 
Industry Minister following his party's coalition with Likud. Sharansky, who spent 
nine years in Soviet camps, told the media in August 1991 that he had organised a 
special meeting at his Ministry where "I announced that the development of 
economic relations with Russia should be for us now a leading priority. , 16 
Sharansky said he would encourage leading Russian companies such as Gazprom, 
which had had traditionally strong links with Iraq and Iran, to work on Israeli 
projects. He added that trade between the two countries would naturally be 
boosted by Jewish emigrants who understood the Russian market. Sharansky's 
official visit to Russia was full of symbolism. His description of the turn of events 
in his life was that "the circle is complete", though perhaps the analogy could be 
extended to the relations between the two countries considering that Stalin was 
among the first to recognise the state of Israel. 
The ever-increasing trade between the two countries created a new dilemma in the 
region in that there was a schism with the complex political and geo-strategic 
aspect of bilateral relations. This situation was exemplified when a military co- 
operation agreement was signed between Israel and Turkey in April 1996. In 
addition to joint aircraft training, the agreement allowed "for access for naval 
vessels to each other's ports. ""' The Israelis benefited particularly from this 
agreement because it allowed their pilots a much greater range of airspace training. 
The agreement was worrying to Moscow because it brought together two of 
Washington's most important allies in the Middle East in a military pact to the 
south-west of the CIS. Considering that at the time Nato expansion to the West of 
Russia was becoming an inevitability, that Saudi-Pakistani support for the Taliban 
in Afghanistan was destabilising the Central Asian arena, and that Washington was 
actively courting China, the Russian sense of encirclement was no longer based on 
unwarranted suspicions. 
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Israel's Ambassador to Turkey described the two countries as being "quite natural 
allies, " and in March 1996 Suleyman Demirel became the first Turkish President to 
visit Israel. "88 The significance of these events was that they appeared to be a step 
towards dividing the region into two blocs; those Washington backed, and those it 
wanted to isolate. Belonging to the latter category, Iran and Syria were vociferous 
in their criticisms of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, which was made with full U. S. 
blessing. Such events led to the resumption of the image held during the Cold War 
era that Israel was the American wedge used to divide and conquer the region, 
despite Moscow's efforts not to over-dramatise the situation. Russian officials 
were attacking Israeli policy with growing regularity by 1996. Andrei Vdovnii, the 
Director of the Middle East Department of the Foreign Ministry, told a leading 
Saudi newspaper in that summer that the Arab countries had to remain calm in the 
face of Israel's efforts to disrupt the Middle East peace process. "We see that the 
heart of the problem lies in the way the new Israeli government behaves towards 
the Palestinian issue, which is the basis of the problem in the Middle East. "89 
Moscow rejected Israeli efforts under Netanyahu to change the guiding principles 
of the peace process, and appeared to back Arab suggestions that Tel Aviv was 
deliberately using this argument to stall the peace process altogether. Primakov 
noted during his visit to the region in late October that the formula of Land for 
Peace should not be rejected only because "in one of the countries a new 
government came to power. " The Russian Foreign Minister encouraged Israel to 
fulfil its international obligations and to tone down its aggressive policies against 
its Arab neighbours. He added, perhaps to the dismay of Israel, that Moscow 
would not only conduct its policy through words but also by means of actions. 
Primakov declared in late 1996 that "Russia means to play a considerable and well- 
heard part in the orchestra" of the Middle East peace process. 90 These differences 
between Israel and Russia prevented relations between the two from developing 
beyond the reserved and frosty level which existed during 1996. 
Conclusion: between optimism and realism 
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In 1991 and 1992 there was genuine and well-founded optimism that Russian- 
Israeli relations were positively limitless in terms of co-operation and cordiality. 
The pro-Western radicals were dominant in Moscow's political arena and they 
were known for their determination to cast away the prejudices and hostility of all 
aspects of Soviet policy. The pro-Western radicals' desire for improved relations 
with the United States was closely associated with the way Moscow behaved 
towards one of its most important international allies. In addition, Russia's 
relations with hard-line regimes such as Syria and Iran were at that time negatively 
affected as. a consequence of Gorbachev's New Thinking, the continued flow of 
Jewish immigrants into Israel (and the occupied territories), and Russia's general 
neglect of its relations with the East at that time. 
However, as Russia's relations with the West cooled, differences with Israel took 
on a new and larger significance. As this happened, the pro-Western radicals 
began losing their influence in Moscow to pragmatic pro-Westerners such as 
Chernomyrdin, who encouraged trade ties with Israel but was restrained in political 
support for Israeli actions and policies in the region which undermined the peace 
process. In 1993, Moscow's political elite, which included Kozyrev, was 
dominated by the pro-Western pragmatist position of acknowledging Washington's 
primary position in the Middle East but suggesting that Russia could still play a 
prominent role in finding a break-through in the Middle East peace process. Both 
Washington and Tel Aviv undermined Moscow's efforts to have a say in regional 
affairs and this led to growing criticisms in Russia from pragmatic and extreme 
nationalists who argued that Russia's interests were being wastefully neglected by 
Kozyrev and his colleagues. They also argued that Russia's neglect of traditional 
allies such as Iran and Iraq was costing the country billions of dollars in lost 
revenue. 
After 1994, Russia raised its diplomatic profile in the region by improving relations 
with old Arab and Iranian allies, but it also persisted in seeking to improve 
relations with Israel, which indicated that there was not an overbearing influence of 
the pragmatic nationalists on the government's policy. Instead, a more centrist 
policy was taking shape in 1995, when Russian-Israeli relations were given a fresh 
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impetus by Tel Aviv's encouragement of Moscow to convince the hard-line states 
such as Syria and Iran to tone down their belligerent policies and statements and 
show support for the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian peace agreements. 
The appointment of Primakov in early 1996 coincided with a period of growing 
friction between the two countries, both of which faced leadership elections in that 
year. In Russia, the strong neo-communist opposition posed a serious challenge to 
Yeltsin, whose pro-Western policies had come under strong criticisms in the light 
of the growing debate about Nato expansion into Eastern Europe. In Israel, Prime 
Minister Peres was seen as being too much of a dove, particularly in the light of 
terrorist attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah, which led to calls of more stringent 
reactions against Israel's enemies. Operation Grapes of Wrath, launched in April 
1996 against Lebanon, was intended to silence Peres' critics, but the mission was a 
complete failure because it did not suppress Hezbollah and at the same time the 
death of hundreds of innocent civilians and the destruction of homes, factories, 
roads and other buildings rebuilt after the 20-year civil war led to widespread 
international criticism. Peres was replaced by Likud hard-liner Netanyahu, who 
opposed many of the concessions made to the Palestinians in the peace process. 
As his government rescinded on various agreements with the Palestinians, and 
pushed forward plans to expand Jewish settlements in disputed territories, 
Moscow's criticisms of Tel Aviv became more frequent. However, these criticisms 
were not in the same vein as those emanating from pragmatic and extreme 
nationalists, but were more akin to the condemnation of most European capitals at 
the time, particularly Paris. 
Thus it appeared that by 1996 Russia's policy towards Israel had reached an 
impasse, despite the growing trade links, not because Moscow had opted for a 
return to the anti-Israeli line of the Soviet era, but because of Israel's aggressive 
policies in the Middle East. There was also an acceptance by Moscow that the 
special relationship between Israel and the United States acted as a barrier to 
greater Russian involvement in the region. In the words of one leading Russian 
academic, "Russia cannot be compared to the United States in terms of direct 
political influence in Israel. "9' Added to this, Russian foreign policy had by 1996 
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defined a certain outlook on world affairs based on a domestic consensus of 
national interests and principles, typified by the centrist-nationalist position of 
Primakov. This new perspective stressed the need for the restoration of relations 
with traditional Arab allies, some of which were Israel's most dangerous enemies. 
These factors made it difficult for Moscow to create better working conditions 
with the Jewish state than was aimed for in the early 1990s. 
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Chapter VI: Russia and Israel's Neighbours: a New Basis of Relations 
The improvement in ties with Israel and the general reorientation of Russian 
foreign policy since the demise of the Soviet Union appeared at times to be 
incompatible with Moscow's strategy of rebuilding its relations with Israel's 
neighbours. ' Syria continued to be Israel's most bitter foe and the danger of a 
major military confrontation between the two countries remained high between 
1991 and 1996 because of the continued Israeli occupation of neighbouring 
territories and the uncompromisingly hard line of the leadership in Damascus. In 
the five-year period between 1991 and 1996, Moscow attempted to develop 
relations with Israel's neighbours on the basis of pragmatic and mutually beneficial 
bilateral relations. The challenge for Moscow was to balance this with the still 
unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israeli army had been active in southern 
Lebanon since the 1970s and it fortified its position there in 1982 by creating a so- 
called security zone. The Golan Heights were occupied since 1967 as were parts 
of Jordan while the Palestinians were left stateless. Since the Madrid Conference 
in October 1991, the peace process aimed at finding a settlement that would be 
acceptable to all sides of the dispute. For Russia, which inherited the role of co- 
sponsor from the Soviet Union, the occupation of Arab territories sustained a 
volatile Middle East which did not coincide with its national interests. 
In the first year or so of the Yeltsin presidency the trend that existed under 
Gorbachev in his last years continued: very little involvement in the Middle East. 
Moscow's relations with most Arab states at the time of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union were negatively affected on a bilateral level, particularly with regards to 
Syria, because of the Kremlin's overriding commitment to improving relations with 
the West. For many years, Syria and the Soviet Union had the shared interest of 
curtailing the dominance of U. S. and Western-backed countries. However, Syria's 
involvement in the Lebanese civil war was one of the many areas of dispute with 
the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for Moscow's displeasure was that 
from the start of the civil war in 1975 the Soviet leadership wanted the 
preservation of a united and sovereign Lebanon free from outside domination, 
whether it was Syrian or Israeli. 
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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its ruler King Hussein, long regarded as a 
solid Western ally, had good working relations with the Soviet Union since well 
before New Thinking and Gorbachev. The British-educated King Hussein was also 
a shrewd political player with a talent for keeping his political and diplomatic 
options open. This contrasted with PLO leader Yasser Arafat, who was treated 
with suspicion by almost every leadership in the Middle East ranging from Israel to 
Syria, from Jordan to most Lebanese groups as well as Iran and the GCC 
countries. Arafat was not allowed into the United States until 1993 and his 
relationship with Moscow had often been tense and superficial, yet in retrospect, 
the Soviet Union had on occasions been the only friend that the PLO leader could 
turn to. 
Russia's relations with these four of Israel's Arab neighbours were based on a dual 
approach determined by the peace process on the one hand and direct bilateral 
relations on the other, yet these two aspects often overlapped and influenced each 
other. For example, when Gorbachev allowed the speeding up of the rate of 
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, the relationship with Syria 
became soured because the move was seen as indirectly endorsing the growth of 
Jewish settlements on occupied territories and lessening the likelihood of Arab 
lands ever being returned. 
The Decline of Soviet Influence 
The US-led war against Iraq was decisive proof for the Arabs of Washington's 
leadership on the world stage, in contrast to Moscow's passivity and weakness. 
For Jordan and Lebanon the changing attitude was less visible because they already 
had strong relations with the West that were unaffected by the Soviet demise, 
unlike the more clearly defined transformation which affected relations with Syria 
and the PLO. On the whole, until Gorbachev's New Thinking, Soviet policy in the 
region and its anti-Israeli stance were intended to prevent the formation of any 
`pro-western' bloc. Moscow sought to contrast its policies with Washington's 
statements on the issue, "thereby locating their allies in the region on the `moral 
high ground' while forcing `pro-American' regimes into a defensive posture. "2 
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This moral factor was a very important aspect of Soviet policy and was used to 
justify its support for Israel's foes. The de-ideologisation of foreign policy by 
Gorbachev was understood by the Arab states as meaning that the illegality of 
Israel's occupation ceased to be an issue worth fighting for. Upon this basis of 
finding a practical solution to the dispute with Israel by means of negotiations, as 
Gorbachev began suggesting, the Arab parties decided that it was in their greater 
interest to do so with U. S. help. Arafat quickly detected the altered state of affairs 
and from 1988 began to move PLO policy substantially towards one that would be 
acceptable to Washington. He renounced terrorism and in an address to the UN 
General Assembly in Switzerland (the United States would not grant him a visa to 
go to New York) unilaterally recognised the right of Israel to exist. 
The leaderships from Brezhnev to Yeltsin had all encouraged a settlement by 
negotiations under the guidelines set by UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. But since New Thinking Moscow changed its approach, placing Russia's 
policy towards Israel's neighbours within a new framework. Gorbachev also made 
clear a new attitude towards terrorism at the CPSU congress of February 1986: 
"... political assassinations, hostage taking, aircraft hijacking, explosions in streets, 
airports, or railway stations - this is the loathsome face of terrorism, which those 
inspiring it try to disguise with various kinds of cynical fabrications. "' This 
principle of total opposition to terrorism, which was sometimes ambiguous under 
Brezhnev, continued to be emphatically supported by Yeltsin. 
Gorbachev's acceptance of the role of co-sponsor of the peace process was a 
symbolic gesture that the USSR was still a power, but it signalled that the two 
camp world with superpowers fighting their battles through regional clients had 
ceased to exist. 
Russia and the PLO: a friendship without commitments 
As far as the PLO was concerned, New Thinking had pulled the proverbial carpet 
from under their feet because there was no legally-existing Palestinian state. What 
could the Palestinians have to offer the Soviet Union in non-ideologically based, 
business-like bilateral relations? Arafat managed to emerge from this dramatic 
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transformation unharmed because he had never actually been fully dependent on 
the Soviet Union. Moscow was useful in countering U. S. and Israeli efforts to 
undermine the PLO, but Arafat managed to strengthen his power base from the 
support he received from particular Arab states: Saudi Arabia until 1990, but 
mainly Iraq, Tunisia and Algeria. 
In April 1977, almost a year after a PLO office was opened in Moscow, the first 
publicised meeting between Arafat and Brezhnev took place and relations seemed 
to have been further consolidated when in November 1978 the office was granted 
diplomatic status. Such gestures were recognition by Moscow that the PLO was a 
coherent political organisation - and not a rogue movement - that could provide 
significant political value in terms of prestige in the wider Arab context and as a 
bartering chip vis-it-vis the United States. 
Arafat's points of friction with Moscow, until 1986, were over the existence of the 
state of Israel, and "the locale of a Palestinian state (alongside or instead of Israel - 
either within the 1947 Partition Plan lines or the 1949-1967 borders), " and the 
PLO's relationship with Israel's neighbours. 4 But to the further distress of Arafat, 
when in 1988 he finally accepted the Soviet position, which was in essence the 
creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Moscow 
changed its standpoint under Gorbachev (and later under Yeltsin) to a settlement 
based on the principle of land for peace that was virtually identical to the U. S. 
position. The consequence of this for Lebanon, Syria and Jordan was less drastic 
because only part of their land was then occupied and the extent of Israel's 
withdrawal from these territories was the main issue of negotiations. Yet for the 
Palestinians there was a startling omission because there was no actual guarantee 
of statehood. Although under Yeltsin Moscow continued to be more open to the 
idea of Palestinian statehood when compared with Washington, Russian diplomats 
emphasised the need for the parties to find their own arrangement between each 
other. 
During the first years of the post-Soviet era, Yeltsin's Middle East policy faced 
opposition from his political opponents for excessive concessions to the West. 
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They pointed out that if Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev wished to fulfil their 
objective of repairing Russia's damaged relations with the Arabs, Russia ought to 
resume placing emphasis on the moral factor, and that there was a practical reason 
for doing so because it would counter U. S. economic might, which Moscow could 
not hope to compete with. Russia, they suggested, needed to pursue its own set of 
principles and interests. 
Regarding the Palestinians, Yeltsin and Kozyrev did not rapidly embrace this way 
of thinking. Russian participation in the Israeli-Palestinian side of the negotiations 
was minimal and they played no part whatsoever in the secret talks in Oslo which 
culminated in the Gaza-Jericho peace agreement. Moscow did not even know that 
they were actually taking place. With the official talks taking place in Washington, 
the Russian Foreign Ministry was probably provided with a general briefing of the 
official negotiations, and even then only sporadically. Russia had little to offer the 
Palestinians in the way it could other Arab states such as Syria and Jordan in terms 
of supplying military hardware, because there was no Palestinian army. An 
example of the insignificant role that Russia played in the peace talks was that a 
special letter of assurances had to be sent to the Palestinians from the United States 
to convince them to attend the Madrid Conference. The letter stated: "The United 
States believes that there should be an end to the Israeli occupation which can 
occur only through genuine and meaningful negotiations. "5 No letter of assurance 
was ever requested from the Russian side, perhaps because the Palestinians felt that 
it would not be worth the paper it was written on. 
From his first encounters with the Soviet leadership Arafat had known that 
Moscow was not prepared to make huge sacrifices for the Palestinian cause. A top 
Arafat aide who travelled to Moscow in 1968 was quoted as having said after a 
long lecture by his Soviet counterparts: " `You are saying there is no way you are 
going to be drawn into a confrontation with the Americans for the sake of us 
Palestinians in particular and us Arabs in general' ... 
They replied to the effect that 
I was understanding them perfectly. "6 The Palestinians knew that this 
understanding was even more applicable under Yeltsin. 
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One month after the collapse of the Soviet Union a round of talks was held in 
Moscow which by all accounts was a failure. The Syrians and Lebanese did not 
attend and the Palestinians were not allowed to take part because Israel refused to 
meet members who were residents of East Jerusalem. Sergei Filatov, commenting 
at the end of the round of discussions, reflected: "It is hard to assess the Moscow 
meeting in a positive light. President B. N. Yeltsin didn't even pay any attention to 
it... ". 7 One year later, Russia's lack of diplomatic influence in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict was reconfirmed when Israel expelled 416 Palestinians to the 
freezing mountains of southern Lebanon, accused of belonging to the militant 
Islamic Palestinian organisation called Hamas. 
Moscow found it difficult to continue neglecting criticisms by political opponents 
regarding Russia's stance on the Palestinian issue. It was therefore unsurprising 
when Yeltsin met with PLO chairman Arafat on 19 April 1994, after the historic 
peace declaration of September 1993 between Israel and the Palestinians. The 
consequence of the meeting was a pledge by Yeltsin that his government would 
help create a Palestinian police force for the newly established Palestinian National 
Authority. While by great power standards the offer by Moscow was modest, the 
Palestinians were expected to take into account the economic difficulties being 
faced by Russia. Moreover, the offer had great symbolic and political value; by 
offering help to the Palestinians Yeltsin answered his critics' questions regarding 
Russia's interest in the Middle East and claimed that his government was not 
driven by purely pragmatic factors but also by matters of principle even if they 
offended Israel and its Western allies. Following the summit meeting Yeltsin's 
office issued a statement underlining his government's broader interests by stating 
that "establishing a lasting and fair peace was and remains a strategic priority for 
Russia in this region of vital importance. "8 
The offer to help establish a Palestinian police force, by providing 45 DRDM-2 
armoured personnel carriers and training a small group of policemen at no cost, 
had a more specific practical explanation. In fact, it was basically all that Russia 
could offer, since the Palestinians were not permitted to establish an army under 
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the terms of the PLO-Israeli agreement. More significantly, the police force would 
help Arafat remain in power in the face of powerful opposition to the peace treaty 
by Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups. On several occasions in the past 
Soviet leaders had intervened directly to save Arafat's PLO, and even his life, from 
Israel and Syria, particularly in Lebanon. Yeltsin's government, as far as possible, 
continued to support the actions of the PLO leader for similar reasons but with 
different motives. 
The Russian leadership took advantage of the PLO's lingering suspicions of U. S. 
intentions to make inroads into this track of the peace process. Until September 
1993, when the PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles was signed, Arafat's 
criticisms of Washington's strong pro-Israeli line were highly charged. Speaking in 
1993, Arafat complained that "the denial of the Palestinian people's right to self- 
determination and grave violations of Palestinian human rights over decades 
provides us with the most striking example of double standards in the 
implementation of human rights. " The Palestinian leader added that "the very clear 
support accorded to Israel by the USA and other states can only but encourage 
Israel to persist in its violation of human rights. "9 The US response was 
unsurprisingly hostile to such criticism. 
Russia's growing support for Arafat since the peace agreement of September 1993 
was influenced by the perception that the Palestinian leader represented the 
moderate forces. Arafat presented himself as the leader of the democratic, secular 
and progressive path for his people and he made genuine efforts to fight Palestinian 
terrorist groups. The only other option to Arafat was the violent and authoritarian 
Hamas, which had grown out of the miserable conditions of the Gaza refugee 
camps. It would have been difficult to envisage the democratic leadership in 
Moscow justifying support for them instead of the PLO. In May 1994, Kozyrev 
elucidated the Russian position and offered strong language in support of Arafat. 
He acknowledged that in the light of violent opposition to the peace process "it 
must be said that this is his great contribution, his role as a brave, decisive leader. 
Therefore the fact that we received him in Moscow, on his visit on the eve of the 
signing [of the PLO-Israeli Gaza-Jericho agreement], was not simply a gesture of 
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protocol, but was in fact an expression of support for him as the top leader. "lo By 
the spring of 1994, Moscow made clear its willingness to increase its involvement 
in the peace process despite the domestic difficulties the new government was 
facing. "We have our own worries, a lot of them. But nevertheless it cannot be 
said that Russia is standing aside, " Kozyrev was to insist. " He claimed that "it 
was generally acknowledged" that the visits by Arafat and Rabin to Moscow and 
their meetings with Boris Yeltsin "gave a good boost to the work being carried 
out. A2 
In reality, Kozyrev's claims were inaccurate because Russia had virtually no 
bearing on the development of the peace process, but he was correct in his 
assessment that the implementation of the agreement will be "no less important a 
phase than the talks" leading up to it. 13 In fact, as soon as the agreement was 
signed there were many obstacles which threatened its legitimacy. First, the 
Israelis began to question, or reinterpret certain aspects of the agreement, 
particularly with regards to Jericho. The Palestinian understanding of the area of 
Jericho was that it would be much larger than the Israeli interpretation. There 
were also other difficulties such as responsibility for border areas and the continued 
expansion of Jewish settlements which threatened to destroy the agreement before 
it had a chance to be implemented. 
The United States continued to be the most important mediator on the Israeli- 
Palestinian track. But Kozyrev's extensive visit to the Middle East at the end of 
March 1995 suggested that Moscow did not give up on its efforts to match the 
United States and the shuttle diplomacy of its Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher. Before his departure to the area Kozyrev acknowledged that "the 
Middle East peace process is facing great difficulties. " 14 But according to the 
Russian Foreign Minister this only made it more necessary for his country to 
become more involved in finding a solution. While Kozyrev stressed that it was 
Moscow's policy to co-operate more closely with Washington, he added that "it is 
evident now that the efforts by one co-sponsor are not enough to add dynamism to 
the process. "" 
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In the spring of 1995, Russia's renewed vigour on the Palestinian-Israeli track was 
displayed when Kozyrev's most senior aide responsible for the Middle East, Viktor 
Posuvaliuk, attempted to meet with Faisal Husseini, a senior PLO official, in East 
Jerusalem. For Israel the issue of the status of Jerusalem was highly sensitive and a 
similar situation arose in March 1995 when Britain's John Major was forced to 
cancel a trip by his Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Hogg, to the 
PLO's offices in East Jerusalem because of Jewish and Israeli protests. The 
Russian official, however, went ahead with the planned meeting despite Kozyrev's 
assurances to Israeli officials that his deputy would not do so. 
The Palestinians generally received far more sympathy after 1993 with regards to 
the dispute over Jerusalem, when pro-Western liberals began to disappear from the 
Russian political stage. The press and Russian officials noted the significant 
political as well as religious value Jerusalem held for Christians, Muslims and Jews 
alike. Israeli obstinacy over the issue, refusing even to discuss the possibility of 
taking into consideration the perspective of Christians and Muslims, led Arafat to 
make strong demands in 1996 during celebrations marking the birth of Christ. A 
commentary in Nezavisimaia gazeta noted: "The declaration of Arafat is clearly to 
be understood as a signal to Israelis and to all the world. Compromise is 
necessary ! i16 
The election of Arafat as the President of the Palestinian National Authority in 
January 1996 was strongly welcomed and praised by Moscow. Posuvaliuk, as 
Deputy Foreign Minister, said the election of Arafat had caused "a feeling of great 
satisfaction in Moscow" for the successful accomplishment of "the first genuinely 
free and democratic elections in the history of Palestine. "" This support for the 
PLO and in particular to Arafat had become a normal feature of Moscow's policy. 
Posuvaliuk described the Palestinian leader as "a tested and long-standing friend of 
our country. He is one of the few who spoke favourably not only during the 
existence of the USSR, but also at the time of hardships for Russia. "" The 
suggestion that there was a certain continuity between the Soviet Union and Russia 
was in itself significant, highlighting the high esteem which Moscow had for the 
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Palestinian leader. Posuvaliuk added: "[Arafat] has never betrayed friendship with 
Russia and we have also been true to this friendship and have never stopped saying 
that Yasir Arafat's leadership is the embodiment of true democracy for the 
Palestinians. Yasir Arafat believed and believes in Russia, and we believed and 
believe in him. And this has been confirmed by the choice made by the people of 
Palestine. i19 The references to the people and history of Palestine appeared to 
indicate Russian support for Palestinian statehood, a principle which was 
completely rejected by both Israel and the United States. Further praise was given 
to Arafat when in April 1996 the Palestinian National Council (the Palestinian 
parliament) voted to annul declarations in their charter calling for the destruction 
of the state of Israel. This took place at the time when the Israeli army was 
involved in a military offensive against Lebanon which led to many civilian 
casualties. According to a statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
"despite this, a balanced, realistic line in support of the political course pursued by 
Arafat to advance the peace dialogue with Israel has prevailed at the National 
Council of Palestine. 1120 
The language of friendship and warmth was often reciprocated by the Palestinian 
leadership. Arafat often emphasised what he believed to be the special relationship 
that existed between the two leaderships. He consented to comment personally on 
this research partly because he felt it important "to highlight the friendship between 
the Russian people and the Palestinians, " and when asked if there was a preference 
towards the neo-communists rather than Yeltsin and the democrats he interrupted 
with an emphatic "no, we are friendly with all sides in Russia. 'M This was not 
unusual because many of the personnel in Russia's government and political- 
economic elite remained in place and, if anything, progressed within the new 
system. Foreign Minister Primakov was a prime example of a senior official in 
Moscow who had long-standing ties with the Arab leadership. When asked if he 
preferred Primakov to his Western-oriented predecessor Kozyrev, Arafat did not 
mention the latter but dwelt on the relationship with his successor. "I have known 
Primakov for twenty years, and he speaks Arabic fluently. And he doesn't only 
know me, but he is also familiar with all the Palestinian leadership. "22 Clearly, this 
answer suggested that Primakov was preferred because the Middle East was less of 
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a concern for Kozyrev, who regarded relations with the United States as the key 
priority. While Primakov undoubtedly placed relations with the United States at 
the top of Moscow's agenda, his special knowledge of the Middle East gave him 
the ability to act more decisively and independently from Washington, and to some 
extent from Yeltsin as well; something that Kozyrev failed to do in his early years 
in office. 
Arafat was keen to show that the level of ties between the Palestinian and Russian 
leaderships went beyond individuals and parties, adding that "our relations are not 
only with Primakov but with many others in Russia. " He pointed out that a 
committee was especially established to set a framework for relations between 
Russia and a future Palestinian state. This committee had resulted from "Russia's 
role as a co-chairman of the peace conference. "23 But the problem of gaining 
anything tangible from this `special relationship' was conceded by Arafat. When 
asked if Primakov had offered any specific help to the Palestinian authority the 
PLO leader answered: "Not yet, you know this is still his first year [as Foreign 
Minister]. i24 Perhaps in this response there was a subtle expression of the limited 
ability of Russia to act decisively on behalf of the Palestinians. 
But a senior Russian official interviewed in Moscow for this research defended the 
Russian role and argued that it had actually become increasingly prominent 
between 1991 and 1996. Sergei Kepechenko said that while he did not "deny that 
US diplomacy was more active at some phases" of the negotiations between 
Palestinians and Israelis, he noted that neither power had the full capability of 
finding a lasting peace between the two parties. 25 He correctly noted that the 
"Oslo agreement was a fruit of direct talks between the PLO and the Israeli 
government, concealed from both the United States and Russia. s26 According to 
Kepechenko, with consideration to the view from Moscow that the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict was no longer a foremost priority, Russia did not have to be present 
at every step of events but rather make itself available when its help was needed. 
Overall, such comments served to add weight to the argument that the Palestinian 
issue had been relegated to a peripheral status in Russian foreign policy thinking. 
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Even by 1996, when the centrist-nationalists had become dominant in Moscow and 
the pro-Western radicals were excluded from the foreign-policy elite, there was no 
apparent sense of urgency regarding the Palestinian issue. Generally, there was 
strong support for Arafat, but not upon the basis that he was an ally who could 
help to contain U. S. influence in the region but rather because of Russia's strong 
endorsement for the peace process, which he had come to symbolise. Very few 
voices in Russia between 1991 and 1996, other than some extreme nationalists, 
argued that Moscow should revitalise its support for the Palestinians at the expense 
of good relations with the United States. 
Russia, Jordan and the triumph of realism 
Even under Brezhnev there was never any deep animosity between Jordan and the 
Soviet Union and King Hussein's official visit to Moscow in June 1976 resulted in 
an "arms agreement which provided for the dispatch of a Soviet SAM system and 
even some Soviet advisers to Jordan. i27 King Hussein's close relationship with the 
West, particularly Britain but also the United States, meant that Soviet leaders 
looked upon him with suspicion. But since Brezhnev there was recognition in 
Moscow that King Hussein's pragmatic policies and moderate stance with regard 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict created a positive climate for developing bilateral 
relations. At the same time, there was a perception in Jordan that too much 
reliance on the West was not in the Kingdom's interest, and King Hussein skilfully 
followed the strategy of `keeping your friends close and your enemies closer'. 
Jordan's biggest threat since the late 1960s was Syria and not Israel, with 
Damascus making several threats to invade the Kingdom. The consequence of this 
was a close relationship between Jordan and Iraq, another foe of Syria. This 
alliance was particularly strong in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war, with Syria's 
support for Iran in the war leading to further antipathy between Amman and 
Damascus. 
King Hussein's political survival differed from the Gulf monarchies because it was 
based on a measure of domestic popularity, on skilful diplomacy in terms of 
relations with the outside world, and independence from the West. One such 
example of this was Jordan's stance in the Gulf War, in which it refused to cave in 
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under U. S. pressure to join the anti-Iraq coalition. For most of the 1980s, when 
Ronald Reagan had intensified his policies against the `evil empire', Jordan 
preserved a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Jordan had adopted a policy, which dated back to the late 1970s, of cultivating 
good relations with Moscow while things were not going well with the United 
States. Then, Washington had been pressurising Amman to join Egypt in signing a 
peace treaty with Israel but threats from Syria prevented King Hussein from doing 
so. However, the pro-Jewish Congress and administration in Washington did not 
sympathise with Jordan's predicament and arms sales to the Kingdom decreased in 
value and quality. On 26 May 1981 King Hussein made an official visit to Moscow 
with the specific aim of purchasing an air defence system. In November 1981, an 
agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union for the purchase of 20 SAM-8 
vehicle-mounted surface-to-air missile units and 16 ZSU-244 AA gun units. 28 
Jordan's request to Washington for advanced air defence equipment and jets had 
been flatly rejected by Congress while the Reagan administration upgraded its 
weapons sales supplies and support for Israel to new levels, with Alexander Haig, 
the Secretary of State, announcing in May 1982 plans to revive strategic co- 
operation with Israel following a meeting with Israeli Defence Minister (the 
hawkish and anti-Arab) Ariel Sharon. "The whole U. S. approach to Jordan, 
compared with the way it dealt with Israel caused consternation in the Arab 
world. "29 
The Jordanian monarch made another trip to the Soviet Union in June 1982 to 
discuss the enhancement of the Kingdom's air defence system and a deal was 
announced on 30 June, which included the purchase of SAM-8 missiles; this was 
concluded in 1984.3° King Hussein attempted to ease U. S. -Israeli concerns by 
assuring them that these security measures were aimed at Syria, which in 1980 
built up troops on the Jordanian border and threatened to invade under the pretext 
that Amman had been supporting Islamic militants who tried to overthrow the 
Alawite regime in Damascus. Jordan paid for the military equipment, substantially 
subsidised by Iraq, in hard currency. Amman made use of its diplomatic strings to 
increase the chance of dialogue between Washington and Moscow mainly by 
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openly supporting the Soviet Union's proposal for an international conference on 
the Middle East. 
Amman was critical of Washington's failure to force an Israeli and Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon because Jordan wanted neither to become too dominant. 
Jordanian policy-makers also criticised Washington's increasing military support 
for Israel because it led to a spiralling arms race in which Moscow countered with 
supplies to Syria. Moreover, King Hussein criticised Washington's total support 
for Israeli aims of defining the status of Jerusalem as the undisputed capital of 
Israel and the refusal to acknowledge the illegality of Jewish settlements on 
occupied territories. This, the monarch believed, made it more difficult for Arabs 
to make peace with Israel and jeopardised the potential role of the United States as 
peace-maker. King Hussein stated on 15 March 1984, that "the U. S. has no right 
to object to the presence of the Soviet Union at any new peace negotiations, but 
because the USSR is allied with Syria and the U. S. with Israel, neither superpower 
is in a position to act as an honest broker in peace talks. 113l 
Although the differences between Jordan and Israel were not as wide-ranging or 
complicated as between Israel and other Arab states, and peace could have been 
attained much earlier, King Hussein waited until the right political moment to take 
this step. The fact that after 1991 the Yeltsin government continued to encourage 
the peace process eased Amman's international position. 
In October 1992, the first visit by a high-level Russian delegation to Jordan was led 
by Petr Aven, the Foreign Economic Relations Minister. Aven told Jordan that the 
main purpose of the visit was "to pay special attention to your question of debt, 
which Jordan had to the former USSR, and, now as Russia is the legal successor of 
the USSR. 02 Jordan had failed to keep up with all the payments for increasing 
Soviet arms supplies though Moscow recognised that Jordan's record was better 
than other Middle Eastern countries. In fact, the Russian delegation gave high 
praise to the Jordanian position while openly criticising the Syrian leadership, 
which Aven and his colleagues had found difficult to deal with. "The government 
of Jordan preferred not to complicate the talks with a protracted dispute over legal 
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succession, "one reporter noted, and "it took little more than a day for Jordan to 
sign an agreement with Russia to buy back the debt accumulated in relations with 
the former USSR. 03 And as if to amplify the contrast with Syria, a delegation 
member noted the "exceptionally friendly tone of the talks, in which Jordan's King 
Hussein also took part. "34 This did not detract from the fact that the United States 
remained as the most valuable economic patron for Amman. Washington's ability 
to provide large-scale aid and reschedule debts was recognised by Moscow as a 
vital lever in directing the course of Middle East negotiations and strengthening 
bilateral ties. When in 1992 the United States "rescheduled about $128 million of 
debts under an agreement" between Washington and Amman, made possible by the 
Agency for International Development and the Defense Department of the United 
States, it was viewed as but one of the many carrots that could be dangled to 
35 encourage Jordan to make peace with Israel. 
In late October 1992, a Russian parliamentary delegation headed by Ramazan 
Abdulatipov, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, held 
talks with Jordanian Prime Minister Zayed Bin Shaker. This was followed by a 
visit to Jordan by Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov on 5 
January 1993, and Lt-Gen. Andrei Nikolaiev, First Deputy Chief of Staff, who 
arrived in early February. Visits by Russian officials became regular and at the 
most senior level of government, which included Foreign Minister Kozyrev, 
characterising the active and positive nature of bilateral relations. Deputy Foreign 
Minister Viktor Posuvaliuk's visit at the end of 1994 revealed a point of friction 
over the Russian intervention in Chechnia. Jordan had adopted a firm position 
against the war and in sympathy with the Chechens, whose links with Jordan were 
historic. Following a meeting with Posuvaliuk, Prime Minister Abdul Salam al- 
Majali said he had "clarified the Jordanian government's stance on the issue, which 
stresses the principle of resorting to dialogue and reason to settle controversial 
issues to avoid further bloodshed of innocent victims. 7136 
The Chechen community in Jordan had always been loyal to the Hashemite 
monarch, who in most of the Muslim world is regarded as the true protector of the 
holy sites of Mecca and Medina as well as Jerusalem. A chain of complicated 
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political events led to the limitation of the influence of the Hashemite family in the 
Arab world since the First World War but Chechen fighters continued to be the 
most loyal military guards of the King. Nonetheless, in 1996 Moscow 
acknowledged that Jordan had toned down its support for the Chechen rebels. 
Sections of the Russian press, which claimed that "Chechen fighters had been 
quietly receiving support from various Jordanian aid and support organisations... ", 
acknowledged that mutual diplomatic efforts had led to reduced pro-Dudaev 
activity and a "strict ban on pro-Dudayev propaganda in Jordan. )07 The diplomatic 
tone of the message was indicative of the nature of Jordanian-Russian relations. 
The Chechen war did not lead to a deterioration in bilateral relations which were 
practical, business-like and non-ideological. They represented in many ways what 
both countries wanted from each other. 
King Hussein, like Arafat, was also praised by Moscow for his active pursuit of the 
peace process. Following the anti-terrorism Conference in Egypt in March 1996, 
which Yeltsin attended and offered strong support for its aims, the Russian media 
contrasted the positions of the different Arab countries. Syria did not attend and 
its Foreign Minister Faroukh Shara' said that his government did not believe the 
conference served the interest of the Arabs. His Jordanian counterpart, Abdel 
Karim Kabiriti, was praised for his constructive role and support for the gathering 
at the Egyptian sea-side resort of Sharm al-Shaikh. Kabiriti was quoted by one 
report, in a comparison with the Syrian position, as saying that the "final 
communique is extremely balanced and focused more on the problems of peace 
than on the fight against terrorism. ""' This moderation by Amman was highly 
valued by Moscow. 
Russian relations with Syria and Lebanon: the old and the new 
Syria was in many ways the most consistently pro-Soviet state in the Middle East 
until the mid-1980s. During that time the Soviet leadership was forced to take 
special account over events in Lebanon, particularly the civil war, because of the 
heavy involvement of Syria. Throughout the course of the conflict, Moscow had 
generally been critical of Syria's actions in Lebanon, but this difference of opinion 
did not alter the strategic alliance that the two countries had. Yeltsin inherited icy 
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relations between Damascus and Moscow from the Gorbachev era, but it did not 
take long for members of his government to try to revive the close relationship that 
existed under Brezhnev. The reasons for this had great significance because on the 
surface such aims contradicted the general thrust of Yeltsin's policies in the Middle 
East and his country's relations with the West. 
Unlike the cases of Jordan and the Palestinians, Russia under Yeltsin believed that 
it could play a decisive role in resolving the conflict between Syria and Israel, not 
only regarding the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, but also taking into 
account that both countries occupied Lebanon. Historically, the two countries 
were the bitterest of enemies and Israelis viewed Syrians with greater suspicion 
than any other Arabs because the Ba'athist regime in Syria had shown itself to be 
brutal in the suppression of its opponents. Simultaneously, the Syrian government 
claimed that Israel was an expansionist Zionist state; not content with the land it 
already occupied, it sought to subject all Arabs from the Nile to the Euphrates 
under its control. 
The clash between Israel and Syria in Lebanon on 9 June1982 highlighted the 
danger of a direct superpower involvement in the region. The battle resulted in the 
destruction of the Syrian SAM network in Lebanon in what was described as the 
largest single air battle since World War II, in which "Israel downed twenty-three 
Syrian MiGs (by the end of the war the Israelis destroyed eighty-five Syrian planes 
without the loss of a single Israeli aircraft). "39 This clearly underlined the 
inferiority of Soviet weapons even if one took into account the skill factor where 
the Israelis also held an advantage. 
From the late 1970s onwards, the Brezhnev leadership began to feel that it had 
little control over events in Lebanon and had decided that Syria's policy "had 
entered a stage of diminishing returns. "40 Brezhnev had taken offence, according 
to many observers, because Asad had falsely convinced Moscow that Syrian 
intervention would be short lived with the only objective of stabilising the situation 
in Lebanon. When Syrian troops intensified their assault on the leftist coalition in 
Lebanon and their PLO allies in the mid-1976, Brezhnev sent a strongly worded 
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letter to the Syrian leader: "We understand neither your line of conduct nor the 
aims which you are pursuing in Lebanon.. . we are still prepared to consolidate the 
links of friendship between our two countries... unless Syria behaves in such a way 
as to cause rifts in the relations between us. i41 Moscow's dilemma was that it 
wanted to support Syria in order to limit Israeli domination, but at the same time 
the Soviet leadership feared that Syria would interpret such support as a green light 
to military action in pursuit its ambition of returning the Golan Heights and 
exerting full control over Lebanon. 
Gorbachev's refusal to support Syria's objective of achieving strategic parity with 
Israel did not mean that Moscow was prepared to abandon its interests in the 
Middle East altogether. Arab press sources reported just before Asad's spring 
1990 visit to Moscow that the two countries were "negotiating a secret contract to 
refurbish Syrian air defense systems, " and that the USSR "continued to supply SS- 
21 and Sukhoi 24s to Syria. "42 Gorbachev, as Yeltsin did later, justified the sale of 
weapons to Syria by arguing that Moscow had a right to sell weapons to its 
partners for defence purposes in the same way that the United States continued to 
arm Israel. 
Nonetheless, since the mid-1970s onwards Moscow had felt uneasy at the 
surreptitious co-operation between Damascus and Washington, with tacit US 
approval for some of Syria's policies in Lebanon. Washington's indirect support to 
Asad "signalled not only that he was not a Soviet client but that he could be an 
asset to US interests in the Middle East if he were to be properly acknowledged. "43 
Syria's role in the release of Western hostages held captive in Lebanon and the fact 
that Syrian troops helped crush PLO forces in Lebanon in the late 1980s was not 
unwelcome to Washington nor Tel Aviv. Growing co-operation in relations 
between Syria and the United States - President Clinton, during his first term in 
office, had twice met President Asad - was a source of concern for the Yeltsin 
government. Russia feared Syrian participation in a peace deal would completely 
exclude Moscow from the Middle East. This scenario was not discounted as Syria 
had already played the role of ally to the United States in the anti-Iraqi coalition, 
and these factors partially explained the reason for the Russian Foreign Ministry's 
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energetic efforts to establish an important role in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations 
over the Golan Heights since 1993. 
Russia's relations with Syria began badly when in October 1992 Aven travelled to 
Damascus as head of a delegation to discuss the question of debts that had been 
owed to the Soviet Union. The Russian delegation described the Syrian position as 
"disheartening. The very legality of holding talks on indebtedness with Russia as 
the USSR's legal successor was called into question. " The Syrian officials wanted 
to create a joint commission that would examine the legal issues relating to the 
Russian succession and whether Damascus owed Moscow anything at all. ` 4 The 
Russian delegation, which also included high ranking officials from the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, met with 
Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Zoubi, Economic Minister Muhammad al-lmadi and 
Defence Minister Mustafa Tlas. The Syrians told their Russian counterparts that 
other former Union republics had demanded repayment of Syrian debts, "however, 
the Syrian officials declined to present a single document proving that such 
demands have been made, " the Russians claimed. 45 The Russian delegation was 
clearly annoyed by the complete stubbornness of the Syrian position and took up a 
similarly firm position: "Not only will the Russian government not write off any 
more debts or be satisfied with a lack of dependable guarantees that deliveries will 
henceforth be paid for promptly and in full; the Russian Federation Parliament will 
also reject any hint of charity in the matter. "46 
Aven himself admitted after the meeting that "political dialogue with Syria has been 
broken off for a rather lengthy period of time. As a result, negotiations on financial 
subjects have run into purely political problems. "47 The Syrian leadership wanted 
to stifle Russian hopes of exiting from the Middle East arena after taking what it 
was owed. Damascus sought after reassurances that Russia would continue the 
Soviet responsibility for refurbishing and upgrading Syria's defences. Russia 
refused to make such a commitment until it had received guarantees from Syria 
that it would be able to pay for what it had purchased in the past and what it 
wanted to purchase in the future. 
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On 2 November 1994, Kozyrev's meeting with Asad in Damascus took place 
under a completely different political setting. In the two years that had passed 
Moscow gradually shifted its position to the extent that it appeared as if the years 
between 1988-1992 had been some form of aberration. Kozyrev had on his trip 
commented on the need for "Russia's presence in the Middle East (as) necessary to 
provide a balance and a counterweight" to the U. S. -supported peace process. 48 
The Syrians in turn wanted to see Russia "reactivating" its role in the Middle East, 
which from their point of view would strengthen Syria's hand vis-ä-vis the United 
States and Israel. Damascus had been facing mounting pressure from the United 
States to join the PLO and Jordan in signing a peace treaty with Israel. The 
agreements signed by the PLO and Jordan left Syria more isolated than ever, 
prompting the leadership in Damascus, which did not want to sign a treaty from a 
position of weakness, to see the value in reaffirming its links with Moscow. 
The realisation by Moscow since 1992 that concessions to the West on the 
international arena would not necessarily guarantee financial aid to rescue Russia's 
shrinking economy served to realign Moscow's priorities. Russia's growing 
assertion that it should be responsible for the security of the whole of the CIS 
meant in effect that the Middle East would once more be across the border from 
Russia's most urgent security concerns. Such considerations influenced the 
thinking of Russia's foreign policy makers and played a part in enabling Russia and 
Syria to move nearer a settlement over debt repayment. In April 1994, First 
Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets proposed in Damascus that repayments of 
debts, estimated at $10 billion, could be met in part through the import of Syrian 
goods such as food, medicine and cotton. Damascus in turn softened its position 
and announced that it was determined to repay any legally outstanding debts, 
opening the way for the signing of a military-technical agreement on 27 April. 
Syrian Defence Minister Tlas said the agreement was a "first step" toward reviving 
close relations between Damascus and Moscow. He added that the agreement 
reflected Syria's "privileged relations" with Russia and that Damascus had 
"powerful friends" in Moscow. 49 
170 
Moscow had become wary of U. S. efforts to bring Syria into the fold, following 
two trips to Damascus in February and August 1993 by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher. During the August trip Asad had vocally highlighted the value of the 
U. S. role in the peace process, setting the wheels in motion for U. S. -Russian 
competition with regards to resolving the Syrian-Israeli track. By the spring of 
1994 these differences were barely concealed, with Moscow insisting on a more 
prominent role. On 14 March Kozyrev met Christopher in Vladivostok airport: 
"The location represented an attempt by each side to rebuff the other: Kozyrev 
refused to travel to Washington to meet Christopher and Christopher refused to 
hold talks outside the tentative setting of the airport. , 50 Kozyrev candidly stated 
that "how and in which issues should there be a close partnership, and in which 
should the partnership be a loose one" were matters that needed clarification and 
agreement from both sides. 51 In effect, Kozyrev implied that while Russia was 
prepared to accept a secondary role with regards to Jordan and to some extent the 
Palestinians, the Syrian-Israeli track was given a higher level of importance by 
Moscow. 
On 4 May 1994 Kozyrev reaffirmed Russia's "long-standing vital interest" in the 
Middle East but he attempted to stifle Western and Israeli fears that his earlier 
remarks were a threat that Russia was about to act independently by saying that 
Moscow and Washington were "in daily contact, we are acting in unison, in 
complete accord. "52 Yet by then it had become obvious that this was not true, 
with U. S. officials complaining to reporters "about Russia's failure to consult on 
some issues connected with the Middle East peace process, "53 in particular, with 
regards to the Golan Heights negotiations. 
Kozyrev was under pressure to remain vigilant with regards to Washington's aims. 
A group of State Duma deputies warned their government in June 1994 about U. S. 
ambitions to place troops on the Golan Heights. The warning, which was reported 
in Segodnia under the headline of "Duma Deputies Rise to the Defence of the 
Golan Heights", reflected Russian pragmatic and extreme nationalist attitudes and 
perceptions. 54 According to the report, the Duma deputies had reached the 
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conclusion that Washington's "strategic goal of a peaceful settlement" was to "turn 
the Golan Heights into a military base for the deployment of rapid reaction 
forces. s55 The deputies were in agreement with the general opinion of Middle East 
observers that it was Israel and not Syria which most opposed the idea because in 
the military sense it would limit its ability to act independently in the region, and 
would leave it more dependent on the United States. The deputies, who directed 
their message at Kozyrev and State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, called for both 
U. S. and Russian armed forces to be excluded from any Syrian-Israeli deal. "In 
order to avert the treacherous U. S. plans, the deputies asked the Russian Foreign 
Ministry to step up its influence on the process of peace settlement. "" In fact, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry had already stepped up its role on that track, but it was 
not as a consequence of pressure from political opponents as much as it was due to 
geo-strategic factors. The Syrian example reflected the Moscow leadership's 
predicament of balancing support for peaceful settlements to regional conflicts 
through co-operation with the United States, while being more assertive in 
protecting its own interests. 
On 22 July, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Moscow and Damascus, the Russian Ambassador in the Syrian capital 
keenly promoted the need for closer relations between the two countries. 
Aleksandr Zotov, who was interviewed in Literaturnaia ga eta, admitted that 
when he arrived in Damascus in 1989, at the height of perestroika, "it was not an 
easy time. 1)57 The Ambassador also did not deny that there were differences 
between the two countries. He pointed out that in the past, "if there had been no 
crises, there had been disagreements in the ideological sphere during that time, 
notably over Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war. i58 However, he 
suggested in the interview that under Yeltsin, the aberration of those differences 
were being corrected and that the two countries were working towards 
reactivating the traditionally close relationship between Moscow and Damascus. 
Zotov also defended the continuation of Russian arms sales to Syria, saying that 
"thought may be given to the creation of a modern air defence system, which 
would be rather a stabilising factor. "59 These comments were made at a time when 
radical pro-Westerners, and leaders in Israel and the United States, were arguing 
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that increased arms sales to Syria would make the regime in Damascus less willing 
to compromise with Israel with regard to finding a peace settlement. 
The question of debts continued to loom. Despite efforts in April 1994 by both 
governments to smooth over differences, the quarrel erupted into the open once 
more in May when Izvestiia reported that a high ranking official from the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations, Juni Mikhailov, refuted media claims that Russia 
had agreed to write off 90 percent of Syria's debts. The report had noted that 
Damascus wanted to write off the greater part of the $11 billion debt and defer 
repayment of the rest for 20 years. Mikhailov bluntly rejected the possibility and 
declared that "Moscow insists on fulfilling contractual obligations under each loan 
with payment of the debt by 2005, at least of hard currency credits. The rest is to 
be paid out with goods deliveries and reinvestments in the local economy. i60 The 
Russian government believed that with Syria's growing rate of oil production, 
economic benefits from their presence in Lebanon, and financial aid from the Gulf 
countries, Damascus easily had the capability of repaying a substantial section of 
the debts. Kozyrev's visit to Damascus at the end of March 1995 was yet another 
endeavour to resolve differences regarding the question of debts. Kozyrev 
asserted that "the time has come to untie that knot and release the potential of 
bilateral relations. , 61 According to estimates in Moscow, this knot was worth 
between $7 billion to $11 billion for arms shipments alone. 2 Despite this point of 
contention, Kozyrev argued that co-operation between the two countries was 
necessary "to prevent utter stagnation or even reversal in the process of settlement 
in the Middle East. "63 
The drive for revitalising the relationship with Syria was intensified under 
Primakov, who received broad support for this strategy from both official and 
media circles. Kozyrev's neglect of bilateral relations with traditional allies such as 
Syria, particularly in his first years in office, came under pressure not only from 
pragmatic and extreme nationalists but by many moderate forces. Syria was 
presented as a potentially useful ally in the region and in relation to Russian 
national interests in general. The media revived memories of Soviet participation 
in construction projects which formed the infrastructure of the Syrian economy and 
173 
military. In addition, during that period, "sympathy to Damascus was underlined 
by the similarity of positions in fundamental political problems of the Middle East 
region. 7764 There was an apparent resumption of a broader realignment of interests 
between Syria and Russia over various issues which included the aim of preventing 
U. S. domination in the region and restraining Turkish influence. However, 
Moscow also began to lay greater emphasis on the need to pursue economic 
relations with traditional partners. "To neglect the potential of Russian-Syrian 
trade-economic ties and to let them go, would be a serious mistake, in as much as 
Syria is able to play the role of `economic gateway' to Russia in the Middle 
East. "65 
In 1996, there were clearer indications of Moscow's willingness to provide 
political support for the regime in Damascus. When asked in an Arab paper if 
Syria had missed its opportunity to make peace with Israel as a result of the 
election of Netanyahu in Israel, Deputy Foreign Minister Posuvaliuk's answer was 
unambiguous: "No, I don't think Syria lost any opportunity, but President Asad 
worked in a clear way for the cause of peace, and he was prepared to move in this 
direction on the basis of land for peace. I believe that Syrian society has developed 
its mentality and character towards peace, and for this reason I don't believe Syria 
has lost any opportunity. "66 In effect, the Russian Deputy Minister was saying that 
accusations that the Syrian leadership was stalling the peace process were incorrect 
and that Damascus had, on the contrary, set out to reach an agreement. The 
implication could thus be interpreted as being that the blame for the failure of the 
peace progress to progress was due to Israeli obstinacy. 
When Primakov made his trip to Syria in 1996, there was a distinct effort to give 
the impression that Russia could utilise its influence in Damascus for a positive 
regional goal. The Russian Foreign Minister told reporters that "In Damascus, I 
did not get the impression that the Syrians were preparing to strike Israel. "67 This 
was hardly a startling revelation but Primakov used the opportunity to announce 
that Moscow would not be supportive of any Syrian attack. Clearly, these were 
assurances intended for Israel, where he went after Syria, in an effort to raise the 
Russian profile on that track of the peace process. On his return to Russia, 
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Primakov told reporters that Israeli officials "put a very high value" on his 
consultations "and for their part put forward similar assurances to Damascus. 2M 
Primakov maintained the habit of being vague on the Russian view of the Syrian 
role in Lebanon by calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that 
country. The issue was a sensitive one for Damascus, which wanted to portray the 
military presence as a stabilising force in response to the request of the Lebanese 
leadership. Israel, which perceived the Syrian presence as a threat to its own 
security, had regularly suggested that both countries withdraw troops from 
Lebanon as a prerequisite to a peace deal. It was also implicitly recognised by 
Moscow and the West that the majority of Lebanese and the exiled opposition 
viewed Syria as an occupying force, using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in its 
negotiations with Israel. 
The Syrian government responded to its sense of growing isolation between 1991 
and 1996 by giving more priority to Russia but it did not delude itself into thinking 
that it was as important as the United States in terms of finding a lasting solution in 
the region. In the words of a leading Russian insider on foreign policy, speaking in 
October 1996, "Damascus still sees Russia as a friendly country but at the same 
time Asad understands that the key to the problem lies in the hands of the United 
States. Without the United States he cannot do anything. At the same time he is 
trying to use Russia as a counterbalance and source of support, especially in recent 
months. "69 
In 1995, Kozyrev went to Lebanon in a widely publicised trip, where he met 
President Elias Hrawi and Foreign Minister Fares Bouez. Kozyrev was 
accompanied by a delegation of 40 diplomats and businessmen, indicating that 
Russia was already hoping to play a part in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged 
economy and infrastructure. 70 Kozyrev reiterated that Moscow supported the 
continuation of the peace process on the basis of Resolution 425, which was very 
much in keeping with the policy of the Lebanese government and not wholly 
agreed with by Israel. Lebanon praised the visit, with Bouez noting that it was 
attributed "great importance, especially as it occurs at a time we welcome a 
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Russian role in the peace process. 117l Moreover, bilateral trade was encouraged, 
which the Lebanese Foreign Minister said would "no doubt have a deep and well- 
founded future. i72 
The two countries signed economic, financial and cultural agreements but Kozyrev 
also highlighted the political significance of the visit. He said that his aim was to 
"strengthen the relations which are tied between Russia and Lebanon, which are 
traditional and its roots are very old. From another perspective, we want to 
participate in ensuring progress on the Lebanese-Israeli track in the peace 
process, " which he called a necessary component of a fair and comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East. 73 The statement fully endorsed the Syrian position that 
there should be a unified front in negotiations with Israel, whereas Tel Aviv would 
have much preferred to reach a settlement with each country separately. Kozyrev 
also reaffirmed the Russian position that Moscow endorsed the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Lebanese territories, which was also a reference to the forty 
thousand-strong Syrian forces. But in 1996, a leading Russian expert with good 
contacts in the Foreign Ministry confirmed that "the general view is that Lebanon 
is not a country which can conduct its policy independently, regardless of the 
Syrian factor. Unless the Syrian track is successful and the problems between 
Syria and Israel are solved, there would be no success on the Lebanese front. s74 
Moscow's perception that Syria played a key role in Lebanese-Israeli negotiations 
was further underlined by a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official in October 
1996. His comments were a substantial divergence from the Kozyrev period when 
Moscow endorsed any path towards a regional settlement. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry had by 1996 become more dismissive of Israeli suggestions that its troops 
would withdraw from Lebanon on condition that Syria did the same. Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu had suggested this on the basis that Lebanon and Israel could 
then reach an agreement separately from Syria. Sergei Kepechenko claimed that 
this Israeli tactic did not have much sympathy in Moscow: "We see such proposals 
as a political manoeuvre, so that the new government of Israel can escape from 
talks with the Syrian government and agreements with the Palestinians. '75 Such a 
strikingly cynical view of the Israeli government was perhaps a reflection of the 
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different climate that characterised the Russian Foreign Ministry in 1996 than was 
the case in the early 1990s. However, it was also necessary to place this position 
within the context of the harder line adopted by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. 
By 1995, there was a broader consensus on the need for better utilisation of 
Russia's traditional contacts with Israel's neighbours. The opening lines of one 
article entitled "Russia, Syria and Lebanon: Half a Century of Friendship and 
Fruitful Collaboration, " advised: "Don't be startled, dear reader, by this headline, 
which at first look seems to be as a struggle through the pages of a journal of 
lectures from stale times. 1)76 It enthusiastically endorsed a more active Russian 
policy in its relations with the two countries and reminded its readership that the 
history of interaction between them had been highly positive and was based on 
many joint interests. "The faith on which the renewal of Russia's relations with 
Syria and Lebanon is founded serves as a guarantee of their effective co-operation 
on the path to providing a just and hopeful Middle East settlement. "" 
With Russia moving towards a free market, Lebanon seemed a better prospect for 
trade and business for post-Soviet private enterprises. With the case of Syria, 
where the leadership in Damascus tightly controlled all imports and exports from 
the country, trade agreements were almost always based on an inter-governmental 
level. But the limits of the Russian economic capacity were often highlighted by 
the high prominence Beirut attributed towards the European role and the general 
lack of recognition for Moscow's role. For example, in one interview President 
Hrawi commented that "if U. S. policy is to continue supporting Israel, contributing 
more than £2 billion annually to its budget, then the EU should play a more active 
role in assisting Lebanon. ""' Unsurprisingly, no mention was made of Russia 
because its economic difficulties were known to international community. 
Kozyrev's last trip to Lebanon, in spring 1996, coincided with a period of growing 
violence between Hezbollah forces in the south of the country and Israeli troops. 
Kozyrev clearly felt that Syria held some responsibility with regards to this when 
he said: "I hope the Syrians will exercise their influence in Lebanon to bring an end 
to the exchange of violence. "79 By recognising Syria's key role in the Middle East, 
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Russia could not abandon such an important regional player. In April 1996, an 
Israeli offensive against Lebanon caught the world's attention by the severity of its 
actions and its morally dubious aim of crippling the country's infrastructure, which 
was being rebuilt following twenty years of civil war. Israel called the offensive 
Operation Grapes of Wrath because it was in response to the persistent shelling of 
Israeli villages by Iranian-backed Hezbollah guerrillas. As the situation worsened, 
with the threat of Syrian involvement looming, the United States, France and 
Russia all sought to utilise their influence to stabilise the situation. On 16 April, 
after Primakov contacted Syrian Foreign Minister Faroukh Shar'a, he said that he 
accepted the interpretation of events provided by Damascus that what had taken 
place "in Lebanon is unacceptable inasmuch as Israel's actions are undermining the 
sovereignty of the Lebanese state and are harming the civilian population and civil 
installations. " Primakov also contacted Israel's ambassador in Russia and informed 
her that the actions of the Jewish state were "counterproductive. "80 
On 20 April, Primakov followed Christopher and the French Foreign Minister 
Herve de Charette to the region. Primakov met with de Charette at the Russian 
Embassy in Damascus and also held a meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Ali 
Akbar Velayati. The following day Primakov went to Lebanon to meet 
government officials while Yeltsin and Clinton were discussing the problems of the 
Middle East in the Kremlin. These talks, according to reports, took over thirty 
minutes longer than scheduled and were carried out "in an open but sometimes 
rather sharp fashion, " according to officials close to Clinton. 81 These events taken 
together could have suggested that Russia was acting from a position of strength, 
considering its close relations with Iran and Syria which both had an important 
bearing on affairs in Lebanon. There was a brief temptation to believe that 
Moscow could emerge with a surprise peace deal that would upstage Washington. 
In fact, the opposite happened: Russia's reputation was to some extent more 
damaged as a result of Operation Grapes of Wrath. The main reason for this was 
that the United States and Israel undertook direct measures to squeeze Russia out 
of any possible settlement. Christopher's behaviour during his shuttle diplomacy of 
the region was described as "incomprehensible" by Yeltsin because his strategy 
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appeared more concerned with asserting Washington's role and with finding a 
face-saving exit for Israel from the fighting than to actually stop the fighting 
itself. 82 Moscow let its dismay be known, which in itself was a reflection of the 
frustration that the Russian leadership felt. As Deputy Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov complained: "Unfortunately, US representatives were not felt to be striving 
in a reciprocal fashion towards co-ordinated actions. It seems at present that the 
USA would like to some extent to monopolise its role' as far as the settlement in 
the Near East is concerned. "83 
The attitude of the Russian media towards the 16 days of fighting during Operation 
Grapes of Wrath provided a good understanding of the political climate that 
existed in Moscow at the time. One of the better written features was in Novoe 
vremia by Mikhail Gorelik, entitled "16 Days of Wrath. s84 The article provided a 
factual and non-emotional description of events which ended on 27 April: "Here 
are several figures characterising the total 16 days of military conflict, began by the 
persistent shelling on Kiryat Shimona by Hezbollah's Katyushas. 127 inhabitants 
of northern Israel were injured, three of them seriously. Around 200 peaceful 
Lebanese civilians perished. 50 Hezbollah guerrillas and 10 Syrian and Lebanese 
soldiers were killed. 1400 homes in northern Israel were targeted. s85 The clinical 
and detached approach was, at the time the article was written, becoming ever 
more acceptable in the Russian media. The policies of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry were expected to be made in a similar vein. Yet it was also regarded as 
the duty of the journalist to provide an accurate explanation for human losses. So, 
when Israeli shells hit a refugee camp in southern Lebanon, it was reported in the 
following way: "The tragedy in Qana... where over 100 refugees in southern 
Lebanon were killed as a result of artillery shelling... [was caused by] the stationing 
of Hezbollah fighters in the immediate proximity of the refugee camp; the guerrillas 
were under intensive shelling from Zahal divisions [Israeli forces]. "86 The 
controversial suggestion that Israel's actions were justified on the basis that its 
forces knew that Hezbollah forces were using the refugees as human shields was 
accompanied by the contention that Hezbollah was as equally ruthless as the 
Israelis for the purpose of achieving its military and political ends: "It is possible to 
assume that Hezbollah were not too depressed upon hearing this [the death of 
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refugees by Israeli shelling]...: First, the guerrillas place no value on human life 
(not their own, nor others) - it is better for them to use it for a greater goal; 
secondly, it is tactically acceptable to them to extol their victims among the 
international community as a principle. Thirdly, the bitterness and anger of people 
is directed against Israel and world opinion censures Israel. From this perspective, 
when there are more injuries, more crippled children, more blood, the better it 
is! "87 
The involvement of the United States and France in the region seemed to be much 
more highly valued than that of Russia by all sides in the dispute, including 
Moscow's ostensible ally, Syria. When an international committee was established 
that comprised France, USA, Syria, Lebanon and Israel to oversee a cease-fire, the 
most obvious absentee was Russia. During his Middle East trip, Primakov was 
told by Israel's Prime Minister Peres that the involvement of Moscow was 
complicating rather than helping the situation in the region. Russia's exclusion 
from the Lebanese crisis in April 1996 led Foreign Ministry officials to be more 
vocal in their affirmation of the continued interest of Moscow in Lebanon. The 
set-back of being publicly snubbed by the United States and Israel, according to 
leading officials, did not affect Russia's policy and aims. Foreign Ministry officials 
explained that "the Russian co-sponsor intends to vigorously assist the Arab-Israeli 
talks, which should lead to the restoration of the territorial integrity of Lebanon in 
accordance with Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council. "88 
In his condemnation of Operation Grapes of Wrath, Primakov adopted the 
strongest anti-Israeli position since 1991, calling on the Israeli forces to withdraw 
from southern Lebanon. He effectively blamed the Israeli government for the 
instability on the Israeli-Lebanese border by suggesting that by occupying parts of 
their territories, Damascus and Beirut could not justify keeping so-called resistance 
groups such as Hezbollah under control. Primakov said that in order to achieve a 
breakthrough, Israel had to withdraw from Lebanese territory, "and only after this 
will it be possible to place full responsibility on the Lebanese government or Syrian 
government which has forces in Lebanon. "89 There was a noticeable change of 
emphasis in this point in that during Kozyrev's last visit he had called on Syria to 
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use its influence in Lebanon to restrain Hezbollah. Primakov did not support the 
pro-Iranian group, but he was equally dismissive of Israel's justification for 
keeping Israeli soldiers on Lebanese territory. 
Russia's media echoed the policy of the Foreign Ministry in its emphasis on 
democratic ideals, the upholding of international law, as well as giving greater 
valuation for international institutions such as the United Nations. The United 
States, by contrast, clearly tilted towards the needs and concerns of Israel. More 
importantly, Washington's policy was to leave all areas of dispute fluid and open to 
negotiations. Thus, even UN resolutions were not accepted as `sacred law' but 
instead there was an encouragement for negotiations and events to take their own 
course. The difference in the stances between Moscow and Washington had subtle 
motives behind them. Israel, backed by the United States, had the strongest 
bargaining position among the negotiators and by de-emphasising the importance 
of international laws and institutions, it was able to use more options to achieve its 
objectives. Russia recognised that with the Arabs being in a militarily inferior 
position, international laws and UN resolutions were the best means of putting 
pressure on Israel. 
This aspect of policy, intended to be fair and non-partisan, only succeeded in 
irritating all sides of the conflict. The Syrian government's interpretation of 
terrorism differed from that of Russia and most certainly from the view in Israel 
and the United States. Thus while groups such as Hezbollah were described by the 
Syrian regime as freedom fighters, Israel viewed them as terrorists. The 
leadership in Moscow generally agreed with the international consensus that such 
groups were terrorist because of their attacks on civilian targets. This view was 
often reflected in the Russian press in its criticism of Hamas and Hezbollah 
bombings. An interview in a Russian newspaper with Major-General Yossi 
Ginossar, head of the Shabak Israeli intelligence services, on the threat of terrorist 
attacks was particularly sympathetic with Israel and neglected to remind readers of 
the Arab side of the dispute. Instead, Ginossar was quoted as saying that "it is 
necessary to fight terrorism with total force. i90 The implication of the interview 
was that Israel's actions were simply a reaction to Arab provocation. 
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Likewise, the Russian press changed its perspective in handling the internal affairs 
of Lebanon. An article in early 1996 in Novoe vremia provided a thorough 
explanation of the Lebanese civil war, with a far more even-handed perspective 
than was the norm in the past. The report revolved around the debate over the 
prolongation of the presidential term because of the still unstable situation in the 
country. Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution prevented the president from 
remaining in his post for more than one term, but as the Russian feature pointed 
out, this was disregarded through a constitutional amendment under Syrian 
pressure because the President of Lebanon, Elias Hrawi, was generally recognised 
as being a puppet of Damascus. "In October 1995 Parliament submissively 
prolonged the presidential term for Elias Hrawi for three years.. . The people of 
Lebanon silently witnessed this... s91 There was none of the Soviet era cliches or 
propaganda blaming all of Lebanon's problems on Israel. In fact, there was equal 
condemnation of the roles of Syria and Iran for the country's instability, especially 
for their backing of Hezbollah. Damascus and Tehran were accused of 
undermining Lebanon's traditionally democratic culture. While "ex-president 
Amin Gemayel reflected upon the `perishing Lebanese democracy' from a long 
way in America and Michel Aoun [Lebanese army general and anti-Syrian 
nationalist] based in France, is appealing to his people not to lose spirit and to hope 
for the future, " President Hrawi kow-tows to "Syrian power. "92 The article 
disputed Syrian claims that its presence in Lebanon was purely intended to 
maintain peace and stability in a `friendly' neighbouring state. Despite calls on 
Damascus from the Lebanese and the international community to withdraw, "the 
Syrian army is not abandoning Lebanon with haste... Syrians feel themselves to be 
at home in Lebanon. Their security service [based on the Romanian and East 
German models] often carried out arrests of Lebanese civilians" who appeared to 
question the presence of Syrian troops in their country. 93 
The article in many ways typified the transformed perspectives in Moscow with 
regards to Israel's neighbours; being anti-Israeli did not automatically make that 
country a friend of Russia. Syria could no longer act as it pleased to ensure 
support from Russia because other countries in the region were equally valued. 
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While Syria continued to be an important country in the region, the authoritarian 
nature of the regime made it more difficult for Russia to appear too closely 
associated with it. Nonetheless, Moscow could not ignore the usefulness of 
relations with Syria which had been developed over a period spanning decades. 
Conclusion -a balanced policy 
By the end of 1996, Russian foreign policy was clearly more vocal in its desire to 
play a bigger role in the Middle East process and in improving its relations with 
Israel's neighbours. During his trip to the Middle East in October 1996, Primakov 
continued to insist that the solution to the problems of the Middle East would not 
be reached by the efforts of any one power but as a result of multinational 
participation, working in harmony in the same way that a musical orchestra 
performs. "We want our efforts to supplement this orchestra, " so that the melody 
of peace can be best heard, Primakov said after his visit. 94 
Relations between Israel's neighbours and the United States worsened in 1996 and 
this coincided with a more involved Russian approach to regional matters. 
Washington's standing in the Arab world was not improved when in 1996 Clinton 
appointed Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State. From her work as the U. S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, she was believed to hold anti-Arab views and 
was staunchly pro-Israeli, and the `revelations' that she was of Jewish origin did 
not ease the concerns in Arab capitals. Albright was not the first Jewish Secretary 
of State; Arthur Goldberg held that title in 1965 under President Lyndon Johnson, 
but he proved to be a strong supporter of the Israeli cause and was in fact active in 
providing vital diplomatic back-up to the Jewish state during and after the 1967 
war. One leading and well-connected Arab writer, Saleem Nassar, observed that 
"Arab diplomats at the UN have said that the extreme passion which Ambassador 
Albright showed in her defence of the Israeli position following the Qanaa 
Massacre, led to her nomination by Jewish organisations for her to be 
Christopher's heir in Clinton's second term. i95 From a Western outlook, the point 
could be dismissed as a sign of excessive Arab paranoia, but the writer was simply 
expressing the perceptions that were prevalent among the political elite. 
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Washington's actions strengthened the calls in Arab capitals for the return of 
Russia and Europe into the Middle East as a counterbalance to U. S. involvement. 
A bigger role for the European Union was officially encouraged by Moscow, in 
line with Primakov's encouragement for a multipolar world. Following the 
election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995, France had taken a much more active 
position in the Middle East which was often not compatible with the policies of the 
United States and Israel. The European Union committed itself to major 
investments in the Arab world, including a pledge of $630 million to the Palestinian 
self-governing territories by the end of 1998. Such donations would invariably 
have led to political influence, leading some Russian commentators to note that 
Moscow was slightly concerned that it had a serious rival to its position in the 
Middle East. "Brussels is aspiring to the niche of major friend of the Arabs... It is 
noteworthy that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Luxembourg talked about the 
EU's striving to be a co-sponsor of the peace process `along with the US. ' The 
other co-sponsor, Russia, wasn't even mentioned. "96 
When Chirac paid a successful visit to the region in October 1996, Moscow must 
have taken note of the warm welcome he received, not only in Lebanon but also in 
Syria. Asad referred to him as "my great friend, my dear friend, friend of all 
Syria", 97 language that was not a characteristic of the astute dictator. In order to 
preserve its reputation as `friend of the Arabs', Moscow was thus compelled to 
adopt a more critical approach to Israeli policy. In 1996, Primakov skilfully played 
a balancing act by intensifying the tone of criticism of Israeli actions such as the 
building of Jewish settlements on occupied land while clearly stating Russian 
support for a peace deal that would fulfil all of Israel's security requirements. 
During his trip to the Middle East in November 1996, within days of Chirac's visit, 
the Russian Foreign Minister criticised the Israeli government for undermining 
agreements that had already been made and called on them to respect "approaches 
that have already been agreed upon, already signed or already found. s98 Primakov 
also reminded Israel and the West that Russia's role could become more prominent 
on the basis of its traditional ties and "other dimensions of a great power, including 
the military dimension. "99 
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Syria's overwhelming reliance on Russian-built weapons for its military forces was 
a dominant consideration for both Damascus and Moscow. Ambassador Zotov's 
justification for Russia's reactivated role in building up Syrian military forces was 
highly worrying to Israel as well as Syria's other neighbours. In particular, both 
Turkey and Jordan viewed Syria with suspicion, therefore Moscow's actions could 
have appeared to raise the tension in the area. Resuming large-scale military 
support to Syria could also have been interpreted as tacit support for the presence 
of Syrian troops in Lebanon. Zotov, however, was keen to point out that Russia 
was not reviving the policies of the Soviet past. Consistent with the arguments of 
the centrist-nationalists typified by his Foreign Ministry chief, Primakov, Zotov 
contended that Russia was not taking sides in the Middle East, nor had it any 
interest to do so. He reassured "the Israelis [not] to worry about the scale of 
military supplies... Russia understands that it is cosponsor to the peace process in 
the Middle East, and peace is more important than anything else. "'oo 
Russia's support for the peace process was consistent and firm throughout the 
1991-1996 period. This unambiguous strategy of promoting peace served Russian 
interests for various reasons. First and foremost, a large-scale eruption of violence 
and war would have threatened to extinguish any remaining influence Moscow had 
in the region and provide the opportunity for the United States to increase its 
already dominant position there. Secondly, most policy makers in Moscow did not 
rule out the possibility that instability and the rise of extremism as a consequence 
of a new Arab-Israeli war could negatively affect the relationship between Russia 
and its new Muslim neighbours (as well as Muslims within the Federation), forcing 
the leadership in Moscow to direct its concerns towards increasing military 
expenditure, thus allowing the military establishments to become more powerful, 
and divert attention away from economic and democratic reforms. The leadership 
in Russia strongly supported King Hussein of Jordan and Arafat as leaders of the 
new Palestinian authority because they symbolised a new Middle East where 
moderation prevailed over extremism and belligerence. Moreover, King Hussein 
and Arafat were seen by Moscow as a bridge to co-operation with the West and 
integration in the world community. 
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The Lebanese Ambassador to Moscow under Gorbachev, Mahmoud Hamoud, 
noted in 1996 that the Soviet Union had been consistent in its support for Lebanon 
by insisting on Israeli compliance with UN Resolution 425, and the same stance 
was adopted by the Russian leadership. Asked if Moscow could play a more 
meaningful role in the peace process, the Ambassador responded that Lebanon 
"expected a bigger role from Russia considering it is an important country on the 
world stage and it has a noteworthy role in the politics of the Middle East. We 
have noted the increasing activity of Russian officials in their visits to the region 
and their wish to co-operate with all sides in reaching a solution to the region. """ 
Moscow gradually succumbed to the attractions of rebuilding the damaged 
relationship with Damascus which centred around the possibility of arms sales, 
recouping the estimated $10 billion debt, and forging a strategic alliance that would 
prevent outside powers, particularly the United States, from monopolising the 
region in their sphere of influence. More specifically, Syria was seen as a wedge 
that could split the increasing military co-operation between Turkey and Israel and 
prevent Nato from extending its `security' umbrella over the Middle East. 
However, the new pragmatism of Russian foreign policy did not create a dividing 
line of enemies and friends. Moscow cultivated its ties with all of Syria's 
neighbours and ensured that its support for Damascus did not cross the point 
whereby it would antagonise any of them too much. Primakov often reiterated the 
point that Russia had many options ahead of it, including the utilisation of its 
traditional ties as well as the cultivation of new ones, to further its aims in the 
Middle East. 
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Chapter VII: Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Russia Between New Friends and Old 
Allies 
Rivalry between Moscow and the Western powers for a dominant position in and 
around the warm waters of the Gulf dated back to the last century. Since the 
1960s the USSR looked to Iraq as a bridge towards this objective. In the post- 
Khrushchev era, ideology had become superseded by more practical and material 
considerations; thus the oil factor took on a greater priority. The Gulf region was 
treated as a separate geographical entity from the rest of the Middle East because it 
had not been directly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the superpowers, a 
strong position in the Gulf was in effect a means of controlling a substantial share 
of the world's energy supplies. But the complexities of the Middle East and the 
unpredictability of local actors (President Saddam Hussein in this case) resulted in 
financial and political losses for the Soviet Union which undermined the argument 
for the need for involvement in the Gulf. As a consequence of the Gulf War of 
1991, some estimates put Russian financial losses at $18 billion in Iraqi debts and 
contract losses. The UN Security Council-imposed sanctions on Iraq not only 
resulted in material losses for Russia; the sanctions were a blow to the Kremlin's 
prestige and standing since Moscow had completely failed in providing any useful 
backing to the co-signatory of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation (1972), 
which was regarded as a strategic ally. 
By contrast, Saudi Arabia had been an important wedge used by the West to 
restrict Soviet influence in the Gulf. Riyadh ranked second to none in its support 
for Islamic militants in Afghanistan during the 1980s, which dragged the Soviet 
Union into a war that became more obviously unwinnable as the conflict became 
more prolonged. If the Afghanistan war played an important part in the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union then it was Saudi oil money which fuelled that 
event. The vast oil resources of Saudi Arabia and Iraq offered enormous economic 
prospects. Saudi Arabia was wealthier in terms of higher oil output and per capita 
income but Iraq was more advanced; boasting an educated workforce, a large and 
professional middle class and relatively diverse and modern industrial output, 
making it potentially among the world's most lucrative markets. The challenge for 
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Russia's post-Soviet leaders was to avoid being excluded from both markets, with 
the United States virtually monopolising the Saudi market while maintaining an 
international embargo against Iraq. 
A positive development for Yeltsin was that his country inherited from the 
Gorbachev era a breakthrough with regards to relations with Saudi Arabia and its 
little-brother Sheikhdoms of the Gulf Co-operation Council (Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain). For the radical and pragmatic pro- 
Westerners, Saudi Arabia was seen as offering much better tangible rewards than 
the crippled economy led by the Iraqi regime. Pragmatic and extreme nationalists 
believed that Iraq offered a guaranteed return to the Gulf region, because of the 
strong ties developed in the Soviet era. The challenge for the leadership was to 
find a balance between these two forces and articulate a policy that would be 
fruitful on both fronts. 
Saudi Arabia and the USSR 
The Hejaz, which holds Islam's most holy centres, was recognised by the USSR in 
1924, though at the time they were actually under the rule of the Hashemite 
ancestors of King Hussein of Jordan. When in 1932 King Abdul Aziz of the Najd 
area of central Arabia annexed the Hejaz and joined it with other conquered 
territories to form the Saudi Kingdom, Moscow was amongst the first to grant him 
recognition. In fact, these were the first such relations between the Soviet Union 
and an Arab country. In August 1931 an agreement was signed between the two 
countries in which, again rather ironically, the Soviet Union was to provide 
shipments of 100,000 crates of petrol and kerosene. ' 
In the post-Second-World-War era, relations between the two countries gradually 
worsened until the very last few years of the existence of the Soviet Union. The 
rise of Nasser's pan-Arabism in the 1950s threatened the tribal-based monarchy 
and Soviet support for Egypt during that period naturally placed a great strain on 
relations with Moscow. Egypt's involvement in the Yemen war and the 
establishment of a Marxist South Yemen (PDRY) in the 1960s with Soviet support 
was perceived by the Saudi rulers as a threat to their own survival. This fear was 
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compounded by the 1963 reýn in Iraq which moved Baghdad to the Soviet 
camp, later to be joined by Algeria, Syria and in 1969 Qaddafi's revolution in Libya 
which displaced the British-Italian-backed monarch there. The Saudi response was 
to align itself more closely to the West, but the leadership faced a dilemma with 
regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ostensibly, Riyadh supported the Arab line of 
not recognising the Israeli state by providing financial funding to the PLO and 
Egypt in order to allay criticisms. But it also endeavoured not to be drawn into 
direct confrontation with Israel, or to provide enough backing to the front-line 
states which might enhance the chances of an actual Arab victory. This was 
because Saudi Arabia's ruling family believed that its survival would be 
undermined if their policies ran counter to those of the West, or if the radical Arab 
regimes became too powerful. 
Khrushchev's attempt to improve relations with Saudi Arabia in 1964 on the 
coronation of King Faisal failed because of the monarch's personal antipathy 
towards communism. Khrushchev harboured similar prejudice towards the Gulf's 
rulers. In the same year when Kuwait established relations with the Soviet Union, 
Khrushchev made one of his typically undiplomatic remarks: "Kuwait! there is 
some little ruler sitting there... He is given bribes, he lives the life of the rich, but he 
trades in the riches of his people. He has never had any conscience and he will not 
ever have one. "2 The Kuwaitis grudgingly endured such attitudes because they 
hoped relations with Moscow would serve as a further check to Iraqi designs on 
the emirate. With Egypt's increasing financial dependence on Saudi Arabia and the 
West in the 1970s, Iraq become the greatest destabilising force to the monarchies. 
The assassination of King Faisal in 1975 had no positive effect for the USSR, since 
his successors were equally committed to driving out communist influence from the 
Muslim world. In the late 1970s Riyadh was confronted, however, with several 
dilemmas which almost led to the resumption of relations with the USSR. Fearing 
a hostile reaction from the Arab masses, including their own, the Saudi government 
went along with the Arab League position of condemning Egypt for signing a 
peace treaty with Israel and increased its criticisms of Tel Aviv and Washington. 
In effect, Saudi Arabia adopted the same position as the USSR, which joined the 
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Arabs in condemning the treaty for the reason that it divided the Arab stance. The 
growing resistance by the Saudi royal elite to US pressure led to more tension in 
bilateral relations. Perhaps as a consequence, the Western media began to criticise 
the super-rich lifestyle of Saudi princes and Sheikhs which included gambling, 
drinking and womanising while they imposed an Islamic system which was rigid 
even by Muslim standards. The Saudi monarchy, highly sensitive to such 
campaigns, felt increasingly isolated, particularly after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan at the end of 1979. Added to this was Washington's unwillingness to 
provide the Kingdom with modern defence systems to protect itself from its 
neighbours. To make matters worse, the USA furnished Israel with even more 
advanced weapons on a highly favourable financial basis, while Saudi Arabia was 
refused similar weapons at the full price. 
The most important event in the Gulf in 1979 was the overthrow of the Shah and 
the establishment of a Muslim republic in Iran headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who preached a distinctly radical Shi'ite brand of Islam that was 
anathema to the conservative Sunni Islam of the Gulf states. What particularly 
worried Saudi Arabia was the feeble US response to the Iranian hostage crisis 
which led Saudi Minister of Defence Prince Sultan to state that "in the end, it turns 
out that the US is only a colossus with feet of clay. 113 In May 1979, King Fahd 
underlined the shift in Saudi outlook towards Moscow: "We are aware of the 
important role that the Soviet Union plays in international politics and we are 
anxious to ensure that this role supports the Arabs' just cause. "4 Evgenii 
Primakov, then Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Soviet Union 
was able to respond: "Personally at present I see no insurmountable obstacles to 
the development of normal Saudi-Soviet relations. "' An agreement was signed 
that year between the two countries which allowed Soviet aircraft to fly to South 
Yemen over Saudi airspace. 
The apparent thaw in Saudi-Soviet relations however was shattered in December 
1979 when Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia was the first 
country to announce that it would boycott the Moscow Olympic games in 1980 
and its press orchestrated a critical campaign of the Soviet action. Of course the 
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Saudis immediately seized on the religious significance of the invasion too, 
pointing out that it was a battle between fellow Muslims and the atheists. But the 
anti-Soviet position following the Afghan invasion was a more subtle manoeuvre 
than the simple reasons provided. The argument from Riyadh that the Communist 
system of the Soviet Union was incompatible with Islam did not suffice as Saudi 
Arabia's growing relations with China were no longer secret by the early 1980s. A 
better interpretation of the Saudi reaction to the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan 
was that Riyadh saw an opportunity to rally Arab support, repair the damaged 
relations with the United States and force the West to resume a greater interest in 
the Middle East, where Saudi Arabia was beginning to feel distinctly isolated. 
Washington and its new anti-Soviet president Ronald Reagan began to see Saudi 
Arabia's value as an Arab ally that would check the expansion of Communism in 
the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world. In the early 1980s the Gulf Co- 
operation Council was formed and King Fahd changed his title from `His Majesty' 
W- jqg6 
to the `Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques'to boost his Islamic credentials, and 
rallied Arab support against the Soviet invasion, successfully bringing long- 
standing Soviet allies such as Iraq to criticise Moscow's action. Saudi Arabia's 
more assertive role was made possible by the sudden and sharp increase in oil 
revenue. In the 1972-73 fiscal year revenue amounted to $4 billion, rising to an all 
time high of $96 billion in the fiscal year 1980-81.6 The Saudi Kingdom, with a 
population of barely 14 million, and sparsely developed, was essentially earning far 
more than it could consume. There were five-year plans to develop agriculture, its 
petro-chemicals industry and its financial sector, but there were still enough petro- 
dollars left to be used to give the Kingdom a substantial say in Arab and 
international affairs. 
While with reference to Afghanistan Moscow regarded Saudi Arabia's involvement 
as directly damaging to its interests, the Soviet Union did to some extent indirectly 
gain from the increased revenue to be found in the Middle East. Saudi `aid' and 
donations were extended to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the PLO during the 
1980s. Syria, Iraq and Jordan all purchased military hardware from the Soviet 
Union, effectively with the help of Saudi money. According to the Saudi monarch, 
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aid extended to Iraq in the period 1980-1988 comprised "$5.8 billion in cash 
grants; $9.2 billion in concessionary (long-term interest-free) loans; $6.8 billion in 
oil (to be repaid eventually by oil shipments from Iraq); and $3.7 billion in military 
equipment and other items. "7 Saudi financial support to Iraq slowly moved the 
latter away from the Soviet camp and towards the West, particularly Europe. With 
regards to Syria, Saudi money moderated Damascus's stand in the Middle East and 
gave it some leverage in the Lebanese civil war. Likewise, support for the PLO 
ensured that the Palestinian cause would not be completely dominated by Moscow. 
Gorbachev's quest to rethink Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, and with 
regards to Afghanistan, had obviously to include Saudi Arabia in the equation. 
Abdul Aziz Muhiyaldin Khoja, Saudi ambassador in Moscow during the final 
Gorbachev months and the first five years of the Yeltsin presidency, had no doubts 
that Gorbachev's transformations were genuine: "Under Gorbachev the Soviet 
Union introduced radical changes as far as its international relations are 
concerned... Gorbachev worked for the establishment of relations with the Gulf 
States and especially Saudi Arabia. "8 Riyadh, however, preferred not to respond 
immediately until there was a clear commitment of a Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. The eventual withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan in 1989 
led to contacts between Saudi and Soviet officials but the establishment of full 
relations was cautious because of fear of offending the Saudi clerics, who posed 
the most serious political challenge to the ruling family. 
It was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which facilitated the rapid normalisation of 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the USSR. Saudi suspicions about Soviet 
intentions in the Gulf were effectively evaporated by Moscow's Cupertino with the 
U. S. -led stance in the war. Saudi Arabia needed Soviet Co-operation at the 
Security Council, which was received and which was rewarded with the promise of 
improved diplomatic and economic relations. Ambassador Khoja confirmed this by 
saying that Riyadh was able to move closer to Moscow "when the Soviet Union 
supported the Security Council's resolutions against crag and maintained its 
neutrality during the war. Moreover, the domestic policies under Gorbachev, 
which aimed at achieving reforms and liberalisation, particularly the right to 
195 
worship, contributed to the consolidation of Saudi-Soviet relations and the 
speeding up of their development. "9 
On 17 September 1990, diplomatic relations between the USSR and Saudi Arabia 
were officially restored. In August 1991 Saudi Arabia offered the Soviet Union an 
aid package worth $1.5 billion in credits as a reward for Gorbachev's stance in the 
Gulf war. It was primarily aimed at easing Soviet debts to Arab countries, worth 
about $5 billion. The establishment of full relations with the rest of the GCC states 
subsequently took place. This was essentially what Gorbachev had hoped would 
be the consequence of his New Thinking, from which relations offered tangible 
rewards rather than claims to ideological superiority. 
Russia and Saudi Arabia: failed expectations 
Yeltsin's government needed hardly any time to take advantage of the door opened 
to them by Gorbachev. Ambassador Khoja's view was that "President Yeltsin 
continued during 1992 the policies initiated by Gorbachev and even enhanced 
them. "10 Russian government officials began arriving in the Gulf that year, eagerly 
seeking to establish markets at a time when the fledgling capitalist economy was 
seemingly close to collapse. In the words of the Saudi Ambassador, "the Yeltsin 
administration had pinned great hopes on receiving economic aid from the Gulf 
States as well as encouraging their investments in the Russian economy. "" 
In May 1992, Kozyrev embarked on a major tour of the GCC during which he 
indirectly acknowledged that there was little hope of securing large financial gains 
from the oil-rich states. "I didn't come here for credits. A policy oriented solely 
toward financial assistance is worthless. " 12 Kozyrev (as head of the Russian 
delegation in the Gulf) also made it clear, however, that "our visit is part of a drive 
for markets, including arms markets.. . In the past our country relied on just a 
handful of states in the region - Iran, Iraq, Libya etc. But that was an extremely 
unfortunate choice. Now we prefer to deal with stable, moderate regimes, and 
these are the ones with which we are trying to develop military Co-operation. " 13 
These comments were a telling example of the way Gorbachev's New Thinking 
was extended into the early phase of post-Soviet foreign policy. It was also 
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indicative of the dominant position of the radical and pragmatic pro-Western 
position in the first year after the demise of the Soviet Union, particularly in that 
Kozyrev described the formerly close relations with Iran and Iraq as an 
"unfortunate choice. " 
Riyadh had declared its chief interest at the time to be in aiding the development of 
the Muslim Republics of the former USSR. Nonetheless, the Saudi leadership did 
not undermine the potential dangers that could arise from antagonising Moscow, 
despite the dominant position of the pro-Western radicals at the time. During 
Kozyrev's visit in 1992, King Fahd told the visiting minister with regards to 
Chechnia, which was then threatening to secede: "Tell your president that we will 
never interfere in the internal affairs of other states. No matter what the religious 
convictions of a person living in Russia are, for us he is first and foremost a citizen 
of the Russian federation, and he should be loyal to his motherland. "14 Most of 
Saudi aid to Muslims in the Russian Federation and other CIS states took the form 
of religious and cultural material and projects such as the building of mosques and 
schools. 
In November 1994, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made a tour of the GCC 
states in an effort to achieve better results than his compatriot. Agreements were 
made with the UAE and Oman due to what Chernomyrdin described as being 
Russia's "rich experience in the oil and gas industries, " and he invited businessmen 
from the latter country to go to Russia to study opportunities for investment. 15 
Russia also proposed to the UAE the offer of participating in the development of a 
new multi-purpose fighter plane, the Su-37, and hoped that the UAE government 
would be interested in purchasing Russian air defence systems and T-80 tanks. 
Relations with Saudi Arabia had appeared to develop more slowly after 1993, 
particularly in financial and economic terms. 
After Chernomyrdin's 1994 visit to Saudi Arabia there were efforts by Moscow to 
sound up-beat about the results that had been achieved. An agreement signed by 
the two countries on 20 November was described as a turning point in their 
bilateral relations by Russia's Prime Minister. It had been reported that Saudi 
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Arabia agreed to grant Russia a deferment on the "repayment of the $250 million 
dollar debt incurred by the former USSR. As a result Russia will be allowed not to 
repay the overdue amount of $100 million, " according to vice-premier Oleg 
Davydov. 16 He also suggested that a substantial part of the rest of the Russian 
debt could be repaid by arms supplies to the Saudi Kingdom. This was a dubious 
claim because the United States would have opposed any such possibility. In fact, 
Russian claims were refuted by the Saudi Minister of Finance, who pointed out that 
Russia had no debts to the Saudi government but to two Saudi banks which had 
extended loans to the Soviet Union in 1991. Since Russia had undertaken 
responsibility for loans signed by the Soviet Union the Saudi banks were 
demanding full repayment of the total, amounting to $250 million. The Saudi 
Finance Minister said that in order to "help the two banks in their demand, the 
issue was raised at a meeting with the deputy premier" on his visit to the 
Kingdom. '7 He also added that discussions about a joint investment bank were 
made but only under the understanding that the Saudi government would not be 
party to it, but rather that it would be through the private sector. In effect the 
Saudi government was distancing itself from economic ties on the inter- 
governmental level. The stake of the ruling elite over Saudi financial institutions 
was fairly widespread and highly influential. Political commentators in Moscow 
were sceptical that the visit by the Russian Prime Minister had achieved anything 
substantial. One report bluntly stated that the visit "did not fully meet 
expectations, especially in the economic sphere. i18 The fact that the visit was 
made by Chernomyrdin, and not the Defence Minister nor Foreign Minister 
revealed that the purpose of the visit was to make a breakthrough in the economic 
sphere and not the military or diplomatic spheres. 
There appeared to be similar rigidity in the development of bilateral diplomatic 
relations up to 1996. Stumbling blocks which arose since 1991 included the ever- 
improving ties between Russia and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states 
feared that Iran was developing a nuclear programme which posed a direct threat 
to their security, and suspicions that Moscow was aiding the nuclear project led to 
widespread Arab concern about Russia's role in the Middle East. Ambassador 
Khoja deliberately noted the Saudi concern regarding Russian support to Iran. He 
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noted that between 1993-1996, "Russia strengthened its ties with Iran, particularly 
in the exports of arms. Iran bought 3 submarines as well as armoured vehicles and 
anti-tank missiles. "19 The influential Saudi diplomat also noted Russia's role in 
helping the Persian state build a nuclear-powered reactor for energy generation. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular were also unhappy about the more active 
role adopted by Russia in attempting to ease the sanctions against Iraq and the 
seeming support that Moscow gave to the Ba'athist government in Baghdad after 
the Gulf War. A commentator for Nezavisimaia gazeta ('Moscow's actions 
puzzles Arabs') pointed out that Russia's overtly pro-Iraqi position at the UN in 
which "specifically, Moscow urged the Security Council members to consider 
establishing a mechanism for gradually lifting the sanctions against Iraq in response 
to its `positive steps' to accommodate the UN"20, had become a source of friction 
with Saudi Arabia. At the Damascus Declaration Summit (GCC plus Syria and 
Egypt) in 1994 the Saudis made it clear in a direct response to Moscow, that it was 
too early to "ease sanctions against Iraq, as Russia proposes, let alone lifting 
them. i21 Another political observer in Moscow, in explaining the nature of 
relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia with regards to the Iraq issue in the 
post-Soviet era, reached the conclusion that "Russian diplomacy's subsequent 
steps at the UN left no doubt that present-day Moscow intends to be friends with 
present-day Baghdad. "22 
Russia and Saudi Arabia had more general differences over issues concerning the 
Islamic world. In Chechnia, while Riyadh supported the integrity of the Russian 
Federation, it preferred to distance itself from the whole affair. The Saudi attitude 
was perhaps best summed up by Ambassador Khoja: "The Islamic countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, expressed their hopes for a peaceful solution of the 
Chechen crisis. They stressed, however, that it was an internal issue. i23 Likewise, 
Russian support for the Serbs in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the 
Muslim-dominated Bosnian government was severely criticised by the Saudi 
clergy, who placed considerable pressure on their government to be more critical 
of Moscow. When asked if Russia's policies could be interpreted by some as being 
anti-Islamic, Ambassador Khoja provided the typically diplomatic response of the 
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official Saudi position: "I do not accept that Russian policies in Chechnia or in 
Bosnia were anti-Islamic because it is not in the Russian interest to be against 
Islam. [There are] 20 million Russian Muslims spread over ten entities of the 
Russian Federation... The Russian leadership is keen to safeguard their religious 
freedoms. Russia is also committed to the implementation of the Dayton peace 
accord in Bosnia, and is now doing its best to solve the Chechen crisis through 
negotiations. "24 
Russia's media also veered toward a greater understanding of the unique Saudi 
system during the first five years of Russian foreign policy and moved away from 
the Soviet simplification of branding it a feudal monarchy. The media commented 
regularly on Saudi affairs in a more objective and, sometimes, sympathetic way 
than in the past. One event that attracted the attention of the Russian press was 
the announcement in January 1996 by the Saudi king to temporarily relinquish his 
throne for health reasons. One Russian weekly, commenting on the ailing King, 
wrote: "The government of King Fahd was an era of stability for Saudi Arabia, of 
the first to give a positive influence in the whole of the Middle East. "ZS But the 
article also provided a sound analysis of possible problems facing the political 
system of the Kingdom, particularly as the Crown Prince and potential successor to 
King Fahd held little popularity even within the royal court. 
There were remnants from the Soviet era of a cynical attitude by some Russian 
commentators. One article in Novoe vremia assessed the Islamic punitive system 
in which breaking the law could result in having an arm or a nose or even your 
head chopped off. In particular, the report looked at punishment handed out to 
suspected drug smugglers. "In the last ten years, " the article informed us, "the 
number of drug traders who have been beheaded were 20 Saudi citizens, 82 
Pakistanis, 17 Nigerian, 9 Afghanistanis and 5 Syrians, " as well as others from a 
wide range of Asian and African countries. 26 The commentary's description was of 
a backward and hypocritical state, where no Westerners had been executed 
because of fear of upsetting their governments. Moreover, the article pointed out 
that drug money was used in large quantities to arm the Mujahedeen during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The attitude of the Russian government 
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towards such `non-political' issues was that of benign indifference. When Moscow 
had to comment on specific events, such as the bomb blast in north-east Saudi 
Arabia in late June 1996 which killed 19 US servicemen, it did so firmly in support 
of Riyadh. "The Russian Federation strongly condemns the terrorist act which was 
carried out at the US military base... " the official statement from the government 
said. 27 But even then, the author of the release could not resist an indirect 
reference to Washington's bid to exclude Moscow from the Kingdom: "We (the 
Russian government) know from experience that terrorism cannot be stopped 
without fair international Co-operation. 7928 
The task of improving relations with Saudi Arabia fell increasingly under the 
responsibility of Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvaliuk. His style was to 
promote the impression of great strides being made, noting that "The two sides, 
which originally took a negative view of each other and looked at each other with 
suspicion, have managed to strengthen mutual trust" since the demise of the Soviet 
Union. "29 Saudi Ambassador Khoja also attempted to paint a rose-tinted picture of 
bilateral relations by saying that "since Russia is a major power and as it is one of 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council there is no doubt that its 
relationship with the states of the region is expected to develop and flourish. s3o 
However, despite the rhetoric there were many obstacles which prevented a 
tangible improvement in bilateral relations. With the relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and the United States appearing to be closer than ever during the early 
1990s, Washington became more determined that neither Russia nor any other 
country should move in on its most valuable prize in the Gulf. Moreover, there 
was recognition from Posuvaliuk himself by 1995 that relations with the Saudi 
Kingdom were not as flourishing as he had hoped they would be. Writing in a 
Saudi-financed Arab daily, Posuvaliuk reflected on his visit to the Arab Gulf 
countries in early 1995. He noted the desire from Moscow "to move away from 
declarations and promises towards the practical implementation of the trade- 
economic and military-technological fields. 1)31 While Russia was happy with the 
progress being made with the smaller GCC countries, Posuvaliuk suggested that 
more could have been achieved with Saudi Arabia, which "occupies a special place 
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in which the exchange of political views carries a weighty position" in Moscow. " 
In particular, Russia was concerned about Saudi Arabia's role in the Islamic world, 
and its potential influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Deputy Foreign 
Minister sought to refute charges that Russia's policies were anti-Islamic by 
claiming to have a "deep respect for Islam" and added that "Orthodoxy and Islam 
coexist in brotherly alliance within the Russian family. "33 That Posuvaliuk 
dedicated most of his article regarding his trip to Saudi Arabia to the rise of Islamic 
extremism in the CIS and to insist that there was no hostility between Russia and 
Saudi Arabia in itself revealed a deficiency in deep and flourishing bilateral ties. 
In 1996, there was a noticeable freeze in Saudi-Russian relations, with Moscow 
expressing particular disappointment at the lack of progress in the trade-economic 
aspect of bilateral ties. In 1995, the volume of trade did not far exceed $50 
million, a very small sum considering the size and wealth of the two national 
economies. 34 A leading Russian adviser to the Foreign Ministry sounded distinctly 
pessimistic in his assessment of bilateral relations during an interview in Moscow in 
late 1996: "Nothing turned out with our relations with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis 
were not interested in developing relations, they are quite comfortable with the 
United States... They don't see in Russia any kind of important player. 705 Senior 
officials from the Foreign Ministry were equally downbeat. While saying that the 
existence of dialogue and diplomatic relations between the two countries was 
better than nothing, one such official reflected that "it seems the break between us 
was too long and its impact was strong. We need to be patient. "36 The narrowing 
of the Saudi avenue had arguably convinced Moscow that it should concentrate on 
another long-established partner, Iraq, for access to the Gulf. 
Writing for Al-Hayat in April 1997, Posuvaliuk attempted to highlight some 
positive features of bilateral relations, following his meeting with the new Saudi 
Ambassador in Moscow Fawzi Shabokshi. But he was again forced to admit that 
"some aspects of relations have not fulfilled earlier expectations. "37 For the first 
time, it was openly admitted that despite earlier rhetoric, "we must say frankly that 
events in Chechnia were part of the reason for the delay. Now that there is peace 
we can say that we understand the feelings of Muslims outside but that cannot 
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detract from our firm need for the principle of the unity of the Russian 
Federation. "" The Deputy Foreign Minister also bluntly pointed out that "the 
exchange in trade between us remains a drop in the ocean. "39 
Radical and pragmatic pro-Westerners had hoped, until 1993, that Saudi Arabia 
would be a good example of a new friendship which would provide tangible 
financial rewards for a democratic Russia. They believed,, perhaps rather naively, 
that a new democratic Russia would be accepted by Saudi Arabia as part of the 
Western world and that the United States would encourage Moscow's 
participation in Gulf security. In fact, Washington made it clear to its Saudi client 
state [and Moscow] that Russian entry into the region was not welcome. 
Moreover, regional security issues such as the Iranian-Russian and the Iraqi- 
Russian relationships, and wider Islamic issues such as the Chechen war, all 
prevented the successful development of bilateral relations. 
Iraq: an old friend with many enemies 
The starting point in relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq was July 1958 
when a military coup overthrew the Western-backed monarchy in Baghdad. After 
the Iraqi revolution Moscow provided Iraq with large-scale economic and military 
aid, similar to the way it had done with Egypt and Syria earlier. The Ba'athist 
regime of Hassan Al-Bakr which took power in July 1968 attempted to heal many 
of the differences with Moscow, which had surfaced in the preceding period, by 
signing a long-term oil agreement in 1969. The Soviet Union was to be repaid for 
its role in Iraqi oil field development with Iraqi crude oil. On 13 August 1970 a 
trade and economic agreement was signed between Iraq and the USSR which 
granted a $34 million loan to Iraq as part of the deal. The flourishing relationship 
led to over sixteen agreements being signed by mid-1971 between Iraq and the 
Soviet Union, which spanned the military, economic, technological and cultural 
fields. The culmination of this rapidly developing relationship was the signing of 
the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in April 1972. This coincided with the 
growing domination of Saddam Hussein within the Ba'ath Party and in Iraq. At 
the same time Moscow recognised that President Hussein was a political 
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opportunist who was not prepared to share power with anyone else, including the 
Iraqi Communist Party. 
Government persecution of Iraqi communists threatened to cause serious damage 
to relations between Baghdad and Moscow, particularly as there were rumours 
that KGB agents were behind attempts to create cells in the Iraqi army with the 
intention of overthrowing the Ba'athist regime. Hussein's antipathy towards 
communists was apparent in the statements he made, in which he described them as 
a "rotten, atheistic, yellow storm which has plagued Iraq. i40 The Soviet media saw 
other reasons for the anti-Communist Party actions by the Ba'ath leadership. "It 
may well be that Moscow saw more than just a domestic problem in Iraq's 
persecution of the ICP... Iraq, in leading the opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty, was seeking to project itself as the leader of the Arab world . 
)54' At that time 
Baghdad did improve relations with its historic foe Syria and the PLO, and more 
importantly, it was clearly seeking to improve relations with Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, the anti-Communist propaganda campaign by Baghdad was intended to 
show Riyadh and other Arab capitals that Iraq was not a Soviet client state but an 
independent actor. The Treaty of Friendship signed by Baghdad in 1972 was in 
effect the limit of Baghdad's willingness to co-operate with the USSR. 
On 29 May 1976 Prime Minister Kosygin went to Iraq to discuss the possibility of 
further harmonising relations between the two countries. His failure to secure 
changes in Iraq's policies which were more favourable to Moscow were only 
balanced by the realisation that there was no better alternative for Moscow. The 
most the Baghdad regime would concede to the USSR in the military sphere was 
"the use of some Soviet-built bases or other facilities under Iraqi control and 
supervision. "42 There were also many reports of the arrest and dismissal of Iraqi 
officers who opposed their president's policy of diversifying weapons purchases to 
avoid complete dependence on the Soviet Union. 
But the arms trade remained the most significant aspect of bilateral ties between 
Iraq and the Soviet Union. In October 1976 the USSR promised to deliver $300 
million worth of T-62 tanks and additional Scud missiles. In 1977 the Soviet 
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Union announced it would supply 11-76 long-range military transport planes and to 
upgrade its air force by sending more MG-21s and EG-23s, and in 1979, before 
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the USSR supplied Baghdad with MI-8 
helicopters, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters, and MiG-25 fighter-reconnaissance 
aircraft. For Iraqi ground forces, SP-73 and SP-74 self-propelled howitzers were 
purchased. 43 The fact that Iraq, unlike Syria or South Yemen, could purchase such 
weaponry with hard currency made it a valuable market for the Soviet Union. 
Between 1964 and 1973 Iraq ranked fifth in the world behind Egypt, North 
Vietnam, India and Syria as a customer for Soviet arms supplies. However, 
between 1974 and 1978 Iraq moved into first place, not just in the Middle East, but 
in the world. 44 
Yet there is a more telling set of statistics which display the nature of Soviet-Iraqi 
relations in a different light. The percentage share of Soviet weapons bought by 
Iraq was to decrease as Baghdad looked increasingly to Western sources. 
"Between 1964 and 1973, the USSR and its satellites supplied 90 percent of Iraq's 
arms imports. The corresponding figure for 1974 through 1978 was 70 percent, 
and the downward trend continued in 1979 and 1980.1945 
TABLE: (Actual cash value in US$) 
1964-1973 1974-1978 
USSR ( Czech. and Poland) $843mi1. $3,720mi1. 
Total $874mil. $5,300mi1. 
The sources for arms that make up the total of the latter figure in the above table, 
other than a $10 million deal with China, went to Western suppliers and 
Yugoslavia. "Of this amount $430 million went to France, $150 million to West 
Germany, $70 million to Italy, " as well as deals struck with Brazil, Switzerland and 
Spain. 46 By the close of the 1970s France emerged as Iraq's second largest arms 
supplier, illustrating Iraqi diversification of sources for its military plans. 
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Perhaps the most enduring and complicated issue that all the Baghdad governments 
had to face had been the Kurdish question. The Soviet position on this issue had 
generally been sympathetic to the Kurds, which was a permanent source of friction 
in Iraqi-Soviet relations. Of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, only the first had 
officially recognised its Kurdish minority, roughly one fifth of the total population 
according to most estimates. The Kurds in Iraq were divided into two main 
strands and dominated by the leftist Jalal Talabani and the conservative tribal leader 
Mustafa Barazani, later succeeded by his son Massoud. The Soviet position in the 
1960s was rather ironically supportive of the latter rather than the left-wing forces 
of Talabani. 
In 1970 Barazani did come to an agreement with Baghdad in which the ruling 
Ba'ath allowed five Kurdish Ministers to participate in government, released all 
Kurdish political prisoners, ceased all military operations against them, and 
introduced an economic plan to develop the areas of northern Iraq. This consensus 
was short-lived as by the mid-1970s hostilities resumed between the two parties. 
There were two main reasons for this and both were linked to Iran. First Barazani 
was promised that he could nominate a vice-president from his party (KDP), but 
his choice was turned down by Hussein because the nominee, the party's General 
Secretary, was seen as being too closely associated with Iran. Secondly, friction 
increased between the two as Barazani's group began `importing' Iranian Kurds, 
up to 100,000, according to Baghdad, into northern Iraqi cities, particularly Kirkuk 
which was a city of mixed ethnicity that was not recognised as part of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. This was part of Barazani's effort to take advantage of a promised 
census which would determine the limits of the Kurdish areas. As a result, there 
was growing strain on the Accords of 1970. Pravda correspondent E. Primakov, 
reflecting the official position, and other Soviet commentators were critical of 
Barazani's actions and expressed sympathy with the Ba'athist position. This trend 
continued so that by the 1990s, Moscow's position was that of fair arbitrator 
between Baghdad and the Kurds. 
When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 Moscow was facing a major dilemma 
with regards to Iraq. Since 1980, Iran and Iraq had been fighting a bloody and 
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costly war in which neither side appeared close to winning. In the early part of the 
war Moscow seemed to waver in favour of Iran, but when the Khomeini regime 
made it clear that it saw no distinction between the Western `infidels' and the 
Communist `infidels' then the Soviet leadership reverted to its support for 
Baghdad. Despite the increase in the number of Soviet military specialists in Iraq 
in the 1980s, from 1300 in 1967 to 5000 in 1990, Moscow could not prevent the 
Iraqi leadership from seeking military and economic support from the West. 
Nonetheless, Moscow continued to support Iraq up until 1990 for the reason that 
it had no other alternative in the Gulf and the Middle East in general. Syria and 
Libya were the only two Arab countries which sided with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, 
and not uncoincidently, their relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated in the 
late 1980s. With Iraq claiming victory over the much larger Iran in 1988, Saddam 
Hussein was hailed by most Arabs as a heroic figure defending their Arabhood. 
This leading role in the Arab world made him a valuable asset for Moscow. 
In the light of this, many were surprised at the Soviet reaction to the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in August 1990. Despite the New Thinking, "accepting the deployment 
of American troops in Saudi Arabia went against the grain of all earlier Soviet 
policy in the region - to keep the Americans out. 7747 This was a particularly 
delicate situation considering the proximity of the region to Soviet borders. Yet 
under the banner of New Thinking there was a different interpretation to this event: 
That a new era of superpower Co-operation had dawned, where the rule of 
international law and the quest for peace and stability would overshadow Cold War 
alliances. Gorbachev's position did improve the Soviet image in the West and 
more importantly for him it added to the credibility of his policies for Western 
leaders, though ultimately this was not enough to save his political life. The most 
relevant help that the USSR provided was its support at the United Nations. 
But Gorbachev's position led to substantial financial and economic losses for the 
Soviet Union. There was the delay of billions of dollars of unpaid debts, and the 
danger of forfeiting $6 billion worth of contracts as well as short term losses. It 
was noted by Shevardnadze that $800 million worth of oil would be lost due to 
reduced shipments from Iraq. 48 Gorbachev's expectation that this position would 
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result in Western rewards came under severe criticism by conservatives who 
argued that the USSR should look after its own interests. Conservative opponents 
of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were also angered by what they regarded as a 
blow to Soviet prestige. By the Autumn of 1990, criticisms of Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze had become so severe that there was a noticeable retreat in the 
Soviet position. In October, Gorbachev sent Primakov to Iraq to convince 
Saddam Hussein that his military action was doomed to fail since the West was 
determined to liberate Kuwait. But the move signalled a split between Gorbachev 
and the Foreign Ministry in the approach to the problem. Shevardnadze, unlike 
Gorbachev, "did not believe his country could seriously affect Iraq more than any 
other.. . 
He was more concerned about how Soviet behaviour in the crisis affected 
the USSR's standing in other parts of the world. "49 By contrast, Primakov's 
efforts also led to the illusion, shared by his president, that Soviet success in 
mediation in the crisis would enhance, rather than damage, Moscow's position in 
the Gulf and the world. 
Such hopes were to be abruptly dashed as Western ground forces moved in to deal 
a crushing defeat for the Iraqi army. Gorbachev did nothing to impede this; he 
faced up to conservative pressure at home (although he accepted the resignation of 
his friend Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister, thus deflecting criticism from himself) 
in order to maintain harmonious relations with Washington. Iraq's defeat was 
attributable in part to Hussein's inability to grasp the reality of a rapidly changing 
world linked to the ending of the Cold War. For example, Soviet-US agreements 
to reduce conventional forces in Europe enabled the US access to a larger number 
of troops that could be mobilised. "More than half of the 540,000 US troops sent 
to the Gulf came from the central European front... Together with British and 
French contingents they represented the cream of the army that NATO had been 
honing for combat for years. i50 Moscow, as expected, distanced itself from the 
Iraqi military failure. The then Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh claimed that the 
ineffectual Soviet-built air defence system was "not a reflection of a weakness of 
combat equipment. Ultimately equipment is good when it is in good hands. i51 The 
year 1991 was without doubt a low-point in Soviet-Iraqi relations. 
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Russian-Iraqi Relations: establishing a new framework 
Indicating the importance of bilateral relations in the past, neither side gave up on 
the possibility of restoring the ties that had existed before 1992. Iraq, isolated and 
facing stiff international sanctions, needed all the allies it could get. Russia, on the 
other hand, was facing a more complicated situation. In 1992 President Yeltsin 
continued the policy of Co-operation with the West, which remained a top priority 
until 1996. But as Moscow gradually became more assertive in pursuing its 
national interests, the Iraqi factor took on a more prominent profile. 
On 9 November, 1992, a Russian parliamentary delegation headed by Sergei 
Baburin, leader of the Communist and Nationalist Unity Bloc, visited Baghdad. 
They were received by the Iraqi speaker of parliament Sa'adi Mahdi Saleh, who 
announced that Baghdad wished to "turn over a new leaf in its relations with 
Russia. )152 Baburin was quoted by the Iraqi News Agency as saying that the 
"continuation of the blockade on Iraq's children, elderly and women is a violation 
of international norms, charters and human rights, " and attacked "American piracy 
represented by seizing part of the Iraqi people's assets in foreign banks. "53 Such 
visits appeared to lend weight to claims by the Ba'ath regime that it had an 
influence on members of Moscow's political elite. The Russian media was 
unrelenting about the financial losses as a consequence of the embargo against 
Iraq, and political opponents of Boris Yeltsin blamed this on the government's 
kow-towing to the West at the expense of national interests. Between 1992 until 
1994 there was a growing wave of voices calling on the government not to ignore 
the potential gains to be made from enhancing relations with Iraq. An article in 
Izvestiia in August 1994 mentioned that Baghdad was "proposing to repay their 
debt to Russia - about $7 billion - immediately after the sanctions are lifted or 
eased, " and that payment would be made in oil. "54 There was also the attractive 
possibility of favourable contracts and arms sales to the benefit of the Russian 
economy over its competitors. 
Evidence that the decision-making elite was itself in accord with the view that 
relations with Iraq required serious consideration began to surface in 1994, when 
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in November 1994, Moscow announced that it was "ready to resume arms supplies 
to Iraq" once the UN sanctions were lifted. 55 It was also reported that as part of 
the deal, Russia would provide technical training to Iraqi officers in the field of 
communications. However, Moscow strenuously stressed that it would not act 
unilaterally in defiance of the United Nations sanctions. Moreover, Kozyrev stated 
that Russia's close relations with Iraq would not be at the expense of other Gulf 
states: "Iraq and Kuwait are Russia's economic partners and that is why Moscow 
cannot take sides. "56 When Tariq Aziz made an unexpected visit to Moscow on 6 
December 1994 Russia's Foreign Ministry continued to emphasise this point. 
Yeltsin's envoy to the Middle East, Viktor Posuvaliuk, reaffirmed that "we are not 
Iraq's advocates. "57 Interestingly, he added that Russia was not seeking to 
improve links with Iraq for economic motives, and the interpretation that "the 
Russian leadership is virtually possessed by the desire to recoup these seven billion 
dollars (debt)" was incorrect because "everything is much subtler. "58 
Posuvaliuk seemed to suggest that strategic considerations held equal weight in 
Moscow. One indication of the growing importance of Iraq to Russia was an 
admission by a Russian diplomat that the frequent contacts between the two sides 
"stem from the special significance of the `Iraqi component' in Russia's Middle 
East policy" in which stability in the Gulf was crucial. 59 Other Foreign Ministry 
officials began pointing out in April 1994 that contentious issues such as Iraqi 
disarmament should not be used by the UN to delay the sanctions against Iraq. 
Although the Special Commission on the Disarmament of Iraq did not have a 
complete picture of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme, Russian 
officials noted that in the opinion of members of the commission, "the remaining 
`gaps' are not fundamental in nature. "60 This position was a direct accusation that 
the West's stubbornness on the issue was politically motivated rather than based on 
legal or technical factors. 
Iraq hoped that it could utilise the historic links with Moscow in order to have a 
powerful ally on the UN Security Council. Tariq Aziz relayed a message from his 
President that Iraq "trusts Russia" and added that Baghdad placed "great hopes in 
Russia's objective and active role" with regards to the lifting the international 
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embargo against Iraq. 61 Russia's position since 1994 had been that the all or 
nothing position was harmful to the authority of the UN and Kozyrev urged the 
Security Council to be more flexible rather than act as a coercive tool. This 
interpretation was in fact a direct challenge to Washington's position on the 
sanctions, supported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which argued that Saddam 
Hussein should be punished by the international community for his aggression. In 
what was clear criticism of the US and Britain, Kozyrev said he regretted that 
certain members of the UN Security Council supported "use of sanctions and 
tough pressure without applying political methods. "62 Thus, over a two year 
period Moscow had become bolder in highlighting the difference of opinion which 
existed between itself and Washington over the Iraqi issue. But Yeltsin's 
government had no intention of conceding to demands by certain sections of the 
domestic opposition, namely pragmatic and extreme nationalists, to unilaterally 
break the united international stance. In November 1994 Kozyrev retorted to the 
Communist-Nationalist bloc: "Over the past few years the opposition has 
persistently claimed that the sanctions have been unfair, that this is almost an 
imperialistic plot against Iraq and that we should lift them unilaterally.. . regardless 
of the situation. We did not and have not agreed with this. "63 Official statements 
which understated growing links between Moscow and Baghdad were aimed at 
easing U. S, concern and suspicion. In addition, the Russian leadership had to be 
careful not to unintentionally send a signal to the Iraqi regime which it could 
interpret as a green light for further acts of aggression. 
At the same time Kozyrev reflected that while "Iraq itself is a very complicated 
partner.. . there are 
Western interests which, in this case, do not coincide with our 
interests, and we should simply take this fact into account clearly and soberly. " He 
noted that while comparisons with the Cold War were wrong, "very deep 
differences are stemming from here"; specifically, that the West could get its 
petro-dollars from other Gulf states, while Moscow had lost $7 billion from Iraqi 
oil sales. 64 
In November 1994, Yeltsin dispatched Kozyrev to Baghdad to participate in Iraq's 
recognition of the sovereignty and boundaries of Kuwait in order to strengthen 
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their case for ending the international sanctions. The Foreign Ministry could boast: 
"For the first time in the history of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations it has become possible, 
thanks to Russia's efforts, to achieve a clearly formulated recognition of Kuwait by 
Baghdad. "65 The most surprising aspect of the Russian initiative was that support 
was not only directed towards Iraq, but also towards the Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein. Kozyrev told the Iraqi parliament on 10th November that he was 
"delighted at the political wisdom of Saddam Hussein" for recognising Kuwait's 
sovereignty. 66 For the liberal Kozyrev to comment on Hussein's `wisdom' was a 
rather ironic situation, considering the Iraqi leader's record on human rights and 
the huge blunders he had made in the Gulf War. Moscow could have concluded 
that the best way to the Iraqi dictator's heart and mind would be through his 
vanity, and so making complimentary remarks would have been a cost-effective 
way of recouping influence in Baghdad and the Middle East. 
Kozyrev's mission was clearly intended to provide much needed legitimacy and 
support to the internationally isolated regime. Russia's Foreign Minister told the 
members of the puppet parliament in Baghdad that "the future of the Iraqi people 
today is in your hands and in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council"6' 
Iraq's equivalent of the Soviet Union's Politburo. On his return to Moscow, 
Kozyrev urged the United Nations to react positively to the Iraqi initiative and 
repeated his criticism of the all or nothing approach of the United States. His 
retort to increasing references about U. S. -Russian differences was unambiguous: 
"Is the United States a Sacred Cow which we cannot have disagreements with? "68 
Moscow's leadership denied that Kozyrev's efforts were part of a new move by 
Russia to revert to the Cold War era, but that the contrary was taking place. 
Posuvaliuk pointed out that Moscow's success in getting Iraq to recognise Kuwait 
"is an achievement for which the Gulf countries should be grateful . 
"69 Later that 
year, in September, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Kolokov firmly 
stated the case for taking a pragmatic attitude towards Baghdad. "It's naive to 
think that Saddam Hussein can be removed. He is a flesh-and-blood politician. 
His behaviour does not conform to generally accepted standards, but if he takes 
positive steps, why not say so publicly. "70 Kolokov admitted that Moscow's 
approach was indeed different to that of Washington. In his words, "In 
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Washington it is considered that Hussein's unreliability excludes anything other 
than an extremely tough approach to him. We, on the other hand, think that 
pressure on Baghdad will be more effective if it is stated publicly that there have 
been changes for the better, but such-and-such demands will have to be met in 
order for such-and-such restrictions to be relaxed. "" 
One commentator writing for Izvestiia argued that the reason for the growing 
quarrel with the United States was that Washington had become accustomed to the 
view Moscow no longer played a role in Middle Eastern affairs. In his view, 
Russia and the United States had strategic goals in the region which could not be 
reconciled. "The Americans are irritated at their Russian partner because, by 
offering Baghdad a compromise instead of capitulation and to exchange 
recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and borders for a gradual lifting of the oil 
embargo, Moscow, in Washington's opinion, threw the drowning dictator a life- 
buoy. "" Indeed, what became clear from the whole episode was that the United 
States had overstepped the boundaries of seeking to uphold international law, and 
in many ways used such means as a vehicle to look after its own national interests. 
The dawning reality was that Washington had specific intentions in the region 
which it achieved with relative ease, and any talk of `compromise' or `Co- 
operation', if it did not coincide with US aims, was largely ignored. This view, 
which was once reserved for Russian communists and nationalists, soon became 
prevalent among the mainstream as well. "The new Russia has now reached this 
by no means novel conclusion, after first entertaining infantile illusions about the 
unbounded altruism and disinterestedness of the `civilised world'. "73 
Despite this shift of Russian policy to accommodate a wider spectrum of political 
views, Kozyrev's critics remained vociferous. Vladimir Lukin, as Chairman of the 
State Duma Committee on International Affairs, spoke out in October 1994 against 
what he described as a policy that sought to appease all and pleased no-one. 
"Should we have kicked desert sand into the eyes of two American Presidents, and 
in such a way as to directly affect their prestige all to no particular purpose? " he 
asked. 74 His main concern was that Russian foreign policy had become so ill- 
defined that few in the international community could associate with it. Lukin's 
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contention that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lost its direction, particularly in 
terms of long-term planning, was widely shared among Russia's political elite. 
With the debate over sanctions, Lukin cast similar doubt: "If our national interest 
consists in getting Iraq to start paying off its debt as soon as possible while at the 
same time avoiding any worsening of relations with the West ... then, as a result of 
the diplomatic measures we have conducted, the situation has become more 
difficult on both counts. i75 
If emphasising the importance of maintaining dialogue with Iraq was kicking sand 
in the eyes of US presidents, then Moscow continued to do this in 1995 and 1996. 
Following a visit by Posuvaliuk to Baghdad at the beginning of January 1996, a 
Foreign Ministry statement said rather tersely that "Moscow attaches great 
significance to political dialogue with Baghdad. i76 When within days of that 
statement it was announced that the successor to Kozyrev would be the orientalist 
Primakov, supposedly well acquainted with Saddam Hussein since the 1960s, many 
Western observers began to wonder if Russia was heading towards open defiance 
of the United States. In reality, this was extremely unlikely because Russia was 
still too weak but perhaps it was an indication that the internal dynamics were 
driving the country well away from the position of the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. At the extreme end of these internal dynamics was the leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia, who in January of 1996 praised Hussein for the 
"repulse of the Western aggression of Desert Storm. " Vladimir Zhirinovskii added 
that "the immense army, well-armed and equipped with modern weapons of 30 
imperialist states headed by the United States was defeated by Iraq's valiant sons 
and daughters headed by Saddam Hussein, a wise and noble son of the Iraqi 
people. "" Such an outlook was not widely shared by Russia's political elite, but 
the Zhirinovskii factor did have an effect on some at the very lowest end of society. 
Although Primakov was quick to dampen down any speculation of a growing rift 
between Washington and Moscow, he did so in a style different to that of his 
predecessor. Most notably, Primakov promoted the idea of Co-operation but 
without conceding that the two countries should follow separate paths towards 
seeking their own national interests. Primakov told reporters after his meeting 
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with his US counterpart in Helsinki on 11 February 1996: "We have differences 
and there will be differences, but all this must be [resolved] without confrontation. 
That would be extremely dangerous for our mutual relations and also for the whole 
world. "78 However, standing by Iraq in its time of need was seen as an investment 
for the future, and in that same month of 1996, Russia and Iraq signed what The 
Guardian headlined as a "`Giant' Iraq-Russia Oil Deal. "79 Most reports indicated 
that the agreement was worth $10 billion of industrial projects, which were put on 
hold until the sanctions were lifted. Other than helping to restore the Iraqi oil 
industry, Russia would also be involved in building a metallurgical combine and 
factories producing chemical and other heavy industrial projects. In return, Iraq 
stated its readiness pay off its debts as soon as the sanctions were lifted. In the 
words of one Russian government source, Moscow believed that the sanctions 
issue had "come to a head and the time has come for this to be resolved in favour 
of Iraq, which overall is fulfilling all the demands being made of it by the 
international community. "80 
In July 1996, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement was published, openly urging 
"Russian organisations and entrepreneurial structures to become actively involved 
in buying oil from Iraq and delivering humanitarian goods to that country, " adding 
a promise by the Ministry to provide them with "needed assistance in this 
endeavour. "81 This was in the light of the UN decision to ease the sanctions to 
allow Iraq to buy urgent medical equipment and food with the sale of some of its 
oil. Nonetheless, the implication was that Russia was expecting its leading 
economic institutions to establish firm foundations for future enterprises with 
relation to Iraq. 
An article in Nezavisimaia gazeta by Aleksandr Lavrentev managed to capture the 
over-riding view in Moscow's inner-circle of decision making that was in existence 
in the summer of 1996. The article was written to coincide with the anniversary of 
the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Iraq in 1972, which, 
it was pointed out, was still in force. Beginning with an overview of the history of 
Co-operation between the two countries, and in particular the level of Soviet aid in 
the 1960s and 1970s in particular, the article then almost inevitably moved into the 
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hard facts and figures of the relationship. "Between 1980 -1990 alone, the Soviet 
Union sold Iraq weapons worth more than $15 billion; 55 percent of all Iraqi 
military deliveries for that period. "82 These military deliveries were to become a 
major cause of the large debt that Iraq owed Russia, but the latter had seen none of 
that debt being repaid. The reason for this?: Despite the Iraqi oil wealth, 
"possibilities for its use had been considerably curtailed as a result of the war with 
Iran in the 1980s, and in the 1990s, after the Gulf War this had generally been 
transformed to practically nothing. "" 
Indeed, many Russian and non-Russian commentators expressed growing concern 
at the ease with which the United States had been able to exert its political and 
economic power over regions such as the Middle East. There was a kind of see- 
saw effect in which the greater the prestige for the United States the less the 
respect for Russia. The fear for Moscow was that this would contribute to the loss 
of international markets, such as Iraq, in which it would become impossible to 
return. In fact, there were also many other rivals to Russia than the United States, 
the most notable of which was France, which even in the Soviet era was claiming a 
growing share of the Iraqi market. 
Thus, the author had concluded with the following point: "Returning the debts and 
the traditional market of sales products from the military-industrial complex, joint 
oil exploration, the closeness to our boundaries and an important position in the 
Middle East all but force Russia to begin immediate serious preparation towards 
`day X That is when the sanctions are lifted. )184 While stopping short of calling 
on Russia to act as accomplice to a nation breaching international law, what was 
being called upon from the Russian government was to do everything else in its 
power, even at the expense of upsetting the United States, to reassert its interests. 
Moscow was highly aggrieved following the U. S. cruise missile attacks on Iraq in 
early September 1996. There was a united view in Russia condemning the military 
actions which encompassed a broad range of the political spectrum. The pragmatic 
nationalist Aleksandr Lebed, then Security Council chief, compared Clinton's 
behaviour to a "bull in a china shop. "85 It was reported at the time that various 
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agreements with Iraq, particularly relating to oil, were being jeopardised by 
Washington as a result of the anti-Iraqi policies by the Clinton administration. 
These included a deal "on rebuilding Iraq's petroleum industry and increasing oil 
production to 60.8 million [metric] tons a year ... 
Zarubezhneft [foreign oil] and 
Mashinimport [machinery import] are each hoping to get a 15 per cent share in the 
project, while Lukoil hopes to obtain a 70 per cent stake. Various estimates put 
the value of the project between $2 billion to $7 billion. "x6 As well as preventing 
Russia from benefiting from such deals, U. S. insistence on isolating Iraq delayed 
Baghdad's pledge to repay its $7 billion debt to Moscow. According to one view, 
following the cruise missile attacks, "Washington will now do everything in its 
power to prevent an easing of the embargo. "V 
Washington's justification for the attack was related to Iraqi army involvement in 
inter-Kurdish fighting in northern Iraq. The Russian media was equally scathing 
about such motives: "If one is to follow this logic of relations, which hardly 
favours Moscow, one can even imagine the following-In the final analysis, 
Saddam sent troops to battle separatists who are threatening the integrity of his 
country ... 
If one applies the standards the US has set for Saddam Hussein to 
Russian-Chechen relations, one can surmise that analogous UN resolutions would 
be adopted on Chechnia... And if one continues this reasoning even further, one 
should not rule out the possibility that the US could very well allow itself, in the 
future, to speak to Moscow in the language of Tomahawks too. i88 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin reflected Moscow's dismay 
regarding the U. S. military strikes and added that his government wanted the 
resolution of the Kurdish problem to be "guided by a political character. "x9 In 
other words through dialogue and negotiations rather than through fighting. In a 
separate Foreign Ministry statement, a much more critical assessment of 
Washington's actions, which included the extension of the `no-fly zone' over Iraq, 
was presented: 
"Serious concern is prompted by the fact that Washington is essentially laying claim to the role of 
supreme arbiter, trying, in effect, to supplant the Security Council, which in accordance with the 
UN Charter, possesses an exclusive right to authorise the use of force. The decision adopted 
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unilaterally by the US and Britain to expand the `no-fly zone' in southern Iraq should also be 
viewed in this context. These actions, which set a dangerous precedent, are at variance with 
international law and are unacceptable. The military actions in and around Iraq must be 
stopped. "90 
These were amongst the most severe criticisms of the United States in the first five 
years since the demise of the Soviet Union. What was even more indicative of the 
transformation that had taken place was that the comments were supported by the 
leading reformers in government, including the Presidential Chief of Staff Anatolii 
Chubais. Yeltsin's chief administrator said that he backed the Foreign Ministry 
criticisms and added that "if our viewpoint had been taken into account, the 
bombardment would not have happened. "9' Primakov's main objection, which met 
with agreement from a wide spectrum in Russia, was that the unilateral actions of 
one power were against the spirit of Co-operation in a new world order. "No one 
accepts diktats of any one power, be it the USA, Russia or another state. "92 
Primakov met with Aziz in November 1996 to discuss the implementation of 
Resolution 986, authorising Iraq to export $2 billion of its oil over a six-month 
period in order to buy food and medicine. The two men also discussed the latest 
developments in northern Iraq, where the two main Kurdish factions of Barazani 
and Talabani continued to fight each other. Ostensibly, Primakov expressed non- 
interference from Russia and fully supported Baghdad's peace initiatives. 
However, it was also reported that "according to information from confidential 
sources, Moscow is not only carefully following the development of events in 
northern Iraq, but also receiving emissaries from the parties to the conflict. i93 In 
effect, such vigour and interest in the affairs of Iraq were significant in that they 
were indicative of a new approach by Moscow compared with the case five years 
earlier, when involvement in such matters was seen as costly and of little strategic 
value. In addition, this episode added credence to the argument that Moscow was 
deliberately downplaying its aims in the Middle East in order not to antagonise the 
West and some of the regional players, which continued to be wary of Russian 
intentions in the light of the Soviet past. 
218 
A senior official at the Foreign Ministry underlined Russia's contribution during 
fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan in late 1996 by saying that "because of our influence and 
our political dialogue with Baghdad, we were able to calm the situation in the 
north and to reduce tension between Baghdad and Washington. "94 The general 
thread of the argument was that Russia had the potential to play a positive and 
constructive role in the Iraq crisis which would also defuse tension in the Gulf. 
What was tacitly recognised in Moscow was that there was a lack of trust between 
the United States and Russia which prevented this from leading to Co-operation 
over the issue. Washington's neglect of Moscow's -efforts to resolve the Iraqi 
crisis was highly resented by the Russian leadership and opposition parties alike. 
Conclusion: Squaring the Gulf circle 
The Iraqi example provides an excellent insight for understanding the objectives of 
post-Soviet Russia. This was a great power that would inevitably have to pursue 
its own interests, but only in the framework of international Co-operation. 
According to Naumkin, there was a counter-reaction in Russia against Kozyrev's 
early policies of unquestioningly agreeing with Washington. "Most political parties 
and activists in Moscow regarded the policy of Russia being too closely linked to 
the United States as if it did not have its own interests, nor its own view and that it 
was giving up all its partners in the area. s95 He noted that Iraq was one of the few 
countries in the world which could consume Russian products and had a history of 
buying arms. It was therefore inevitable that such economic necessities would lead 
to a policy which would encourage the ending of the sanctions. 
But the dilemma facing Moscow was that upgrading its relations with Iraq would 
also negatively affect relations with Saudi Arabia. Moscow was seeking to raise 
the level of economic Co-operation with the oil-rich Kingdom in order to 
compensate for its losses with regard to Iraq. However, Riyadh's response to 
Russian endeavours was lethargic and slow. In part, U. S. pressure had prevented 
the Saudi leadership from easing its overwhelming economic, political and military 
dependence on the government in Washington. The Saudis would have also 
wished to take advantage of a close relationship with Russia in order to have some 
form of ability to drive a wedge between Moscow's close relations with both 
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Baghdad and Tehran. However, the constitution of the Saudi regime: its weak 
position internally and regionally, the threats facing it faces from both Iran and 
Iraq, has made it very conservative by nature and prevents it from taking any risks 
which might antagonise the United States, its regional guardian. Nonetheless, 
Saudi Arabia had taken great care not to irritate Russia or pursue policies counter 
to Moscow's aims. The chief example was Riyadh's deliberate non-interference in 
the Chechen war and the toning down of its activities in the Muslim republics of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Saudi support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
which was criticised by Moscow, was not directed so much at Russia as much as it 
was an effort from preventing Iran from extending its influence in the war-torn 
country. 
Russia's adherence to the internationally imposed sanctions naturally provoked a 
negative reaction from Iraq, but it had been widely accepted as being a price worth 
paying for the sake of maintaining Co-operation with the United States despite the 
loss of a profitable outlet. Nonetheless, since 1993 Russia embarked on a more 
energetic drive to remove Iraq from its position of international pariah through the 
United Nations Security Council as well as by more direct diplomatic channels. 
The problem for Russia, as one Russian commentator pointed out, was that 
Washington simply did not want to see the "development of bilateral Iraqi-Russian 
economic relations. When Washington decides to remove the sanctions, it will be 
done easily and without us. "96 
Primakov was attempting to steer a course in 1996 through the stormy political 
waters of the Gulf which did not lead to a direct confrontation with Washington 
and which promoted relations with Saudi Arabia in the hope that they would result 
in high economic returns for Russia. This was a continuation of the policy initiated 
by Shevardnadze and maintained by his predecessor Kozyrev. However, as a 
centrist-nationalist, he believed that it was in Russia's interest to use the long- 
standing links with Baghdad to strengthen Moscow's position in the Gulf. 
Relations with Iraq were seen as promising large economic returns once the 
sanctions were lifted. Moreover, the geo-strategic aspect of relations provided a 
balance to Washington's dominant position over the GCC countries, including 
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Saudi Arabia. Riyadh had frustrated Moscow's efforts to further bilateral relations 
in order to gain entry into the highly sought-after economic market of the oil rich 
kingdom. Preserving good relations with Iraq was also an indirect way of getting 
Saudi Arabia (as well as Iran, Turkey and other neighbouring states) to take 
account of Russia in regional equations. So, for example, if Riyadh was concerned 
about an Iraqi arms build-up, it would need the goodwill of Russia to use its 
influence in Baghdad to moderate the Iraqi position. As one commentator noticed, 
Moscow's foreign policy under Primakov "is pursuing a low-cost and relatively 
risk-free strategy of stepping into regional disputes as peacemaker and bolstering 
its influence through successful mediation and conciliation, often at the expense of 
a `bellicose' U. S. s97 Relations with Iraq also have an important bearing on 
relations with Iran, which in turn is important for Moscow in term of relations with 
Central Asian and Caucasian countries in the CIS. Primakov's realism, which 
characterises his foreign policy style, made it logical to preserve relations with 
Baghdad, but that same quality had led him to reiterate to both Washington and 
Riyadh that such a policy would take particular care not to undermine their 
interests. 
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Chapter VIII: Russia, Turkey and Iran: a regional power game 
As regional powers in their own right, the influence of Turkey and Iran was not 
only related to the Middle East, but also to the vast area to the south and south- 
west of Russia's borders. It was most feared that the three powers would clash as 
a result of instability in the Caucasus. There were also discord over the delineation 
of the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Such differences were not new, but had 
existed for centuries. However, the post-Soviet era added a new equation to the 
formula; there was no longer a direct border between Russia the other two Muslim 
powers. Instead, a geo-political space was opened for the three historic rivals to 
reassert their own influence. In 1992, with the domination of the pro-Western 
radicals at its peak, Moscow focused its attention on relations with the West while 
seeking to avoid entanglement with the `Muslim world' to its south. It was 
believed in that year that the biggest threat to its security from that region would 
come from Islamic Fundamentalism, guided by Iran. But as pragmatism become 
the dominant feature of Russian foreign policy, many observers were surprised to 
find that Moscow was increasingly co-operating with Tehran in order to balance 
Ankara's more assertive role in the Eurasian land-mass stretching from Central 
Asia to the Balkans. 
Bilateral relations with Turkey and Iran were another key component on which 
Russia placed greater significance from 1993 onwards. Arms sales to Iran, as well 
as industrial projects, were to have an important bearing on relations with the 
United States as well as other key states of the Middle East, particularly Turkey, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Furthermore, Cupertino with Iran promised Russia a 
more influential voice in the politics of the Gulf. Turkey was involved in a 
territorial and water dispute with Syria, which became more hostile towards 
Ankara after the latter began to raise the level of military Cupertino with Israel. 
The Kurdish issue also forced Turkey to become more involved in Iraq and more 
critical of Syria for its support of extreme Kurdish factions. Thus it could be seen 
that relations with Iran and Turkey preoccupied Russia in a massive geo-strategic 
tangle which was of vital importance to Moscow's national security. 
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Post-WWII relations with Iran and Turkey 
Immediately after the Second World War, the Soviet Union had two basic 
objectives with regards to the Middle East: First, to ensure a Soviet presence in the 
region to the south of its border. Second, to weaken or eliminate British and 
Western influence in the area. Stalin's obsession with the concept of creating a 
buffer zone around the USSR left Turkey and Iran particularly vulnerable to Soviet 
expansion. In October 1945, Moscow fortified its military position in northern 
Iran contravening the internationally agreed agenda that foreign troops would pull 
out within six months. In December of that year, uprisings and fighting broke out 
in Azeri regions of Iran which led to the establishment of the Autonomous 
Republic of Azerbaijan and a month later it was followed by the creation of the 
Autonomous Kurdish Republic of Azerbaijan. Moscow declared that these new 
areas would come under Soviet protection and Iranian government forces were 
prevented from entering. Such actions from Stalin caused alarm in the West and 
the matter was taken to the United Nations where British and U. S. protests forced 
the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Iran on 9 May 1946. 
Stalin was equally careless with Turkish fears in the post-war years. Strategically, 
Turkey was more important to the Soviet Union not only because it bordered its 
south-westerly frontier but because it controlled the straits which allowed entry 
and exit to Soviet ships into and from the Black Sea. Added to this was a 
territorial dispute between the two countries over the Eastern Anatolian provinces 
of Kars and Ardahan, which were under Turkish control after 1920 as a result of 
an agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Ataturk revolutionaries. Stalin, not 
happy with the terms of the agreement, called in 1945 for the return of these 
territories. At Potsdam, Stalin also demanded joint control of the Dardanelles and 
Bosporus Straits, "specifically a naval base in the Sea of Mamora which connected 
the two straits. "' 
Both Britain and the United States rejected Soviet demands and gave total backing 
to unrivalled Turkish control of the Straits. As with Iran, Stalin sought to increase 
the pressure with intimidation tactics by amassing Soviet troops on the Turkish 
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border. Ankara responded by declaring martial law and suppressing all left-wing 
groups. Many observers agreed to the view that "by the spring of 1947 Ankara 
genuinely feared a Soviet invasion. "Z Washington was concerned by these 
developments and announced the establishment of a naval presence in neighbouring 
Greece as part of the Truman Doctrine's aim of containing Soviet expansion. 
Stalin's Turkish bluff was called and he backed down as he was not seriously 
contemplating a direct conflict with the West. But his style and actions served to 
enhance the suspicions of the Turks who requested Nato membership in 1949, 
which was accepted in 1952. The consequence was that Turkey became a highly 
valued base for Nato and U. S. forces, with direct proximity to the Soviet Union. 
In the Turkish case, as the Iranian example, Moscow's policy was clumsy and 
blundering, leaving Stalin's successors with the difficult task of winning back the 
trust and Cupertino from such important neighbours. 
Khrushchev's energetic drive to improve the Soviet Union's international standing 
enabled Moscow to jump over the crescent of countries that seemed to be 
containing the Soviet block and build relations with key states of the Middle East 
such as Egypt and Iraq. But Moscow's policy makers were well aware that it was 
crucial to soften the hostility of Iran and Turkey. A difficult task considering that 
both regimes were inherently opposed to communism; Iran's conservative 
monarchy and the fiercely nationalist Turkish republic regarded socialism as a 
challenge to their values and, in effect, the legitimacy of their existence. Yet 
Khrushchev was fairly successful on both counts, particularly Iran, because of the 
Shah's strategy of playing both superpowers against each other. The fruits of such 
efforts was that in 1962 the Shah of Iran announced that his country would not 
deploy any foreign missiles, opening the way for the development of bi-lateral 
relations. In 1963 Leonid Brezhnev made an official visit to Tehran, the year that 
the USSR gave Iran a $38.9 million loan. 3 
Turkish rulers were less malleable. Although Khrushchev renounced the territorial 
claims to Kars and Ardahan in July 1953, many differences remained. In 1957 bi- 
lateral relations suffered a further blow when the USSR threatened to attack 
Turkey if that country invaded Syria, which had become, with Egypt, a key Soviet 
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ally. In February 1955, Turkey's signing of the Baghdad pact with Iraq was 
interpreted as a way of blocking Soviet entry into the region and of asserting 
Western influence on the Middle East. Turkey was thus portrayed as an agent of 
Western imperialism given the task of dividing and weakening the countries of the 
Middle East as well as threatening the security of the Soviet Union. As a 
beneficiary of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey received through the Marshall Plan 
$500 million by 1955. By 1967 this figure totalled $1.9 billion in U. S. aid. 4 
Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, was able to build on the new course 
pursued by Moscow, particularly by improving economic relations. The first major 
deal was struck when Kosygin visited Ankara in September 1966, where a $200 
million Soviet loan was provided to allow Moscow to construct a steel mill and 
several other industrial projects. ' Turkey reciprocated by allowing freedom of 
movement for the USSR's newly developed Mediterranean fleet, intended to 
counter the U. S. Sixth Fleet. Similar successes were being achieved with Iran, 
which was manifested in the visit by the Shah to the Soviet Union in July 1965, 
followed a year later by a $288.9 million loan. But of greater significance was the 
Soviet-Iranian agreement reached at the time, whereby the Russians would provide 
Iran with $110 million in military equipment, primarily small arms and transport 
equipment, in return for Iranian gas. 6 In the Cold War arena, it began to appear as 
if the Soviet Union was ebbing away at spheres which had been under more or less 
complete U. S. influence. By 1970, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership promised to 
provide $788.9 million in economic aid to the nations of the Northern Tier (Turkey 
and Iran), along with $110 million in military aid. ' 
Soviet relations with Iran (From 1970 to 1991) 
After 1970 relations between Iran and the Soviet Union gradually deteriorated and 
tension rather than detente characterised events. The Indian-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship in 1971 was a potential a threat from the east while a Treaty with Iraq 
had the same effect on Iran's western border. But despite such concerns, there 
was little evidence to suggest that Moscow deliberately sought to undermine the 
Shah, who was perceived to be a stable and pragmatic leader capable of standing 
up to the United States in order to defend Iranian interests. In this context, it was 
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not unusual that Moscow was among the last countries to withdraw political 
support for the Iranian monarch before he was replaced by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The initial Soviet reaction was that the revolution was instigated by the 
United States because of the growing differences between the Shah and the 
administration in Washington. Eventually, the anti-Western rhetoric that 
accompanied the new order encouraged Moscow to believe that Iran could be 
convinced into joining the `anti-imperialist' block under the leadership of the 
Soviet Union. However, the ageing Brezhnev leadership failed to understand that 
the anti-Western rhetoric by the Ayatollahs was directed not only at the 
Westernisation of values and culture introduced by the Shah, but also at the 
atheistic Soviet Union. 
Relations with Iran were further complicated by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. 
Sporadic fighting which had been taking place on the Iraqi-Iranian border escalated 
in September 1980 when Iranians began the heavy shelling of Iraqi border towns. 
The Iraqis reacted by launching a full-scale military invasion of the Iranian-held 
land in the Shatt Al-Arab. The war posed a dilemma for Moscow because while it 
was hoping to establish good relations with the Islamic regime in Iran, it had 
already a long-standing and profitable alliance with Iraq. The Soviet leadership 
initially portrayed Iran as a victim of U. S. imperialism and Zionism and in further 
efforts to court the Islamic government in the first year of the war Moscow 
ordered back a naval convoy carrying weapons to Iraq and soon after "imposed an 
actual embargo on new arms shipments to Iraq. "' 
With the defeat of the Iranians imminent in the early phase of the war, as Iraqi 
successes multiplied, it was difficult to understand Moscow's tilt towards the 
besieged government in Tehran at the expense of old allies in Baghdad. According 
to Middle East specialist Dennis Ross: "First, the Soviets saw Iran - twice as big as 
Iraq, with over three times its population - as the most important country in the 
region. It was the country that bordered the Soviet Union and physically separated 
it from the Gulf... Second, the risk the Soviets took in backing Islamic Iran was 
probably seen as minimal compared to the costs of seeing the United States re- 
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emerge in Iran... Third, in case they were wrong, they assumed they would in time 
be able to recoup their position with a victorious Iraq... "9 
Iran's success in the latter phase of the war made its government more belligerent, 
seeking to spread its influence throughout the Arab and Islamic world. As it was 
later discovered, some of this newly-found confidence was due to substantial 
military supplies from the United States, in what became known as the Irangate 
scandal. Tehran also continued to criticise the Soviet Union and to persecute 
communists within Iran. Gorbachev put an end to the confused policies of his 
predecessors and adopted a consistent line which tilted towards Iraq but which 
encouraged an immediate end to the fighting. His main aim was to preserve the 
status quo in the Gulf and prevent direct interference from both superpowers. In 
February 1986 Gorbachev attempted to break the ice with Iran by dispatching First 
Deputy Foreign Minister Gregorii Kornienko, who was the highest ranking Soviet 
official to visit that country since the Islamic revolution. The Iranian leadership 
praised the visit and expressed optimism to Moscow of an improvement in 
relations. However, it was more than coincidence that a week after the visit Iran 
launched a major military offensive, making major territorial gains. It quickly 
became clear to Moscow that Tehran "had exploited the Kornienko visit" and the 
promise of better Soviet-Iranian relations to discourage Moscow from increasing 
military support to Iraq while it launched its own offensive. "In case Moscow did 
not see the significance of the Iranian ploy in February, Iran was to repeat the 
manoeuvre again later that year. "10 Indeed, Tehran deftly provided Moscow with 
tempting `carrots' such as economic Cupertino, the resumption of natural gas sales 
to the USSR, and the return of Soviet technicians to Iran who had been expelled 
the year before, in order to unbalance Soviet-Iraqi ties. 
By 1987 Gorbachev could no longer ignore the advantage gained by Iran from 
these tactics at the expense of Iraq. In January 1987 Moscow issued a severe 
criticism of the nature of the war and adopted a line similar to that of Iraq which 
effectively called for an end to the fighting. Iran tried to soften Soviet criticism by 
sending Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in that year and his meeting with 
President Gromyko was reported to be tense. Gromyko bluntly told him that the 
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USSR could not tolerate the Iranian action for much longer. The attack on a 
Soviet ship on 6 May 1987 added to the strain of bilateral relations. Soviet ships 
were then being used to help Kuwait and Saudi Arabia transport oil safely out of 
the Gulf. 
The announcement of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1988 
removed a major barrier to the improvement of bi-lateral ties. However, a major 
blow occurred at the end of that month when Iraq launched a missile attack against 
Tehran. The Iranian leadership denounced the Soviet Union for supplying Iraq 
with the missiles, and Iranians angrily surrounded the Soviet embassy in Tehran 
shouting anti-Soviet slogans. At the end of July Iran finally accepted a cease-fire 
agreement with Iraq, largely due to the Iraqi army's successful reversal of an 
Iranian offensive. Since the cease-fire, relations between Iran and the Soviet Union 
greatly improved and in March 1989 Velayati went to the Soviet Union where the 
two countries announced a new major gas deal. The death of Khomeini in June 
1989 did not impede the meeting between the new Iranian leader Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and Gorbachev in the same month. The meeting was accompanied by 
media reports that the Soviet Union had offered Iran "sophisticated weaponry and 
advanced radar" in return for a more positive and helpful Iranian policy in the 
area. " As Gorbachev was to observe: "Geography and history have determined 
that the USSR and Iran are `fated', one might say, to live peacefully as good 
neighbours and to co-operate with one another. " 12 
The Soviet Union and Turkey to 1991 
After the military take-over on 27 May 1960, relations between the Soviet Union 
and Turkey began improving. The military government of Kemal Gursel was 
quickly recognised by Moscow and a month later Khrushchev told its leaders that 
"it is our deep conviction that the most sincere relations between our two countries 
would develop if Turkey embarked upon the road of neutrality, " though he let it be 
known that neutrality was "not a condition for beginning the improvement of our 
relations. , 13 Turkey played a vital part in the Western military block against the 
Soviet Union. According to one military analysis, "With Greece, Turkey can put 
approximately 25 divisions into the Balkans. As a result, the Warsaw Pact requires 
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somewhere around 34 divisions to defend against them ... 
By the same token Turkey 
has 8 divisions in eastern Turkey near the Transcaucaus which forces the Soviet 
Union to keep approximately 12 divisions forward deployed and in a fairly high 
state of readiness. "14 Therefore, the necessity for keeping Soviet military resources 
and personnel on the southern flank undermined the Warsaw Pact's level of 
strength on the central arena. 
Washington, in particular, placed a high value on Turkey because Nato bases to the 
east of the country (Incirlik, Mus and Batman) made it possible to strike both the 
Transcaucaus and, if necessary, the Persian Gulf. Turkey's control of the 
Bosporus was another key asset to Nato. According to estimates, "60 percent of 
Soviet export and 50 percent of Soviet imports" passed through the Bosporus. In 
1986 alone, there were over 18,000 Soviet ship transits through the Straits. In 
addition, "an average of 150 Soviet merchant ships ply the Mediterranean on any 
given day... approximately a third of their combatants are in the Black Sea. " 5 
Turkey was, in a geographical sense, also a barrier between the Soviet Union and 
the Arab world. Added to this, it was a base for AWAC and other air surveillance 
which seriously limited Soviet air power in the eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. According to U. S. Defense Department estimates Turkey provided 
as much as 25 percent of Nato's hard intelligence. 16 Following the fall of the Shah 
in Iran, when U. S. radar and surveillance installations were downgraded, Turkey's 
role became even more important. 
These figures did not hinder Soviet persistence in courting Ankara until by "the 
summer of 1978 its developing ties with Turkey were crowned by a political 
document on the principles of good neighbourliness and friendly Cupertino. "" 
This included a Turkish pledge on the Montreux Convention of 1936 regarding the 
Straits in which free navigation was assured during peacetime and no ships which 
threatened the Soviet navy were permitted in the Black Sea. 
Gorbachev continued to place a high priority on Turkey and his reforms were 
generally welcomed in Ankara. However, former U. S. Ambassador to Turkey 
George McGhee seemed to suggest that Washington was unconcerned with these 
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developments because the two countries were more likely to differ than to agree. 
McGhee concluded that despite closer with the Soviet Union, there was little 
"evidence that Ankara was moving closer to Moscow, in the political sense. " 8 
One incident in 1989 temporarily caused tension when a Soviet pilot assaulted a 
guard and commandeered a MiG-29 to Turkey on 20 May. Turkey agreed to 
return the plane on the same day but it refused to send back the pilot. On 14 June 
the Turkish Ambassador was called to Moscow where he was warned that "the 
actions of the Turkish side with regard to the criminal A. M. Zuyev can only be 
viewed by the Soviet Union as contrary to the spirit of good-neighbourliness in 
Soviet-Turkish relations and their current positive development. "'9 But bilateral 
relations were mutually recognised as being far more important than that single 
incident, which was quickly swept aside. 
Soviet-Turkish relations under Gorbachev continued to improve until the very last 
year of the existence of the USSR. Turkish President Turgut Ozal arrived on an 
official visit in Moscow on 11 March 1991 and met Gorbachev the following day. 
The outcome of the meeting resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, 
Good-neighbourliness and Cupertino between the two countries. From the 
perspective of both countries, the significance of the treaty was raised in the light 
of the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
Russia and Turkey: diplomacy and trade on separate tracks 
Kozyrev's visit to Turkey in June 1994, as part of a Nato Conference on 
Partnership for Peace, resulted in meetings with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and 
his Turkish counterpart Hikmet Cetin. In the Kozyrev-Cetin meeting the issue of 
the Straits was raised and Russia's displeasure with Ankara's plan to introduce 
new guidelines and restrictions were made. The Turkish side seemed as 
determined as ever to stand its ground. "If necessary, " Cetin said "we can clarify 
some of the issues again and explain that they do not violate the Montreux 
convention... but Turkey cannot allow a city of 10 million people to be 
threatened. i20 The emergence of new Muslim Republics and fears that Turkey was 
seeking to expand its reign of influence into these areas created added tension 
between the two countries. 
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Turkey's introduction of new procedures for seafaring through the Straits, 
implemented on 1 July 1994, led to criticisms from the Russian Foreign Ministry 
because the move was seen as an attempt to limit Russian merchant and military 
shipping out of the Black Sea. Deputy Foreign Minister, Albert Chernishev, 
complained that while Moscow accepted the need to update and improve rules and 
codes to improve seafaring, they should not have been made unilaterally. He 
accused the Ankara government of acting contrary to the spirit of the Geneva 
Conventions. "The interests of all parties concerned and particularly those of the 
Black Sea region should also be taken into account, " Chernisev maintained. 21 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Grigorii Karasin echoed this point and added that 
freedom of navigation in the Black Sea was of primary importance for the Russian 
economy. "In this connection the Russian side has repeatedly made clear that we 
are unable to recognise the introduction of procedures which essentially amount to 
having to ask for authorisation to cross the Straits and unilateral restrictions up to 
and including a de facto ban on such crossings for certain categories of vessels as 
legally binding. "22 
Turkey had long been irritated by Moscow's unrelenting attention to the issue of 
the Straits because it believed that Russia's ultimate motive was some form of 
control over them. Ankara sought to counter Russian complaints by arguing that 
the changes it had introduced were intended to improve sea traffic, which had 
grown rapidly over the years, and for the sake of improving environmental and 
safety standards for the ten million citizens of Istanbul. The undercurrent of 
Turkish suspicions was expressed in extreme terms by the Turkish General Gueres 
in June 1994. He claimed that Russia posed a bigger threat to Turkey than it did 
during the Cold War, arguing that "Moscow had expansionist desires towards the 
Caucasus region, Ukraine and even the Balkan states. "23 The Russian Foreign 
Ministry was sufficiently concerned to make an immediate response in which it 
expressed its hope "that the statements made by Gueres do not reflect the point of 
view of Turkey's political leadership... "24 
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The Turkish political establishment had fears of its own, caused by the rise of 
Russian nationalism and the possibility that it could become uncontrollable to the 
existing leadership in Moscow. Both the government and media of Turkey paid 
much attention to the rise of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the Russian ultra-nationalist 
whose comments were offensive to all of Russia's neighbours. The Turkish 
Foreign Ministry prevented Zhirinovskii from entering Turkey in February 1994, 
wrecking his plan to lead a 15-man delegation at the invitation of a Turkish 
newspaper. 
Another major point of difference between the two countries which continued to 
affect bilateral relations was the traditional support shown by Moscow to the 
Kurdish movement and their quest for independence. Yeltsin's government had 
made clear its support and respect for the integrity of the Turkish Republic and 
distanced itself from the PKK, the Kurdish Communist Party. However, the 
Turkish government did not contain its anger at Moscow for allowing Kurdish 
groups to hold a conference in the Russian capital in February 1994. The 
conference was sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Affairs of Nationalities and 
Regional Policy and was titled `Kurdistan at a historical and political cross-roads. ' 
Turkish President Suleiman Demeirel warned Moscow that "our people are very 
sensitive to this issue. It is necessary that Russia provide additional explanations to 
prevent the impression that it supports terrorism. "25 In fairness to the Russian 
government, the Turkish government's view that any form of Kurdish nationalist 
expression represented terrorism was not shared by most countries of the world 
community. 
Yet the Turkish government did not view the special attention paid to the Kurdish 
issue by the Russian press and diplomatic officials with benign indifference. The 
Kurdish point of view was often reflected in the mainstream press, which implied 
that the fault lay with the Turkish leadership. One article, openly supporting 
Kurdish self-determination, asked: "Is that really such a high price to end a 13- 
year-long war, which has already taken 25,000 lives and costs Ankara from $7 
billion to $9 billion a year? "26 The reader was reminded that the 40 million Kurds 
scattered around the world were the largest ethnic group without a homeland. 
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More significantly, it was noted that one million of them lived in Russia and other 
CIS states. Realistically, however, in the words of the Russian commentator, "the 
Kurds recognise that Russia is not currently in a position to quarrel with Turkey, 
its largest trade partner outside the CIS. "27 
In 1995, Turkey sought to moderate its relations with Russia. Observers noted 
that while Russia remained muted about Turkish operations against Kurds in 
northern Iraq, "Ankara reciprocated on the Chechnia issue, " and it was also 
pointed out that "Russia has the lion's share of the $5.2 billion Turkish investments 
in the CIS. "28 The trade links continued to flourish between the two countries to 
the extent that each side viewed the other as a vital economic partner. In 
December 1995, an agreement was signed between Oleg Davydov, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Bilgin Unan, the Turkish 
Ambassador to Moscow in which Turkey extended a $350 million credit to Russia 
and the two countries restructured the debt of the USSR. 29 The agreement was 
seen as a breakthrough in resolving the Soviet debt issue and allowing new 
investment to flow into Russia. The turnover of trade between the two countries 
stood at $3 billion in 1995. In addition the value of contracts for the construction 
of facilities by Turkish firms stood at $5 billion in that year. There were also other 
important factors such as the well-being of Turkish workers in Russia and the 
number of Russian tourists in Turkey which added to the value of economic 
interaction. Moreover, Turkey agreed to earmark $100 million of the $370 million 
Russian debt for the purchase of weapons for the Turkish army. 30 
The coming to power of Necmettin Erbakan in 1996 was not met with enthusiasm 
in Moscow. The Russian media compared his views to the militant leaders of Iran, 
and quoted him as saying that "our goal is to liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnia 
and Jerusalem. "" The 70-year old Erbakan of the Welfare Party was averse to the 
growing Western influence in Turkey and wanted to restore traditional values into 
society. But a traditional Islamic outlook, as Moscow found so often in the past, 
was not necessarily sympathetic towards Russia because it was accompanied with 
many historic suspicions. 
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Toward the end of 1996, the niggling differences between Turkey and Russia had 
not subsided. Russia's dismay with Turkey's indirect support for the Chechens 
intensified when a Chechen mission was opened in Istanbul. This was the reaction 
in a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry in early December 1996: 
"Governments that allow Ichkeria's so-called missions to be turned into embassies 
will be taking a clearly unfriendly step toward Russia, attempting through such 
action to challenge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. "32 According 
to Russia's Military Doctrine, any country threatening the unity of the Russian 
Federation was in effect making a declaration of war. The strong language from 
Moscow led to a counter-response from Ankara insisting that the mission would 
not be upgraded and that it considered "Chechnia to be a member of the Russian 
Federation and respects Russia's territorial integrity. s33 
Moscow also revealed some unease at Turkey's military build-up and its upgrading 
of its naval power in the Black Sea. According to Russian defence sources quoted 
in the press, the Turkish fleet had a clear superiority over the Black Sea Fleet that 
was 2: 1 in Turkey's favour. The Turkish navy continued to be augmented "not 
only by American-built fighting ships, but also by small craft produced in 
Turkey. "34 The 700 000-strong Turkish army was the second largest in Nato and 
Ankara's plans to modernise it was a clear-cut challenge to Moscow's military 
strategists to utilise and upgrade resources for securing the defence of that region. 
The visit to Russia by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller in 
mid-December 1996 was accompanied with a list of complaints brought to 
Moscow which included matters such as "the sale of Russian weapons to the 
government of Cyprus and the activities of Kurdish organisations" on Russian 
territory. 35 The first point was a reference to Russian plans to sell Cyprus several 
S-300 surface-to-air missile systems for around $660 million. Russia had also been 
supplying the small Mediterranean island T-80U tanks in 1996.36 In return, the 
Russian government delivered its own misgivings, which included the "restrictions 
that Ankara has imposed on the passage of tankers through the Bosphorus and the 
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activities of numerous organisations that have been providing support to the 
Chechen separatists. i37 
Russian officials happily pointed towards the evergrowing trade links with Turkey 
but there was a more forthright tendency to discuss the political differences by 
1996. A senior diplomat in the Foreign Ministry, discussing Ankara's ambitions 
and potential threat to Russia's regional domination, rather sarcastically 
commented that "Turkey exaggerated its own capabilities and pictured itself 
without an objective base"38 In other words, that Turkey's leaders did not quite 
have their feet on the ground when considering their country's role in the regional 
context. Primakov continued the Soviet policy of seeking to co-operate with 
Ankara, despite the various bilateral issues which left them in disagreement. 
Although many of these differences were not resolved at the end of 1996, the 
growing economic dependency of the two countries on each other was a positive 
counterweight to the political problems. 
Russia and Iran 
Russia found a similarly mixed relationship with Iran. In the past Iran had a long- 
standing policy of `negative equilibrium' with regards to foreign policy, which was 
based on rivalling Russo-British interests in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This took on a reversed form in the Khomeini era with the slogan 
`neither East nor West' characterising the country's foreign policy. In the post- 
Soviet era Iran was internationally isolated while Russia was left greatly weakened. 
Both shared similar worries about instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
Although many experts predicted in 1991 that there would be inevitable conflict 
between the two countries because of rivalry over the Central Asian republics, the 
opposite actually seemed to take place, with Cupertino being the dominant 
characteristic. 
Well before the December 1993 elections which brought Zhirinovskii to world 
attention, Russia's policies in the former Soviet republics had already become more 
assertive. In the early years following the demise of the Soviet Union, "Russian 
policynmakers expressed great scepticism about Tehran's intentions in these 
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predominantly Muslim areas" of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 39 Moscow's new 
democratic leadership expected Turkey to be the more favoured partner in 
promoting moderation in the region. But the pragmatic influence of President 
Rafsanjani enabled a rapid rapprochement between Iran and Russia in the early 
1990s, to the extent that the United States began to show growing agitation at this 
development. Both Iran and Russia refrained from criticising the other on a variety 
of issues ranging from the war in Bosnia to events in the Gulf. For example, when 
Russia announced that it planned to sell a number of advanced weapons to Kuwait, 
Iranian news reports were uncharacteristically neutral, pointing out that the $800 
million deal was vital for the Russian economy. 
The most controversial development in Russian-Iranian relations was the 
announcement that Russia would complete the Bushehr nuclear plant in southern 
Iran by 1999. Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Iranian Nuclear Energy 
organisation, pointed out that Germany, which completed 85 percent of 
construction, had refused to complete the deal following pressure from the United 
States. The Iranians were angered by the German withdrawal and the claims made 
by Washington that the plant was a cover for an Iranian military nuclear project. 
Tehran argued that the allegations were intended to divert attention from Israeli 
refusals to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which was up for renewal at 
the time. But this did not lessen genuine concern by the United States, and Iran's 
neighbours, about Tehran's motives and the development of Russo-Iranian ties. 
Yeltsin attempted to answer U. S. worries during his visit in late September 1994 
when he said that "this Cupertino is not extensive, nor does it threaten regional 
stability. '740 But the following month Chernishev met with an Iranian Foreign 
Ministry delegation to "examine all aspects of bilateral relations", with Kozyrev 
characterising existing ties as good and stable at the end of the two day meetings. 41 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Va'ezi, who led the Iranian delegation, 
announced that Iran and Russia had signed 13 documents relating to bilateral 
Cupertino encompassing commercial, scientific, technical and cultural ties. 
On 8 January 1995 the two countries officially signed the contract for the 
completion of the Bushehr Atomic Energy Station. Under extreme criticism for 
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the United States and other countries in the Middle East concerned about Iran's 
nuclear potential, Tehran found it necessary to make a defence of the project. The 
Iranian government argued that while the West had hundreds of similar plants, it 
had "repeatedly tried to deny Iran the right to have its power plant. " The 
statement added that "it was natural that Iran would turn to Russia to finish the 
construction of the power plant in Bushehr. )42 Tehran announced that 500 
Russian engineers and inspectors would be working on the site, though "the 
Russians say they will send 3,000" and about 150 of them began arriving in the 
early months of 1995.43 
Russia's leadership must have been aware that such a deal would result in a strain 
in relations with many key countries in the Middle East as well as the United 
States. Iraq and Israel had most to fear from a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel's 
government and media strongly attacked Moscow's support for Iran and expressed 
concern about the potential to transform the use of nuclear power for military 
purposes. Russian-Iranian Cupertino resumed the old dilemma regarding the 
latter's bitter foe Iraq. However, Primakov appeared to have deftly convinced 
both sides that Russia supported them both in their shared aim of ending U. S. 
domination of the Gulf region. Moscow also criticised Washington for imposing 
sanctions on the two countries and for its large-scale military sales to the Gulf 
Cupertino Council states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Primakov was subtly 
downplaying the differences between Iraq and Iran and highlighting their shared 
interests, which Moscow supported. At the same time, perhaps with a forked 
tongue, Primakov sought to assure Iran's enemies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, 
that Moscow's Cupertino with Tehran was to their benefit because it would have a 
moderating effect on the region. 44 
Despite this atmosphere of criticism, further Cupertino in the nuclear field between 
Russia and Iran was announced on 18 February. But there was added concern that 
the internal instability in Russia and the organised crime factor would allow the 
possibility of the smuggling of equipment and material which could enable 
countries such as Iran to develop their own nuclear programmes. Israeli television 
reported that Turkish security forces in Istanbul arrested several Iranians 
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smuggling "plutonium and Osmium. " The report said that the arrested men had 
been under surveillance and that they had been under regular contact with the 
Iranian Deputy Defence Minister. On 20 February 1995, Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres said that "according to information he received in Paris, Iran will be 
able to produce its first nuclear bomb within three years. "45 The report also added, 
without giving any sources, that "a senior Moscow official claimed that the Russian 
decision to supply four nuclear reactors to Iran will help the Iranians manufacture a 
nuclear bomb within a few years. "46 The factual basis of such allegations was very 
difficult to prove, but Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov 
stressed that "the nuclear reactors which are to be delivered to Iran are not capable 
of producing plutonium used in nuclear weapons. 7147 He did not believe that Iran 
would be capable of developing its nuclear power to military use. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry journal Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' contained articles 
on a regular basis defending Moscow's right to co-operate with whom it chooses. 
In one such article, Iu. Melnikov and V. Frolov wrote that the United States 
continued to stubbornly ignore "the right of Russia to provide nuclear reactors, 
under the control of the NPT, to Iran for peaceful aims, and Russia's interest in 
supporting and developing the friendly and business ties with its neighbours. " 4$ 
In their view, Russia could not neglect the development of "normal bilateral 
relations with its influential southern neighbour, regardless of outside pressure on 
[Moscow] to do so by using the issue of the nuclear reactors. "49 They stressed 
that Washington had neglected to take into account the fact that "the issue here is 
not only about financial interests but also about the geopolitical interests of the 
Russian Federation and considerations of the national security on the southern 
borders of the CIS. '"so 
The construction of the nuclear reactor represented only one side of the 
multifaceted nature of Iranian-Russian relations. Bilateral trade, ranging from raw 
energy to foodstuffs, led Moscow to be highly optimistic about the future to the 
extent that it was prepared to face such international pressure at a time when 
Russia needed Western support as an emerging democracy. In 1995, President Bill 
Clinton had made it clear that he wished to limit the influence of Iran by imposing a 
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trade ban and calling on other countries to do so. Washington's view of Iran was 
that it was a destabilising factor in the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East. For 
example, its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon had greatly undermined the peace 
negotiations on the Syrian/Lebanese-Israeli tracks. Its support for militant groups 
in countries ranging from Algeria to Afghanistan was a contributory factor to war 
and bloodshed in those regions. Hence Russia's nuclear and other economic deals 
with Iran were perceived by Washington as enabling Tehran to escape international 
efforts to squeeze the Islamic regime into refraining from its adventures outside its 
own borders. 
Moscow reacted angrily to Washington's position by claiming, first, that the 
United States had exploited the lucrative Arab Gulf markets without taking into 
account the poor human rights record and the lack of democracy in those 
countries. Russia believed that as the United States had seen it justifiable to 
overlook such matters for the sake of profit with regard to Saudi Arabia it had little 
right to criticise Russo-Iranian economic Cupertino. Russian officials, such as 
Deputy Foreign Minister Gregorii Mamedov insisted that Russia would continue to 
seek Cupertino with Iran. He reflected the growing view among Russians in 
general that "Russia is not a colony. It is an independent state and its decisions 
will be on the basis of its national interests. "" This sentiment was reported by the 
Iranian media during Mamedov's visit to Tehran on 26 February 1995. However, 
Russia's press agency Itar-Tass reported a different angle to the meeting, saying 
that there were differences between the two sides regarding the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. The report commented that Iran wanted "further participation in the said 
treaty only for a limited period and on several conditions" while Russia favoured 
"unlimited and unconditional prolongation of this international document. "SZ From 
this statement cynics claimed that Moscow was seeking to deflect international 
criticisms. However, in the Soviet era Moscow was meticulous in preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons; indeed, that was a major factor in the split with China. 
Russia's leaders were without doubt unlikely to stray from this path, because it was 
not in the national interest to have small unpredictable regimes controlling nuclear 
missiles on its own doorstep. 
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There were other problems affecting Russian-Iranian relations, both in the 
economic and political spheres. Despite Russia's participation in Iran's large-scale 
economic projects, the Tehran government had been lax in paying Russian 
companies for the services provided. In the past, the Soviet government 
sometimes turned a blind eye for the sake of securing political and diplomatic gains 
but in the post-Soviet era, when capitalist values became dominant, it was more 
difficult to neglect the hard cash factor. Overdue debts by Iran had amassed to 
$582 million by the end of July 1995 and the figure continued to grow. Of this 
sum there was "$383 million owed to the Rosvooruzhenie [Russian Arms] State 
Company. "53 There were also complaints by Russian sources that the quality of 
supplies by Iran to Russia were often of a low standard and did not always meet 
deadlines. However, by the end of 1996, successes were achieved in resolving the 
economic problems between the two countries. Deputy Prime Minister Oleg 
Davydov, who for the first time had promoted the concept of a strategic alliance 
between Iran and Russia, participated in an agreement in which Tehran would pay 
back the $600 million debt to Moscow by the end of the year 2000 with oil. 
Moreover, it was aimed to increase the trade turnover between the two countries 
from $400 million in 1996 (the figure was $200 million in 1995), to $4 billion by 
the year 2000.54 
Yet at times, it did appear as if Russian diplomatic efforts were deliberately 
attempting to understate the development of bilateral ties, in order to avert close 
attention from the United States in particular and other Middle East states in 
general. During his visit to Iran in December 1996, Primakov complained that the 
media was "trying to put a spurious accent on my stay... We are not having talks 
here [in Tehran] which are directed against anyone else... Evidently, someone is 
trying to use this visit to cause conflict with someone. "55 Yet Primakov delivered a 
message from Yeltsin to Rafsanjani which stated "the urgency of establishing 
greater Cupertino between Russia and Iran to end instability in the region. "S6 
Primakov's deputy, Posuvaliuk, told journalists in a news conference on 25 
December 1996 that there was no need for the West or anyone to worry about the 
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improving ties with Iran. It was still somewhat indicative of Moscow's sensitivity 
regarding the issue that there was a need to continually justify the relationship. 
Posuvaliuk insisted that "the US administration must understand that we have a 
sovereign right to build our relations with Iran so as to promote our interests. "57 
In the same breath he added that no country was more interested in peace and 
stability in the region than Russia. Posuvaliuk noted, with reason, that as a 
neighbour of Iran, Russia had a far greater interest than the United States in 
keeping Iran nuclear-free and he reaffirmed that the Bushehr nuclear project was 
purely for peaceful purposes. Iran and Russia had signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding which defined export control and according to the Deputy Foreign 
Minister this highlighted the positive nature of Russian foreign policy in the world 
community. He argued that the Memorandum was "an important achievement in 
our efforts to draw Iran into the international non-proliferation regime" since it 
would "help in having objects and technologies covered by export control to be 
used only for their intended purposes. "58 
Throughout 1996 Russia encouraged the development of trade relations with Iran. 
In March of that year Velayati went to Moscow at the end of an extensive trip 
through CIS territories. There was much discussion about developing and linking 
the infrastructures of Iran, Russia, Central Asia and Caucasia in order to create a 
large new economic zone. It was therefore odd that one Foreign Ministry official 
should state in October 1996, "I can't say that Iran has a special priority for 
Russia, " but he could not deny that it was "a relationship of good neighbours and 
joint interests. "59 Interviewed for this thesis, the Russian official was careful not to 
show excessive enthusiasm for the Tehran regime and the state of relations. But, 
he reiterated the view in Moscow that "the isolation of a country such as Iran is 
not in the interest of the area. i60 
However, Primakov's visit to Iran at the end of 1996 underlined the eagerness to 
improve relations as Russia began to develop a foreign policy centred around geo- 
strategic interests which placed neighbouring areas as top priority. Primakov also 
sought to utilise the contacts he had developed with the leadership in Tehran to put 
forward Russian interests in the Gulf region. The Russian Foreign Minister said 
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that the two countries had shared interest in "preventing an increased military 
presence in the Persian Gulf' which effectively meant that the two countries were 
opposed to U. S. policy in the oil rich region. 61 Primakov's visit, and his 
subsequent comments, were clearly incompatible with Washington's wish to isolate 
Iran in the same way that Iraq was at that time. He insisted that "Iran should be a 
full-fledged participant in the international community, " and described bilateral 
relations as "developing along an ascending curve. s62 His Iranian counterpart 
Velayati went so far as to describe relations as being "at the highest point for the 
last two centuries. "63 
A New Dimension: Central Asia and the Caucasus 
The new republics formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were 
home to large Muslim populations, making them prone to influence from Iran and 
Turkey. It became possible that Russia would face a serious challenge to its 
dominance over these co-members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
However, by 1996 neither Iran nor Turkey had made substantial inroads into these 
areas, in terms of economic, political and cultural influence. Radical Iran proved to 
be rigidly pragmatic in its approach, co-operating closely with Russia in all regional 
matters ranging from the civil war in Tajikistan to resource-sharing in the Caspian 
Sea. Turkey was less willing to act harmoniously with Russia but it took care not 
to overstep the limit which Moscow deemed necessary for its national security. In 
other words, it did not pursue policies which threatened the integrity of the CIS or 
directly challenged Russia's position as a great power in the region. 
Moscow's policy in 1992 of deliberately distancing Russia from the Muslim 
republics, partly as an effort to avoid offending the nationalist sentiments of other 
republics and partly because of a nationalist tide which sought to assert a separate 
Russian identity, opened a ray of opportunity for Turkey and Iran to make 
headway. But events in the Muslim republics brought them to the forefront of 
Moscow's concerns. The most immediate was the civil war in Tajikistan which led 
to the involvement of Russian troops. The more obvious attention of Turkey and 
Iran was then perceived to have an effect on the national security of Russia itself 
and posed the challenge that if Moscow did not devise a clear-cut policy in its own 
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backyard then someone else would take its place. Observers began to warn that 
Muslim fundamentalism, imported via Iran and Afghanistan would quickly spread 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia and threaten the unity of Russia itself. A rather 
simplified view began to be espoused describing "Central Asia as a key link in a 
Muslim fundamentalist `arc of instability' stretching from north Africa to western 
China. "64 
When on 8 December 1991 Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met to form their own 
Slav Commonwealth the leaders of Central Asia felt greatly humiliated. Although 
later that month the Central Asian republics were included, there was a general 
feeling of betrayal and a loss of trust. Despite this, it was surprising that in the 
following 5 year period, the new Muslim republics did not move closer to Turkey 
and Iran. Initially, Turkey was perceived as the most welcome alternative and 
Ankara was quickest off the mark to exploit any potential economic benefits. 
Added to this was the surge of nationalist feeling both in Turkey and in the 
republics, where dreams of a great new Turkic world stretching from the Balkans 
to China suddenly appeared to be a distant reality. The Central Asian leaders 
responded to Turkish manoeuvres to show Russia that they could have a powerful 
alternative that was a Nato member and backed by the United States. In other 
words, Turkey could provide the Asian republics with more leverage in their 
dealings with Russia. 
This early enthusiasm for Turkey was tempered by certain difficulties that could 
not be easily ignored. The most obvious one was that Turkey did not actually 
share a border with the Islamic republics and was geographically distant from the 
five Central Asian republics. The Pan-Turkic sentiments expressed in the first year 
of independence was looked upon with great suspicion in Iran, which attempted to 
consolidate its position with Persian-speaking Tajikistan. Critics of the Iranian 
regime accused Tehran of taking part in the civil war in Tajikistan and causing 
instability there. While there had been evidence of an Iranian involvement, it was 
unlikely to have been encouraged by the pragmatic Rafsanjani or the Foreign 
Ministry, which tried to mediate a peace in that country. 
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The fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno- 
Karabakh initially pushed the Baku government closer to Iran which it hoped 
would be a powerful ally. However, to Baku's disappointment Iran's response was 
tame. There was no revolutionary language, nor a call for the resumption of the 
Crusades to win Muslim lands, nor even threats that there would be Iranian 
involvement. Rather, there was a call to find a peaceful solution that would not be 
detrimental to either side. When in January 1991, before the demise of the USSR, 
Azerbaijan's Deputy Prime Minister visited Tehran to seek support and Cupertino, 
"he was forthrightly informed that Tehran would reciprocate within the framework 
of existing Cupertino between Tehran and Moscow. i65 Turkey on the other hand 
was less coy about courting Baku. The growing links between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan were duly noted in the Russian press. On his first visit to Turkey, in 
1994, President Gaidar Aliev signed a friendship agreement and Turkey promised 
to provide economic help. Aliev said that "as a new chapter and new stage in 
bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, I think that we have succeeded 
in laying the basis for their further, more successful development. "66 Similar visits 
were made by the leaders of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan who on achieving independence announced that Turkey would enjoy 
top priority in their foreign policy. In October 1992 a summit meeting of these 
Turkic states was held in Ankara with Turkey establishing an aid program, the 
Turkish International Cupertino Administration (TICA), extending credits of up to 
$1 billion. But the main effort was in the cultural field, with Ankara attempting to 
convince the other Turkic republics to adopt a Latin alphabet instead of the 
Cyrillic. Moreover, thousands of university and educational scholarships were 
made available to the newly liberated people of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
These attempts at cultural domination did not go unnoticed in Moscow. Adding to 
the mutual hostility was Ankara's support for the Azeri cause, clashing directly 
with Russia's tilt towards the Armenians. 
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan was most important for Russia because of the nuclear 
arsenal on its territory and the large population of Russians living there. 
Throughout the Muslim republics there was the problem of inter-ethnic tcnsions. 
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All had a substantial Russian population which threatened to lead to a violent 
backlash, with Kazakhstan inhabited by the largest percentage of Russians, as the 
table below shows: 
Millions Russians Other Nationalities 
I . Azerbaijan 7.1 6% 6% Armenian 
2-Turkmenistan 3.6 10% 9%Uzbek; 3% Kazakh 
3. Uzbekistan 20.3 8% 5%Tajik; 4%Kazkakh 
4. Tajikistan 5.3 8% 24%Uzbeks 
5. Kyr, gyzstan 4.4 22% 13%Uzbeks; 3%Ukraine 
6. Kazakhstan 16.7 38% 6%German; 5%Ukraine 
The Population of the Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan, 1989 census. 67 
Of all the Muslim republics Kazakhstan had been the most eager to ensure more 
Cupertino with Russia. A treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid was 
signed between Russia and Kazakhstan on 25 May 1992. Articles 2 to 10 of the 
agreement stressed the importance of developing a joint foreign and defence 
policy. Article 2, focused on the need by the parties to "carry out a co-ordinated 
foreign policy, " while Article 3 stated that there should be the "joint deployment of 
military bases. " As if to make the message even more blunt to other regional 
powers, Article 6 stated that the two countries "will not participate in any alliance 
or blocs directed against either of them. i68 
The republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were the 
poorest of the successor states of the Soviet Union. Largely for this reason, there 
was much talk about the possibility of a union to be created between these 
countries to form a new power based on the historic state of Turkestan. This idea 
quickly collapsed in the midst of allegations that this was an Uzbek ambition to 
dominate its much smaller neighbours. But this did not prevent the leaders of these 
countries to turn to history for ideas and they joined together in June 1992 
alongside the leaderships of Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Azerbaijan to 
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discuss the possibility of opening up the Old Silk Road, an ancient route linking 
China with the Mediterranean. There were also aims to create a new Central Asian 
economic and cultural zone. Although this appeared to be a logical step which 
would fill a newly created geographic gap, there were far too many stumbling 
blocks for this to occur successfully. " 
In the latter half of 1993 Russia began to re-impose its position in the areas 
between itself and Iran and Turkey. In an article written by Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev in September 1993, a new language was emanating from Moscow about 
the security of Russia and the CIS. Kozyrev wrote that because of the "deep- 
rooted" ties with its neighbours Russia "could not and did not have the moral right 
to remain inditl'erent" to events taking shape there. 70 Kozyrev defended Russia's 
`peacemaking' role in the various conflicts taking place in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus arguing that they did not contradict UN principles. Further still, he 
suggested that Russia had a right to act as it deemed necessary in these areas in 
order to guarantee national security. Russia's knowledge and influence in the 
region enabled it to act quickly, Kozyrev argued. He cited the examples of 
Tajikistan and Abkhazia where the international reaction was slow and inadequate, 
hence leaving Russia with the most important role to play. Russia was evidently 
becoming more assertive in 1993, paying increasing attention to the region that 
was being described as the Near Abroad. As Kozyrev explained, "this is not a 
`neo-imperial' but still a unique kind of geopolitical space, " in which only Russia 
can play the role of peacemaker and stabiliser of a potentially explosive region. 
71 
Turkmenistan was the least receptive to Russian influence among the Central Asian 
states. Ashgabad looked more favourably towards Iran after 1993 because of the 
realisation that both shared an interest in the development of their oil and petro- 
chemicals industries. Iranian President Rafsanjani visited Turkmenistan in October 
1993 and signed with President Niiazov valuable economic agreements, "the most 
important being the construction of pipelines to carry Turkmen gas and oil through 
Iran to Turkey or to the Persian Gulf. "72 Rafsanjani and the more moderate 
elements of the leadership in Tehran stressed that their interest in Central Asia was 
purely economic and cultural and that they did not have a political agenda. 
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Rafsanjani also travelled across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan where he met 
President Gaidar Aliev in Baku. Azerbaijan's war with Armenia prompted many to 
speculate that the religious elite in Tehran would force a policy change to give 
support for the Azeri cause. During his visit the Armenians had pushed deeper into 
Azeri territory yet the Iranian president's comments were noticeably controlled 
compared to the fiery religious language that the ruling clerics were better known 
for. Rafsanjani told reporters that Armenia's assault on "the territory of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan is regrettable and a source of anxiety.. . the world of 
Islam 
will not allow such an event to create hostility and grudges between the nations of 
the region. -7 '1 These carefully chosen words were effectively saying that despite 
the fact that one Christian country had attacked a neighbouring Muslim one, 
Tehran did not encourage grudges against Armenia by Muslims. 
The Armenian advance to reach Nagorno-Karabakh meant that 10 percent of 
Azerbaijan's territory was under occupation. Some of the fighting had actually 
been taking place on the Iranian-Azeri border. Towards the end of the visit, on 27 
October, it had been revealed that the Armenians were stepping up their military 
offensive yet Rafsanjani remained restrained in his language, saying only that he 
was "deeply concerned about the aggravation of the situation. , 74 The Iranian 
President also offered for his country to accept the burden of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and called for political dialogue between the two countries. 
Turkey meanwhile had taken a far more pro-Azeri line saying that Nagorno- 
Karabakh must remain part of Azerbaijan. 
Kazakhstan was by far the least susceptible to overtures from Turkey and Iran. 
When Kazakh nationalists began to publicly air their resentment against their 
former colonial masters Nazarbaev's response was distinct: "The Russian people 
have suffered most of all. During the Great Patriotic War who suffered the 
heaviest losses? The Russians. And in the thirties more Russians died from famine 
and repressions than any other nationality. That is why I say to my opponents: Do 
not identify the Russian people with the empire. "'s China had a higher significance 
for Kazakhstan than Turkey and Iran. During his visit to China in October 1993, 
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Nazarbaev said: "Kazakhstan takes economic and trade Cupertino with China very 
seriously, as China is our largest trading partner. We are very interested in the 
experience of economic reform in China, and we particularly hope to learn about 
China's experience in establishing a market economy. i76 
As 19 93 came to a close relations between Kazakhstan and Russia were strained, 
mainly as a consequence of Moscow calling for the other successor states to 
introduce dual citizenship to accommodate the Russians living outside Russia. In 
that year the proportion of Russians fell to 31%. It was suggested that Russians 
were leaving because of ill-treatment and discrimination by the Kazakhs but 
Nazarbaev argued that part of the explanation for this drop was that many Russian 
servicemen had completed their duties and returned home. The Kazakh leader also 
attacked the attitude of Russian nationalists within Russia and pointed out that 
over one million Kazakhs resided in Russia. "I do not shout from the rooftops 
about their fate, " complained Nazarbaev. He criticised Kozyrev from singing the 
nationalist tune as being irresponsible: "The politicians will stand aside when it is 
the ordinary people who become embroiled in bloodshed. "" 
Alma Ata continued to seek close relations with Russia despite the fact that 
Kazakh pride was otlended by Moscow. At the end of November 1994, the 
Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasyrnzhomat Tokaiev was reported to have told the 
Interfax news service that his country's relations with Russia were top priority and 
this would he so "for many years, most likely forever. "7 Perhaps with a tinge of 
sarcasm, Tokaiev added that the two countries "are doomed to live together. "79 
Since the first year of its independence commentators pointed out that Nazarbaev's 
interest in developing close allegiances even with Turkey was not great. For 
example when Turkey's president Ozal visited Kazakhstan in 1992, at around the 
same time of a visit paid by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, one 
observer noted that while "Ozal's visit was greeted by nationalist-minded 
intellectuals... Nazarbaev himself appeared to be more interested in developing ties 
with Germany. "it was Uzbekistan which had the most enthusiasm for Pan- 
Turkism and it developed friendly ties with Turkey. President Karimov openly 
stated that "my country will go forward by the Turkish route. "81 
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On 8 February 1994 Aliev visited Turkey to mark a "qualitatively new phase in 
Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. 7)82 The two countries signed a ten, year Treaty of 
Friendship and Cupertino and various economic, cultural and scientific agreements. 
The two countries also expressed support for the tripartite mediation effort 
regarding Karabakh launched in 1993, comprising the USA, Russia and Turkey. 
But both the Azeri leader and Turkish President Suleiman Demirel "indirectly 
condemned Russian attempts to mediate a settlement of the conflict unilaterally. "83 
Iran on the other hand intelligently put Russia at ease throughout that period 
despite the continued improvement of Turkmeni-Iranian relations with Niiazov 
describing Iran as an "island of peace. "84 This continued improvement of relations 
alerted the United States and on 4 November 1994 US Special Representative to 
the CIS James Collins met Niiazov to discuss the possibility of Washington 
supporting the Ashgabad government. Collins suggested that the United States 
could help develop the country's oil and gas industry. But he also asked the 
Turkmeni government to postpone a Ukrainian debt of $600 million which was 
mainly arrears for payment of Turkmeni gas imports. This was nonetheless an 
important event for the Ashgabad government which had won US recognition and 
esteem despite its authoritarian rule and the personality cult that had developed 
around President Niiazov. 
Both sides appeared to agree that it was dangerous to allow the tense situation in 
the Caucasus to grow out of control. Andranik Migranian, adviser to President 
Yeltsin, warned in an article that any encouragement of the break-away of the 
Caucasus from the CIS would lead to "destabilisation of the northern Caucasus and 
to squeezing the Russian border to the line of the mouths of the Don and Volga, 
which would be catastrophic for Russia's future. "85 He noted that the Caucasus 
region was "traditionally a political frontier and object of conflict for spheres of 
influence between Turkey, Iran and Russia. "86 He said that one of the 
consequences would be the encroachment of the Muslim world deeper into the 
Russian Federation. His attitude reflected the new sense of urgency adopted by 
Moscow: "An active Russia policy in Transcaucasus and the integration of this 
entire region into the geopolitical space of the CIS has first-rank significance for 
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the stability of the entire Russian state, "87 adding that such a policy would have 
consequences for the long-term future. 
While the Russian leadership and conservatives in the Russian political system had 
become vociferous regarding the need for their country to re-impose itself upon the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, there were initially voices which questioned the need 
for such a policy. The liberal Westerners had argued that to deepen links with the 
Asiatic states would be simply holding back the transformation of Russian society 
into a modern, democratic and westernised system. Moscow's leadership should 
concentrate on protecting the border of the Russian Federation and seek to make it 
the last frontier of the Western world, a separate entity for the world of the East. 
By the end of 1996, such views were silenced in the Russian political elite, despite 
the continuing influence of Tubas on the Russian President. Instead, Primakov's 
pro-intergrationist views dominated Moscow's thinking and relations with its 
neighbours. 88 
Conclusion: balancing regional interests 
In the cases of both Turkey and Iran, Russia sought a policy of promoting stability. 
It strove to gain the Cupertino and goodwill of both countries mainly by increasing 
the level of economic interaction. Although differences existed with both 
countries, Moscow sought to resolve them through compromise and diplomatic 
channels rather than the tactics used by Stalin after the Second World War. This 
was not because it feared a Western backlash if it used more aggressive tactics, 
though there could have been a tough response, but because Stalin's failures and 
the experience of diplomacy since Khrushchev had taught Moscow that there was 
more to gain from Cupertino. 
Russian-Turkish relations had in some ways taken on the same characteristics as 
those that existed in the Soviet era, in which economic relations developed 
fruitfully while diplomatic relations were more tense. By the beginning of 1997, 
for example, while Turkish workers and businessmen were playing a very 
prominent part in rebuilding Russian cities, senior officials in Moscow were being 
blunt with the Ankara government over the missiles to Cyprus issue: "Tansu Ciller 
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can threaten to engage in aggression and Turkey can disregard international law, 
but we're going to fulfil the signed contract, and the use of methods involving 
force to pressure the Russian Federation will accomplish nothing. "" 
Iran and Russia seemed to be moving ever closer as the West began to cut itself off 
from the Tehran regime. In April 1997, the European Union abandoned the policy 
of `critical dialogue' with Iran. Russia's dilemma was to continue on good terms 
with Iran, reaping the economic rewards as well, without this being at the expense 
of its very important relations with the West. In 1996, Primakov had been 
generally successful in balancing the two conflicting interests, by arguing to the 
Western government that the effect of neglecting relations with Iran would be far 
more damaging to Russia than it would be for Europe or the United States because 
of the highly conspicuous geo-strategic factors. During his 1996 visit to Iran, the 
Russian Foreign Minister highlighted the significance of Cupertino with Iran in 
order to stabilise the existing wars in Tajikistan, Chechnia and between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. A letter from Yeltsin to his Iranian counterpart stressed the 
"strategic importance" of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the "urgency" for 
Cupertino between Moscow and Tehran. 90 
A broad political consensus developed in Moscow by 1996, which began to take 
shape from 1993, that Russia could not afford to ignore this strategically vital area, 
even if it was at the price of antagonising the United States. The pro-Western 
radicals were forced on the defensive on this issue, particularly in the light of the 
various conflicts in that region and the potential for more serious threats from a 
broader coalitions of forces. However, the extreme and pragmatic nationalist 
views were skilfully prevented from dominating foreign policy making by 
Primakov, who presented a more moderate stance. The Primakov policy insisted 
on the vital importance of relations with Iran on the one hand, as was evident from 
his visit to Tehran at the end of 1996, while on the other hand he attempted to 
justify the motive as not being directed towards the United States or any other 
power, but simply as a necessary response to possible threats to national interests. 
One Foreign Ministry view noted that the end of the Cold War did not necessarily 
mean the decline in value of the region for Moscow. In fact, "the new geopolitical 
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and geo-economical reality" resulted in Turkey and Iran being "more important for 
Russia than in the period of the Cold War. "91 
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
The following key conclusions regarding Russia's foreign policy in the period 1991- 
1996 can be drawn: `national' interests were for the first time in the history of Russia 
being promoted as a legitimate and absolutely necessary framework for conducting 
foreign policy; there was no longer a bipolar world, but one based upon regions of 
priority and interests; the Middle East region was one which had geo-strategic and 
economic value for Russia on its own merit, and not associated to the East-West 
conflict during the Cold War. Generally, Russia attributed different levels of priority 
for the countries of the Middle East, with Turkey, Iran and Iraq being regarded as the 
most valuable. Syria, Israel and Saudi Arabia were considered as being highly useful 
though they ranked below the former list. The Palestinian National Authority, 
Lebanon and Jordan were considered the least important, though it was believed to be 
practical to maintain good relations with them, as it was with all the countries of the 
Middle East, and the opportunity to enhance and promote economic links was given 
keen attention. Until the early 1970s, Egypt was at the core of Soviet policy in the 
region. After President Sadat switched to the Western Camp, Cairo was largely 
ignored by Moscow, particularly as Egypt became isolated in the Arab world for 
signing a peace treaty with Israel. 
Comparing the Middle East to other regions or countries which were important for 
Russia, clearly the United States, China, Europe, and the CIS ranked higher. But what 
developed in the five-year period after the Soviet Union collapsed was a realisation 
that the Middle East was of great importance, and that the undervaluing of that region 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an erroneous course to adopt. By the time 
Primakov was appointed Foreign Minister in early 1996, there was a much more active 
policy in the Middle East. 
A retrospective overview 
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Between 1945 and 1985, Soviet foreign policy was ostensibly guided by Marxist 
ideology but the dominant leaderships introduced differing nuances to Moscow's 
relations with the outside world. Stalin was set in the two-bloc world, where 
communism and capitalism could not be reconciled. Eastern Europe was vital for 
Stalin's strategic plans, but he sought to gain a foothold in both Turkey and Iran in the 
hope of securing the USSR's south-western flank. The United States under Truman 
refused to allow Moscow to fulfil its ambitions, in the light of the developing policy of 
`containment' of communist expansion. Moscow's demands for joint control of the 
Straits allowing entry and exit into and from the Black Sea were flatly rejected, as 
were demands for disputed territories. Likewise, Stalin sought to take advantage of 
the presence of Red Army troops in northern Iran to create Soviet puppet states. In 
both instances Moscow backed down simply because it did not have the resources or 
ability to become involved in another major war immediately after World War II. 
Stalin's bluffs were costly, leading to heightened suspicion and hostility from both Iran 
and Turkey. The latter was to consequently become a key member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an anti-Soviet military institution. Iran also became a 
loyal Western ally, for decades to come, as a direct result of fear of Soviet intentions 
following Stalin's actions. Beyond those countries, Stalin had little interest in the rest 
of the Middle East. He viewed the Arab monarchies as backwards and semi-colonies 
of the British and French empires. Stalin recognised the State of Israel in 1948 but 
soon afterwards changed his mind and a strong anti-Zionist campaign become 
predominant in the Soviet media and in foreign ministry statements. Stalin's 
recognition of Israel angered the Arab masses, which was heightened when 
Czechoslovakia sent a military shipment which enabled Israel's survival in the face of a 
united Arab attack. In sum, Stalin's lack of understanding of the region and his clearly 
unplanned actions led to one blunder after another in the Middle East in the last years 
of his rule. Effectively, Stalin had managed to offend and antagonise every single 
country in the Middle East between 1945 and 1953. 
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Khrushchev was left with the task of rectifying the mistakes made by Stalin, and to a 
large extent his overall record in the Middle East was a success. He altered the whole 
concept of foreign-policy making so that it ceased to focus on a two-bloc world. 
Khrushchev sought to take advantage of the newly independent Arab states, which 
were emerging from European domination, as part of his vision of a third force of a 
bloc of non-aligned countries which he believed would be hostile towards the West. 
Egypt became the focus of Soviet attention, particularly after the Suez Crisis when the 
British, French and Israeli plan attempted to undermine the radical new leader in 
Cairo, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and maintain Western control over the Suez Canal. 
Moscow's strong support for Cairo made it an instant champion of the Arab cause, 
and symbolically, the protector of the weak states against the powerful `imperialist' 
West. Billions of rubles of investment was poured into the Egyptian economy and a 
special relationship was founded between the elites of the two countries, reflected in 
the growing personal friendship between Khrushchev and Nasser. Yet there were 
serious problems beneath the surface. First and foremost was Nasser's ideological 
opposition to communism: he was an Arab nationalist and did not accept that class 
was the main basis of social development. 
When Nasser died in 1970, Brezhnev had consolidated his supreme leadership within 
the Soviet system. Soviet foreign policy under his direction took a noticeably more 
pragmatic approach, due to the recognition that countries such as Egypt could not 
become compliant communist allies. Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, had by 1974 
completely reoriented his country's allegiance by throwing out the thousands of Soviet 
technicians and advisers and made Cairo a key ally of the United States. Moscow had 
lost years of investment and substantial economic and financial resources because of 
the decision of one man. As Egyptian minutes of meetings between Sadat and the 
Soviet leadership revealed, mutual suspicions resulted in a tense relationship between 
1971 and 1972. Egyptian demands for more weapons and a greater Soviet 
commitment were met with a cold response from the Brezhnev triumvirate, which did 
not wish to fuel the volatile regional situation at the time. ' 
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This episode highlighted the need for Moscow to reassess its whole foreign policy 
approach which resulted in a new emphasis being placed on economic factors and 
tangible political returns. For this reason, countries such as Iraq became all the more 
valuable because of the oil factor. Baghdad replaced Cairo as the most important 
Middle East ally, despite the fact that it was ruled by the fiercely independent and 
unpredictable Saddam Hussein, who was bitterly opposed to communism. 
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union turned a blind eye to Ba'athist persecution of 
communists in Iraq for the sake of securing an ally in the Gulf. The significance of this 
shift was that the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was at the focus of Soviet foreign policy 
in the Middle East until the mid-1970s, became less important in the latter years of 
that decade. Indeed, there was only Syria which was ostensibly leading the Arab 
opposition to Israel, but it became clear to Soviet leaders that Syria was no more 
trustworthy as an ally than was Egypt. Damascus's involvement in the Lebanese civil 
war, against leftist and PLO forces, and growing contacts between Syrian and U. S. 
officials, seemed to indicate that Syria was more concerned about its own interests, 
which included gaining a profitable foothold in Lebanon, rather than an alliance with 
the Soviet bloc. 
In the late 1970s, there was a stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict which was 
increasingly to the detriment of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Gulf region was 
becoming a highly valuable arena for the two superpowers. The United States held a 
clear advantage there, with Iran and Saudi Arabia being traditional allies, but Iraq 
allowed the Soviet Union to have a foothold in the oil- rich region where a large share 
of the world's energy supplies were deposited. However, the deepening relationship 
with Iraq created a new set of problems for Moscow which were never properly 
resolved. First and foremost was trying to reconcile the support for Baghdad with 
seeking to establish good relations with Iran, which bordered the Soviet Union and 
was a major regional player. The most serious complication for Moscow arose when 
Iraq and Iran went to war with each other in 1980. Moscow's hopes of gaining 
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influence with the new Iranian regime were quickly dented upon the realisation that 
the radical Shi'ite leadership was vehemently anti-communist. 
For the last years under Brezhnev, and his two short-lived successors Andropov and 
Chernenko, Soviet foreign policy had stagnated in the Middle East. There were 
strained relations with all the major players, and no relations at all with either Israel or 
Saudi Arabia, the latter taking particular objection to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Only Syria attempted to create an atmosphere of co-operation with the 
Soviet Union, but that was because it was isolated in the region and was being accused 
by the West of being a major sponsor of terrorism. The Syrian government played up 
its `special relationship' with the Soviet Union and presented itself as a loyal client of 
the Soviet empire, signing the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1980. It was 
one of a few states in the region which did not condemn the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Yet in reality it was a friendship of convenience: the Soviet Union did 
not trust the Syrian leadership and the latter was well aware that the former could only 
provide a limited amount of help in its confrontation with Israel. From the Soviet 
viewpoint, it created a facade of continued influence and involvement in the region 
despite the reality being to the contrary. 
Gorbachev's foreign policy overhaul 
Although Gorbachev recognised the contradictions and weaknesses of Soviet foreign 
policy from early on, it took a few years before his New Thinking began to have real 
effect on the Middle East. The appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of 
Foreign Minister was central to Gorbachev's plans. Although the main task and 
priority for Moscow was directed towards Europe and the United States, the impact 
of Shevardnadze's foreign policy directives was to be greatly felt in the Middle East. 
As Moscow sought to avoid confrontation with Washington over the Middle East, it 
was therefore unsurprising when Syria was informed by the Soviet leadership that 
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Damascus would not be supported in its aim of achieving strategic parity with Israel. 
President Hafez Asad was told that negotiations would be the only hope for Syria to 
reclaim the land it had lost in 1967. The Soviet Union also informed the PLO that it 
could only justify providing continued political support to the Palestinian cause on the 
basis that the leadership encouraged the peace process and rejected terrorism as a 
means of achieving its nationalist aspirations. Concerning the Iran-Iraq conflict, 
Gorbachev ended the years of wavering by tilting in favour of Iraq. The motive behind 
this was the fact of Iraqi demands for a cease-fire while Iran was calling for `victory 
until death. ' The Khomeini regime had become so fanatical that thousands of 
volunteers, often children of fifteen and sixteen, were being used for mass suicide 
missions in order to achieve a military breakthrough. In the era of openness under 
Gorbachev, Moscow found it difficult to show support for such a regime which was 
closely associated with international terrorism, assassinations and hostage-taking. It 
was only after Khomeini's death and the succession of the more pragmatic Rafsanjani, 
in 1989, that it was possible for relations between the two countries to improve and 
eventually lead to genuine co-operation. 
Parallel to the policy of distancing Moscow from the hard-line regimes, Gorbachev 
adopted the radical position of establishing relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia. 
Gorbachev tackled the main obstacle in Israeli-Soviet relations by allowing Soviet 
Jews to emigrate. Such a move predictably incurred the wrath of Arabs because of the 
arrival of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews to settlements being built on occupied 
territories. Moscow persisted with this policy for two main reasons: First, because 
with the democratisation of Soviet society it became impossible to justify the refusal to 
allow ethnic and religious minorities the freedom to leave the country. Secondly, the 
United States had placed among its conditions for better relations with the Soviet 
Union that Moscow soften its tone of attacks on Israel at the United Nations and aid 
Israel in its programme to import Soviet Jews. But there was another dimension to 
Moscow's decision to resume ties with Israel: the Soviet Union's position as peace- 
broker was severely undermined by the absence of relations with one of the parties in 
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the dispute. Such conclusions fitted well with the overall theoretical perspective of 
New Thinking which argued that negotiations were the only viable options towards 
solutions, because in the modern age where weapons of mass destruction were 
widespread, war ceased to be an option. 
The Soviet Union also sought to establish relations with Saudi Arabia, another long- 
time adversary of Moscow in the Middle East. The Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan opened the way for negotiations but Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990 led to full relations being established because Riyadh needed Soviet support on 
the Security Council to condemn the actions of Saddam Hussein and allow the 
international community to create a military force to repel the aggression. From the 
Soviet viewpoint, establishing relations with Saudi Arabia was of great significance 
because it greatly increased Moscow's options in the Gulf region. 
Gorbachev also improved relations with Turkey, another important state in the region 
which played a key role in the coalition against Iraq, courtesy of the Nato bases there. 
Turgut Ozal, then Turkish President, welcomed many of the reforms introduced by 
Gorbachev and promoted the idea, in conjunction with Gorbachev, that Turkish-Soviet 
relations could be elevated to a higher level. Gorbachev was particularly keen to win 
Turkish support in the light of Soviet disintegration and instability in the Caucasus. In 
turn, Ozal hoped to open the way for Turkish investors to operate in the territories of 
the USSR, and to win Soviet backing over volatile issues in the Middle East, namely 
over the Kurdish issue and the long running territorial disputed between Ankara and 
Damascus. As if that wasn't enough to Syria's detriment, Moscow sought to improve 
its bilateral relations with Lebanon and overstep Syrian interference there. This was a 
clear signal to Damascus that Moscow did not support the 40,000-strong Syrian 
occupation of Lebanon, and that it wished to see the small Mediterranean state 
independent of outside control and allowed to develop its democratic traditions. 
Finally, as a final blow to the Syrian dictatorship Moscow placed more efforts into 
improving its relations with Jordan, another state hostile to the regime in Damascus. 
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Thus, when the Gorbachev era came to a close, and the Soviet Union became defunct, 
Moscow had inherited relations with all the countries of the Middle East, opening up 
possibilities which had never before existed in the history of the country. 
A new chapter in foreign-policy making 
The first five years under Yeltsin can be best characterised as an era for a new Russia 
setting about a new course for itself. In a rapidly changing world, the first task was to 
be familiar with the terminology which could act as sign-posts for policy-making. 
Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Posuvaliuk noted in one Arab daily that the Middle East 
was difficult to define, in the light of the geographic changes which were taking place 
in recent years. He pointed out that generally in Russia, the Middle East signified 
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, while the Near East encompassed all the countries from 
the Atlantic countries to the Gulf. 2 However, Posuvaliuk argued that this was based 
on a West European outlook, because Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan were further east 
than North Africa. Yet this was debatable, in his view, if one took Turkey as an 
example because "is it Near or Middle East and can it ignore its European link? "3 
The point being made by Posuvaliuk was that in the post-Soviet world, there were no 
longer clear-cut geographical divisions as was the case in the Cold War era. In the 
first year under Yeltsin, Moscow was dominated by so-called Atlanticists (even 
though Russia did not have a direct link with the Atlantic), who wanted to see their 
country as part of a broad coalition of `civilised nations' to the East and West of the 
Atlantic ocean. A more accurate description of those who espoused such a policy, 
radical pro-Westerners, replaced the term Atlanticist. The `Atlanticist-Eurasianist' 
debate4 was too much of a simplification for the subtle differences and nuances 
between various groups and policies. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who was at the 
vanguard of the pro-Western radicals in 1992, appeared to accept existing political 
realities both internally and in international affairs, and adopted the policies of 
pragmatic pro-Westerners. Between 1994 and 1995 this position appeared to reflect 
the general line of the government and its leader, Viktor Chemomyrdin. Co-operation 
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with the West remained a top priority, but Russia became more explicit about its great 
power status and certain spheres of influence, namely the CIS, were seen as 
necessitating direct intervention. 
In fact, the Russian leadership was far more subtle and pragmatic than it appeared to 
be. Although initially wavering, a steady course was mapped out, culminating in the 
appointment of Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister at the beginning of 1996. The 
final destination of this course of the state was a pragmatic, national foreign policy as 
was normal for any great power to have. The idealism and messianism of the 
Gorbachev era and early period when Kozyrev was Foreign Minister was replaced by 
themes such as realism, stability and predictability. Primakov elucidated this policy by 
adopting a centrist-pragmatic-nationalist policy. He criticised those in his country who 
espoused a return to confrontation with the West, rejecting theorists who argued that 
Russia was an Eastern power whose needs were incompatible with Western interests. 
Yet at the same time he did not accept the arguments of the pro-Western radicals that 
Russia should cut all its losses in Asia and the Middle East for the sake of appeasing 
the West. Instead, Primakov proposed that Russia needed to look at each problem 
and each situation separately and act in accordance with Russian national interests. 
When interests collided, as they often do in politics as in life, a list of priorities was 
available to guide the country's foreign policy on a steady course towards achieving its 
goals. Relations with the United States remained as the top priority, in terms of 
avoiding a return to confrontation with its old adversary. China was also very high on 
the list of Russian interests, again because it was a potentially dangerous enemy. The 
Middle East was not as highly regarded as the two countries mentioned, but it was 
nonetheless important enough for Moscow not to ignore. From 1993, there was a 
discernible and increasing re-entry into the region so that by 1996 there were distinct 
lines marking out the differences between Russia and the United States over various 
issues concerning the Middle East. 
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There were five strands of views characterising the foreign policy debate by the mid- 
1990s: the pro-Western radicals, pragmatic pro-Westerners, centrist-nationalists, 
pragmatic nationalists and extreme nationalists. By 1994, Russian foreign policy was 
still in a state of transition, shifting between the pragmatic pro-Western position and 
the centrist position. The centrists were typified by Primakov, then head of the SVR, 
who argued that in principle there was no reason for Russia not to co-operate with the 
West. At the same time, Primakov argued that Russia had a right to pursue its 
interests and defend its national security even if airing such concerns unsettled Western 
governments. The key, according to centrist-nationalists, was that such differences 
could be discussed and negotiated with the West so that acceptable compromises 
could be reached. 
The centrist argument regarding relations with the West was fairly similar to the 
pragmatic pro-Westerners, but there was a difference in emphasis. The pragmatic pro- 
Westerners placed more value on the need to co-operate with the West, thus their 
bartering position appeared to be weakened as a result. Kozyrev and his ever- 
dwindling group of supporters became too closely associated with the Western 
position because they basically argued that there was no alternative for Russia other 
than to accept Western superiority in the bartering process, and that Moscow had 
simply to get the best available deal that was possible to attain. Whether such an 
assessment was correct or not, Russia's political elite could not accept such a premise 
for making foreign policy because it was incompatible with the national aspirations of 
any large state. 
The pragmatic nationalist view was characterised by the chief opponents of the Yeltsin 
leadership, the Communist Party and its leader Gennadii Ziuganov. (Others, such as 
Margot Light, refer to this group as Fundamentalist Nationlists, implying a greater 
intransigence in their policies regarding relations with the West. ) They considered 
Russia to be a great power, and that it had the potential to resume its role as a joint 
superpower because it had all the resources it needed. Therefore, Moscow had to 
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concentrate on its own interests which included the eventual reintegration of the 
former Soviet Union, a more assertive policy regarding Eastern Europe, and the 
restoration of alliances with Eastern powers such as China, India, Iran and Iraq. 
Moreover, the pragmatic nationalists argued that rather than wait in hope for Western 
handouts, Russia could have a sizeable income from arms sales and trade with 
countries such as Iraq and Iran, which the United States was opposed to. The extreme 
nationalists, represented by Zhirinovskii, did believe that Russia should go to war in 
order to reclaim the Soviet empire and beyond. Such views, it must be emphasised, 
had zero influence with the Russian government, and they were not taken very 
seriously with the Russian population as a whole. But the Western media in particular 
did seem to relish the possibility of using such sensational headlines and there was a 
constant hint that should the democratic experiment fail in Russia, then Zhirinovskii 
was a dangerous alternative. To some extent, Yeltsin deviously manipulated Western 
and domestic fears by arguing the same thing. 
Primakov's vision of the world in 1996 was that it had changed into something less 
clear-cut than the days of the superpower confrontation. There were no longer 
obvious enemies, and alliances were more likely to change according to different 
issues and situations. In this new multipolar world, Russia's opportunities could be 
greatly enhanced because of the possibility of joining with other powers to have a 
bearing on various situations. Primakov accepted that on its own, Russia did not have 
the ability to change events in the Middle East, but working closely and co-operating 
with France, the EU in general, or China could serve as a strong counterbalance to 
U. S. domination. France, in particular, was allied with Russia against the United 
States in calling for the sanctions against Iraq to be eased. President Jacques Chirac 
also announced in late December 1996 that France would pull out its aircraft from the 
northern Iraqi no-fly zone. 6 
In terms of international relations theory, Neorealists argued that this fluid 
international situation could have led to new dangers which were contained in the 
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order of the bipolar world during the Cold War; Moscow's changing policy after 1991 
was within this context of thinking. The latter years of the Kozyrev period rejected 
the idealism of `interdependence' theories and under Primakov foreign policy was 
made from the Neorealist premise that `good fences make good neighbours. '' In the 
post-Gulf War period in the Middle East, the United States stamped its authority in the 
region without much resistance. From Moscow's perspective, the challenge was to re- 
establish its parameters of interests and influence without overtly challenging U. S. 
boundaries in the region. In principle, Primakov did not object to the idea of co- 
operating with the United States in the Middle East, as was often the case regarding 
various issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli talks. However, Washington's policies in 
the Middle East became ever-more intransigent against Russian interests as well as 
Arab interests and increasingly supportive of Israeli policies. The situation was 
aggravated by the election of Benyamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister in the spring of 
1996. 
When Moscow criticised the Israeli government's undermining of the peace process, 
and Washington's unwillingness to condemn these actions, it was not because Russia 
had become more hard-line but because events on the ground ran contrary to its 
principles and interests. In reality, Russia's position was not too different from France 
or the rest of Europe. Primakov and his European counterparts believed that Israeli 
violation of international agreements and Washington's compliance would serve to 
undermine stability in the region, which was in the long term not in the interest of all 
the parties concerned. Likewise, on the issue of sanctions against Iraq, Russia and 
France were in agreement that the U. S. position had gone beyond the U. N. mandate. 
The pragmatism of Russia's foreign policy dictated that the punishment must fit the 
crime, and where Iraq was adhering to what the international community was 
demanding from it sanctions should be eased to show reward to the regime in 
Baghdad. Both France and Russia felt that the United States was deliberately blocking 
their chance of capitalising on multi-billion dollar reconstruction deals with Iraq once 
the sanctions were lifted. 
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National interests and the Middle East 
Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma, 
wrote in 1995 on behalf of the generally pro-Western Yabloko party wrote in 1995: 
"It is necessary not to become trapped in confrontation with the larger Islamic 
countries such as Iran and to look for possibilities for agreements and bilateral profits 
in inter-state relations. At the same time it is necessary to give a firm repulse to 
attempts to limit our economic, political and military interests from the side of Turkey, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. "8 It is perhaps interesting to compare the comments in the 
same Foreign Ministry journal by the spokesman for the Liberal Democratic Party. 
Aleksei Mitrofanov wrote that it was necessary to take into account "the expansionist 
policy of Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia which puts Russian strategic 
interest under a serious threat. "9 
It was thus natural that the Middle East was divided into three main categories. The 
first included Iran and Turkey, namely because they bordered the CIS, they were non- 
Arab, and they were seen as fairly serious risks to regional security. They also had a 
degree of influence over the leaderships of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey 
was especially important because it controlled the Straits which allowed entry into the 
Black Sea, which was crucial for Russian trade and military security and because it 
played a pivotal role in the Nato alliance. Russia's main aim was to limit the influence 
of its rivals and re-impose its influence over the so-called arc of instability, which 
ranged from the Eastern borders of China to the Black Sea. Lukin argued that "Russia 
is the largest Eurasian power with many years of experience with the Muslim and 
Eastern civilisations. It is in our interest to influence the global balance of power and 
turn it to our good... "10 The war in Chechnia served to underline the crucial 
importance of the Caucasus region, taking into consideration the huge financial and 
human losses incurred. Russian involvement in Tajikistan also showed that Central 
Asia was an area which Moscow would not allow to come under the domination of 
other powers. 
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In the first two years after the demise of the Soviet Union, it was widely believed that 
Iran would pose the most serious threat to Russian interests in the Muslim states while 
Turkey was expected to be more pragmatic and compliant. By 1996 the reverse 
seemed to be true, with Iran co-operating over a number of issues, including the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, the status of the Caspian Sea and Tajikistan. Turkey, on 
the other hand, was not openly defying Russia but it was less co-operative on many 
issues than Moscow would have hoped. Those most opposed to Russian domination, 
whether they were in Chechnia, Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan, appeared to be getting 
more sympathy from Ankara than Moscow would have liked. There was a fear in 
Russia, which extreme nationalists took to paranoia, that Turkey was part of a Nato 
conspiracy to surround Russia with hostile forces to ensure that it would be 
permanently weakened and unable to expand its influence. This was in the context of 
the growing argument between Russia and the West about plans to expand Nato into 
Eastern Europe. 
Iran's potential as a firm ally was thus raised, being one of a few neighbours of the 
former Soviet Union which was not Western oriented and which could provide Russia 
with an ally to the Gulf But Russia's role in the construction of a nuclear power 
station in Bushehr was to cause friction with the United States, which claimed that 
certain components would allow the Iranians to convert the nuclear energy from 
peaceful purposes to more militaristic aims. The Russians and Iranians strongly denied 
this but the issue became a matter of principle as far as Moscow and Washington were 
concerned. The U. S. government argued that if Russia wanted to be a part of the 
Western family, it had to refrain from large-scale economic and military aid to 
governments which were hostile to Western interests. Moscow retorted that Russia 
had a right to conduct its diplomatic and international economic policy independently 
of outside criticisms and that it alone knew where its best national interests lay. 
Moscow went ahead with the nuclear project, albeit after compromising on some 
aspects of the deal to ease Western fears. The consequence of the episode was to 
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reconfirm that Russian interests were very often not likely to be compatible with 
Western interests, particularly in the Middle East, and that by 1996 new terms would 
have to be established which differed from those which existed in the first year when 
Kozyrev was Foreign Minister. When in April 1997 the European Community 
downgraded its links with Iran following further evidence of Iranian terrorist activities, 
the prospect of "comprehensive co-operation" between Tehran and Moscow was 
being promoted on both sides. " 
Relations with the Arabian Gulf countries were of great importance to Moscow, but 
these countries did not have a direct geo-strategic bearing on Russia in the way Iran 
and Turkey did. Iraq was a long-standing ally which was a major arms purchaser and 
which offered huge economic potential. President Yeltsin was throughout the first five 
years in office adamant that Russia would comply with the U. N. -imposed sanctions on 
Iraq. He stressed that that Russia was a law-abiding country which respected 
decisions of international institutions such as the United Nations, despite the economic 
and diplomatic damage which was incurred. That in itself did not mean that Moscow 
would accept that the decision was fair, and from 1993 there was a deliberate effort to 
regain the trust of the regime in Baghdad and to try to convince Washington to ease 
the sanctions. Moscow's policy of seeking to end the sanctions was supported by a 
broad political spectrum, which included many reformers including Anatolii Chubais 
and Boris Nemtsov, who in July 1997 declared that Russia would propose the lifting 
of the embargo on Iraqi oil when the subject was to be raised at the U. N. Security 
Council in October 1997.12 
The Saudi case was equally fiustrating to Russia but in a different way to that of Iraq. 
The oil-rich kingdom was presented as a symbol of Russia's new world outlook as it 
was one of the countries with which relations were established as a result of New 
Thinking. Yet Moscow was to discover that U. S. influence over Riyadh was too great 
to be able to make a genuine breakthrough. The Saudis were committed to buying 
U. S. arms, to give the U. S. priority in trade, industrial and financial projects, and 
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Washington held the final word in regional matters as well. Although the Saudi 
government would have probably preferred a more influential Russia in local affairs to 
provide an alternative to their dependence on the United States, the government in 
Washington had discouraged Riyadh from attracting too much attention from 
Moscow. By 1996, the Russian government had to be content with accepting that 
there was only a limited potential to be gained from Saudi Arabia and grudgingly 
conceded the right of way to the United States. 
The third and final category of Russian interests in the Middle East included Israel and 
its neighbours which were involved in the peace process opened at the Madrid 
Conference in 1991. Russia placed high value on relations with Israel because they 
symbolised the transformation from the Soviet era, when the Jewish state was high on 
the list of enemies. On the trade-economic level, Israel quickly rose to become one of 
the most important partners in the region. However, on the political level many 
difficulties remained. The complications arose not because of Moscow's intentions 
but rather as a result of various Israeli actions, such as the bombing of Lebanon, the 
building of settlements on occupied land, or the destruction of Arab homes. Russia's 
policy regarding the peace process was that Israel should negotiate all existing 
differences with its neighbours before making any decisions which might inflame the 
situation on the ground. Israel, in turn, had been blunt in telling Moscow not to 
interfere in affairs over which it had no real influence. This Israeli attitude led to 
growing resentment in Russian circles and a genuine popular rejection of what was 
perceived as an example of arrogance by the Jewish state towards Moscow. At the 
same time, relations with the Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians and Lebanese steadily 
improved. In early 1997, Primakov declared that relations with the Arab states were 
"strategic" and Moscow would play a bigger role in resolving regional problems. " 
Relations with the Palestinians, Jordanians and Lebanese were not of great importance 
to Russia, though for the sake of appearances, Moscow constantly issued statements 
giving its view of the progress (or lack of) made in the peace process. Syria was 
slightly more important because it had been a Soviet ally for many decades and it was 
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highly dependent on Russian arms to replace and update its existing military machine. 
But Russia was keen to convince Damascus to repay the $9 billion debt that had been 
owed to the Soviet Union. Syria had been unhelpful on the issue of repayment, partly 
because it wanted guarantees that once Russia had received what it was owed, it 
would not abandon its long-time ally. But Russia wanted more from relations with 
Syria than the repayment of debts: the Russian leadership wanted to play a meaningful 
role in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations over the Golan Heights, and Moscow believed 
that its influence in Damascus would allow it to do so. Success on this track would 
not only have restored national pride and international prestige, but it was also seen as 
important in terms of balancing U. S. domination in this strategically important region. 
The grey lines of Russia's policy 
Naturally, the divisions in priority listed above were not distinct and many dilemmas 
were unresolved by the end of the first five year period. The most complicated task 
for Moscow was one which haunted the Soviet Union throughout the 1980s, and it 
was how to create a harmonious policy relating to Iran and Iraq. The two countries 
were highly valued by Russia and were perceived as important allies with a growing 
importance for the future. Yet the two countries were vehemently antagonistic 
towards each other, and when Moscow became too close to Iraq, Iran became hostile 
and vice versa. It would have been in Russia's interest for Iran, Iraq and Syria to form 
an alliance in agreement with Moscow. In late-June 1997 improved relations between 
the three Middle East countries forced Moscow to issue a denial that it had been 
actively working for this end, although it admitted that it did not discourage such a 
development. 14 This would have been a nightmare scenario for the United States and 
its two most important allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Regarding Iran, 
Moscow endeavoured to strengthen its ties while the West was gradually distancing 
itself from the regime in Tehran. Moscow justified this by arguing that Iran was more 
important for Russia than it was for Europe and the United States because it bordered 
the territories of the CIS. But Russia's relations with Iran also had a negative effect 
on relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and to some extent Lebanon. All four 
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countries perceived Iran to be a major threat to stability in the region because it was 
believed to be embarking on a nuclear weapons project which was near completion. 
Moscow's counter-argument was that it was not doing anything to help Iran prepare 
nuclear weapons as it was not in its interest to have a medium-sized yet unstable 
nuclear power on the doorstep of the CIS. 
Russian policy in the Middle East centred around basic aims in the region: to ensure 
stability in the region, to minimalize U. S. influence, and to allow fair access to trade 
and general economic relations. From the point of view of national interests, such 
aims were rational and did not much differ in their competitiveness from the way that 
France, Britain or the United States pursued their interests in the region. It would 
have been naive to expect a great power such as Russia to abandon the defence of its 
national interests. However, Moscow's top officials also stressed that this did not 
mean a return to the past. Writing in Al Hayat, Deputy Foreign Minister Posuvaliuk 
responded to Arab critics who were suggesting that Russia was a mere shadow of the 
Soviet Union in terms of its commitment to the region. "First of all, " he retorted 
"Russia is not the Soviet Union. " It was necessary for those set in the old mentality to 
realise that "we are completely unable, and unwilling at this moment to export large 
quantities of weapons or provide easy credits knowing that they would not be repaid. 
It should be reminded that such actions represents the direct `grabbing' from the 
pockets of the Russian people, who are enduring many hardships. These people will 
thus demand to know the purpose of such donations. "" At the same time, it was 
regularly emphasised by the Russian Foreign Ministry from as early as 1993 that while 
foreign policy had to be made and pursued responsibly, "it is clear that it is not in 
Russia's interest to stay away from Middle East affairs and from participation in the 
day to day political and diplomatic events of the region"16 
A school of thought emerged in the West which interpreted the changes in Russian 
foreign policy since 1993 as heading down the path of assertive nationalism. This 
concept of Russia First "acknowledges that Russia is a Eurasian entity and not merely 
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European... The honeymoon with the West and the period of close emulation dating 
back to Peter the Great, is over. "" However, the research of this work points toward 
a new set of conclusions: primarily, that the debates of whether Russia will revert to 
Soviet/imperial aggressive policies, or about the pro-Western-Eurasian schism, or the 
danger of a new form of Russian ethno-nationalism's did not match the realities of the 
period between 1991-1996. The rise of nationalism, and the rise of a national foreign 
policy, did not automatically imply a threat to the world order. "The national mission 
can be benign: it can be defensive toward outsiders and focused on improving 
collective welfare, maintaining the territorial status quo, and strengthening internal 
cohesion and unity. "19 By using the Middle East as an example, this thesis has sought 
to show Russian foreign policy had clearly in its first five years pursued its national 
interests in terms of countering the unipolarist ambitions of the United States and 
promoting multipolarism with the purpose of achieving a higher level of international 
harmony. This `national' policy also drove Moscow to pursue with greater purpose 
the economic and geo-strategic challenges which the Middle East offered and posed. 
1 Classified Arabic transcripts of minutes of meetings between President Sadat and the Soviet 
leadership, including Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Gromyko, Grechko (Defence Minister), and 
Ponomarev (Head of the CC International Department). 
2 Viktor Posuvaliuk, "Alsharqan al-Awsat wa al-Adna'... min nafizah fi mosko" (The Near and 
Middle Easts... From a Window in Moscow), A1-Flayat, No. 12418,27 February 1997, p. 17. 
3 Ibid 
4 see Francis Fukuyama, "The Ambiguity of National Interests" and Sergei Stankevich "Toward a 
New National Idea", in Rethinking Russian's National Interests, Stephen Sestanovich (ed), 
Washington, 1994. 
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were of great help. A word of thanks to Sami Amara, Moscow Bureau Chief 
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the workings of the press and diplomatic networks in Moscow facilitated my 
work while I was staying there. 
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